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Prologue
This book grows out of, and indeed connects to, previous
efforts (Reiter 2009; Nef and Reiter 2009). Its realization would have been
impossible without the support I have received from the Desigualdades Network of the Free University of Berlin. I am very grateful for the support
they have given me and want to express my sincere thanks, especially to
Prof. Sergio Costa. My time in Berlin and the dialogues I had with fellows,
students, postdocs, and faculty have proven invaluable and allowed me to
push my thoughts forward in significant ways. I am also indebted and very
grateful for the critical and constructive comments I have received on earlier
versions of several chapters of this book from Manuela Boatcă, Mitchell
Glodek, Ulrich Oslender, Sergio Costa, Katherine Lebow, and Eric Wolters.
Finally, I want to thank my home institution, USF, especially my director,
Rachel May, and my chair, Mohsen Milani, for allotting me the time and
freedom necessary to finish this book. Thanks!
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Introduction
Philosophers have only interpreted the world in
various ways; the point is to change it.
—Karl Marx, 1845

The central theme of this book is autonomy and self-rule. It
focuses on those sites, historical and geographical, where people have taken
up the banner of self-rule and established democratic systems. As soon
as they have done so—and this is the thread weaving together the different
stories here told—they had to face the adversary of those who had something to lose, namely, their own power and their privileges. At the same time
that this book tells the story of autonomy and self-rule, it also tells the story
of the defense of privilege, of exclusion and second-class citizenship, because
one story cannot adequately be told without the other.
Democracy, understood here in the strong sense, that is, as the strife
to rule oneself and achieve autonomy, never “came about”—it was always
fought for. In the same way, it never “vanished” or “withered away”; it was
taken away, dismantled, or weakened by those who had something to lose
from self-rule. The ways to establish democracy were as cunning as the ways
to weaken and destroy it—and this book takes a closer look at how exactly
this epic struggle played out, and still plays out, in different parts of the
world. It focuses on the efforts of specific groups to establish self-rule and
democracy, and it analyzes how their efforts were met by those I call “the
included,” that is, the privileged who tend to benefit from the exclusion of
others (Nef and Reiter 2009).
It is important to highlight that this book grows out of praxis—my
own praxis as someone working for and thus concerned with democracy,
self-determination, power, democracy, and autonomy—both my own and
those of others. Starting from praxis, I contend, makes all the difference.
What follows is done in an effort to think through—and offer tools to
xi
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analyze—some of the most central problems and questions of my life and, I
would think, the lives of many others. How to be free? How to achieve more
justice and autonomy? How to recognize the maneuvers of the privileged to
undo the efforts of the excluded to attain these goals? Hence also: How to
improve the democracies we live in? Behind all these questions stands the
will to address shortcomings and offer tools for improvement. This is at the
same time easier and harder than it seems. It is easy because to achieve such
practical goals, we do not need most of the extremely complicated, cryptic,
and lofty theories offered by some of the “recognized thinkers” of our day.
Most problems we have are not that complicated, after all, and it rather
seems that some of “our” thinkers and writers artificially complicate issues
in order to mystify them, instead of elucidating them. Some also seem
more motivated to add to their own prestige (and positions/salaries) than
to offer usable tools to all those who could actually benefit from such analyses. Most of academic life has become a sort of vanity fair of exalted egos
whose central aim seems to be to flatter themselves by inventing ever-more
sophisticated proposals and languages (attend a random academic conference to verify). It might indeed even be, as Cornelius Castoriadis thought,
that “we live in a period of appalling ideological regression among the literati” (Castoriadis 2001: 24). This trend also complicates this book, because
it forces me to navigate through, and combine wherever possible, different
languages in an act to translate the useful, decipher the cryptic, highlight
the helpful, and in the midst of all of this, explain my own thinking.
Luckily, I have found in the work of Greek philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–1997) a strong ally in this endeavor. His work on autonomy
has allowed me to sharpen my gaze and, if you will, “keep the eye on the
prize.” I share Castoriadis’s starting position and focus on autonomy, and his
definition of autonomy sets the tone for my efforts as well:
But what does “autonomy” signify? Autos: oneself; nomos: law. The person who
gives herself her own laws is autonomous. (Not, The person who does whatever
comes into her head, but rather, The person who gives herself laws.) Now, that is
immensely difficult. For an individual, to give oneself one’s own law, within the
fields in which this is possible, requires the ability to hold one’s own in the face
of all conventions, beliefs, fashion, learned people who maintain absurd ideas,
the media, the silence of the public, and so forth. And for a society, to give
itself its own law means to accept at bottom the idea that it is creating its own
institution, and that it creates that institution without being able to invoke any
extrasocial foundation, any norm of norms, any measure of its measures. This
therefore boils down to saying that such a society should itself decide what is
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just and unjust—and this is the question with which true politics deals (we are
obviously not talking here about the politics of the politicians who occupy the
stage today) (Castoriadis 1985: 158).

However, even if I follow Castoriadis in many of his analyses and critiques and share his preoccupation with autonomy and self-rule, I do not
share his assessment of the Greco-Roman-Western path as a unique one.
Even though it does seem that this path has thoroughly colonized the world
(Chakrabarty 2000), I simply do not know enough about the world in order
to make, or support, such a statement. Making this sort of argument is not
my aim here. This book, too, focuses on democratic Athens as the place
where self-rule was first documented, but this focus is due to the availability
of sources and does not imply that similar experiments were not undertaken
elsewhere. It then focuses on other contested historical sites of struggle for
self-rule, namely the Roman Republic, medieval Italian city-states, and
postrevolutionary France. The struggle for autonomy and self-rule is, however, not historical—it continues to be fought today, as the struggles in
Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Palestine, fought while I am writing this
book, amply testify. To capture the different struggles for self-rule and to
analyze the ways in which, and why, these efforts are blocked and contained
by elites and their allies, I have included four contemporary cases, namely,
France, Portugal, Colombia, and Brazil.
Those cases are selected because they are particularly telling and thus
allow us to gain exceptionally deep insights into the dynamics of this struggle
for self-rule. Chapter 1 will elaborate further on the methodology applied
here, which is one of exploration. Here, it is important to highlight that all
those marching, and willing to die, for democracy in the past and today
do so not to establish a system where one sort of ruler is substituted for
another, even if elected. “Elite democracy,” as it has been called, is not what
the idea of democracy promises. It promises self-rule (Mansbridge 1980).
Similarly, at the heart of the disappointment many experience worldwide
with their own established democracies lies a lack of self-rule, which means
a lack of active citizenship. Passive citizenship, second-class citizenship, or
exclusion from citizenship altogether while being an effective resident in a
democratic country, all contribute to alienation from politics, from government, from the state, and even, as I shall show, from “the political” itself,
so that whole generations of people living in established democracies seem
disinterested in it.1 Why should they be interested in it if nothing seems at
stake for them? The leaders they elect do nothing to allow self-identification
with them and their issues (and if they do, it never seems genuine). Self-rule
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cannot be delegated. According to Castoriadis, “The project of autonomy
itself is certainly not finished. But its trajectory during the last two centuries
has proved the radical inadequacy, to say the least, of the programmes in
which it had been embodied—be it the liberal republic or Marxist–Leninist
‘socialism.’ That the demonstration of this inadequacy in actual historical
fact is one of the roots of present political apathy and privatization hardly
needs stressing. For the resurgence of the project of autonomy, new political
objectives and new human attitudes are required” (Castoriadis 2001: 26).
I agree. The current (2011–2012) political events filling our newspapers,
from the Arab Spring to the Tea Party, all suggest a profound discontent
with the ways “democracy” has come to be understood and practiced. The
minimal common denominator seems to be that many citizens have lost
their trust in the political system, perceiving that politicians do not truly
represent us and/or that they do not represent us truthfully. Rather, they
act as elites, in their own interests, or in the interests of the most powerful
stakeholders—in most cases big corporations. As representation is in crisis,
the whole democratic system evokes discontent and mistrust. In short: the
practice of citizenship needs rethinking and reorientation.
The most prevalent strategy to uphold elitism has been to shift the
core discussions rightfully pertaining to self-rule out of the political realm
into the administrative or legal realms, and to transform citizenship from
a political practice to a set of legal rights and administrative rules. Citizenship has been thoroughly legalized and “commodified,” in the words of
John Pocock (1995)—that is, transformed from a political practice into
a legal concept without many teeth. At the same time, in almost all contemporary democracies, democracy came to mean elite rule, exercised and
upheld through representation. Self-rule, the original idea behind democracy, was practiced in but a few places, for relatively short periods of time,
and it was always opposed vehemently because of its radicalism. And radical it is, as the idea of ruling oneself does not go with many of the things
we have come to accept as fitting under the label “democracy.” Such ideas
as democratic representation and citizenship as a legal status clearly are at
odds with what Athenian citizens, the burghers of Pisa and Lucca, and the
French revolutionaries wanted. They are also at odds with what the citizens
of Egypt want today, as well as with what the excluded and second-class citizens of Portugal, Colombia, and Brazil want and expect from their already
established democratic systems. They all want a voice and an active say in
the molding of their lives. They want self-rule, autonomy, and justice—not
a system of elected and corrupt, or corrupted, elites. In other words, they
want true citizenship. But what is true citizenship? What does it look like?
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How has it been achieved, and what can we learn from where it has failed?
With these questions, the focus of this book is defined. I set out to analyze
the struggles for autonomy and self-rule, and to dissect the opposing forces
and strategies that block its advancement.
I have found the most fruitful way to achieve this by focusing on the
relationships that link citizenship to exclusion, and on the struggles and
processes that constitute the field in between citizenship and exclusion—
that is, the struggles of those who seek self-rule, autonomy, justice, and
democracy, and those who oppose them for the sake of defending their own
privileges. In other words, I have found it helpful to think of the relationship between inclusion and exclusion in and from citizenship as one that is
dialectical, where one constitutes and conditions the other. This argument
at once constitutes the unit of analysis of this entire book—namely, the
space, or maybe the field of tension, that emerges between the two poles of
citizenship and exclusion.2 This focus also gives the book its title.
To demonstrate the fruitfulness of this analysis, the empirical analysis
presented here starts where citizenship itself started—at least where we think
and know it started, namely, in classical Athens. From there, I shall follow
the development and expansion of citizenship and democracy and thus analyze the Roman Republic, medieval city republics, and postrevolutionary
France. All these are obvious places to look in this genealogy of citizenship,
even though they are certainly not the only ones, and I do not want to
claim that the European experience is superior to another. To the contrary,
this book adds to the effort to “provincialize Europe” (Chakrabarty 2000)
by offering a critical analysis of what has been called the “Western democratic tradition” and showing its inherent limitations and contradictions. To
fully achieve this, this book also includes a discussion of three contemporary
cases, namely, Portugal, Brazil, and Colombia.
It is at this point important to explain that my aim in this book is to offer
an approach that contributes to unveiling the common thread that brings
all the cases discussed here together, namely, the dynamics that produce
different forms of exclusion and block the achievement of more autonomy,
self-rule, and hence genuine democracy. I should also explain that even
though my aim is practical, the work presented here is firmly rooted in the
social sciences, offering theory-driven explanations of social reality. Thus,
even though I present and use historical information, this work aims not
at contributing to the production of historical knowledge. In fact, none of
the historical evidence presented here is new, and it is taken almost entirely
from already published work. I am not aiming to present new facts, but
new explanations about facts and thus new, fruitful, and innovative ways to
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look at facts and reality. This is, I want to argue, all that honest social science can and thus should do. In my mind, any heuristic claims beyond are
ill-begotten and misleading and ultimately responsible for the lack of systematic knowledge production in the social sciences. Given that this claim
is controversial, I have dedicated some space to elaborating it. Chapter 1
discusses these issues in some detail, and by doing so it lays out the epistemological and methodological foundations for this book. However, chapter
1 is relevant beyond the cases of this book. It stands on its own and can
be read separately and taken as a general discussion on the epistemology,
theory, and methodology of the social sciences. It is of especial interest to
all those interested in qualitative, explorative research, as I seek to provide a
rationale for explorative research in general.
Citizenship—or better, the reality represented by it—can be analyzed
in many different ways. This book sets out to focus on its inherent tensions and contradictions, and on the ways different people and groups have
sought to uphold and defend their citizens’ rights against others. By doing
this, a sort of genealogy of exclusion and second-class citizenship slowly
emerges as the books moves from one empirical case to the next. The analytical framework chosen makes it appear as if citizenship was never only
about status and belonging to a specially delimited community, as T. H.
Marshall (1950) has argued, but always also about setting oneself apart from
others and thus defining and constituting one’s rights in contrast to others’
non-rights and duties. I deliberately chose to say “this framework makes it
appear this way” because, as I shall seek to demonstrate in chapters 1 and
2, the theoretical framework applied to an empirical reality will influence
and distort what we see—even make us blind to some aspects of that same
reality that we would otherwise see had we chosen a different theoretical
framework (Whorf and Carroll 1964; Davidson 1974; Lakoff 2009). This,
of course, leaves us in a predicament if we aim at explaining “the” reality, or
“all” reality. I shall avoid this claim and instead explain “a” reality, one that I
find important to also consider when reading the important and influential
work of such authors as T. H. Marshall (1950), Margaret Somers (1993),
Ensing Isin (2000, 2008), Ayelet Shachar (2009), Joseph Tulchin and Meg
Ruthenberg (2007), and many others—all of whom have done much to
explain what citizenship is and how it was experienced by different peoples
at different times.
The reality I want to further elucidate here is one hiding behind the
legal category of citizenship. I am interested in exploring how citizenship
is lived, experienced, imagined, and performed in people’s everyday lives,
and how these performances reflect back on the identities of those having to
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negotiate, defend, and uphold their status of rightfully belonging, as well as
how they impact, influence, and qualify the democratic regimes that have
citizenship as their cornerstones. This choice restricts the domain of this
book to democracies and citizens, and thus excludes non-democracies and
noncitizens from the realm dealt with here.
Furthermore, this kind of approach is akin to the one applied by
Benedict Anderson (2006), who takes nationalism as an “anthropological
category” (Anderson 2006: 6) and is thus able to analyze how nationalism
is enacted and experienced. Similarly, I seek to explore what it means to
be a citizen, and how different people and groups flesh out its meaning in
their mutual and daily interactions, as well as their interactions with governments and states, thus investing it with concreteness. As stated above,
the most fruitful way to achieve this is by focusing on the field of tension created by citizenship’s inherent contradictions and its relationship to
exclusion.
Hence, this book aims to contribute. It aims to add to our understanding of what citizenship means and has meant, and it aims to add to the
knowledge that other scholars have already produced in this field. It does
not aim to substitute for or replace that knowledge. Social science, conducted honestly, as I shall argue in chapter 1, should steer away from such
totalitarian claims and position itself in a more humble fashion, because
as social scientists, we seek to explain an ever-changing reality that is constantly explained and categorized by different actors who do not share the
same angle or approach to reality, thus producing different, divergent, and
even contradictory readings and understandings, all of which have a tendency to become reified and even institutionalized (Brubaker 2004; Berger
and Luckmann 1966). This tendency complicates the production of reliable knowledge about social reality tremendously, as all social facts are
indeed laden with meaning, thus escaping an unmediated and simple, or
straightforward, comprehension. In other words, social reality is composed
of material things that are woven into linguistic and symbolic acts from
which they cannot be pulled apart, because they indeed only become reality
through this interwovenness. What some social scientists call “realism” is
indeed a sort of epistemological and ontological naiveté about the stuff that
reality is made of.
Humility, however, is not a highly valued currency in the academic marketplace, so that most social-science treatises we know claim far too much
and do not recognize the limits that scientific methodology automatically
imposes on research practitioners. Scientific procedure, while able to assure
more reliable knowledge than the one produced without a clear methodology,
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automatically cuts away all those knowledges that do not fit into a methodological apparatus. The great majority of the “things we know” are thus lost
to us. As scientists, we end up instead with only what we can prove and
demonstrate—which has been very little indeed. Practicing social science is
nevertheless worth our while if done honestly, with transparency, humility,
insight, and self-awareness—and when aimed at the very real and serious
problems of our times. The quest for self-rule, autonomy, citizenship, and
democracy certainly qualifies, and although it is promising, it continues to
pose one of the most serious challenges to our collective well-being. We cannot afford to leave its discussion to power-seeking demagogues, self-interested
business elites and corporations, or a media invested only in entertaining us
while selling us things we do not need.
Hence, what this book seeks to accomplish is a different, and hopefully
insightful, way to think about citizenship and to make scientifically reliable
and valid inquiries into the reality represented by this concept. If successful, it should unveil new facets of citizenship hitherto left unexplored,
and it should inspire others to conduct similar inquiries, providing them
with some methodological guidelines and worthwhile questions to ask. I
hope that the effort I have put into this book also inspires people outside
the academic world, giving them new ideas and proposals with which to
think about democracy, autonomy, and self-rule, and to use when deciding
which actions to take.

Chapter Overview

Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the book by discussing the epistemological and methodological issues and pitfalls involved in social-science
research.3 It is particularly focused on problems of reification—that is, the
unplanned feedback and interference created when social-science or census
categories reflect back on the social world and are used to form identities. By
insisting on a clear separation between words, models, and reality, the chapter lays out the foundations of exploratory, inductive social-science research.
Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of citizenship and proposes a way to
fruitfully analyze the social reality represented by this concept—keeping in
mind the caveats discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter proposes
to think of citizenship in terms of a positional good, as well as a social
role. Such a conceptualization provides innovative analytical tools that allow
for an analysis of some of the previously unexplored aspects of citizenship,
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especially its inherently exclusionary character. To further capture the
intrinsically contradictory nature of citizenship, this chapter elaborates a
“dialectics of citizenship”—both to provide an analytical approach, and to
adequately describe the phenomenon of citizenship.
Chapter 3 focuses on classical citizenship as it was practiced in democratic Athens and republican Rome. First, the chapter focuses on the
very sense of what it meant to be a citizen in Athens, concluding that the
main trait was that in Athens, there was no clear separation between rulers
and ruled, thus making alienation from politics, or the state, impossible.
Instead, Athenian citizenship demanded many duties alongside the rights it
offered. Athenian citizenship was foremost political membership—a character it soon lost, as the analysis of the Roman Republic demonstrates. There,
citizenship was codified into a set of rights, perceived as entitlements, and
access to these rights was conditional on one’s social and economic standing. Rome is also the beginning of representation, another tradition we have
kept alive since then.
Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the ways in which Athenian
politicians and reformers such as Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes have
sought to remedy and counteract the very prevalent social and economic
inequalities that divided the people of Attica at the time. Instead of trying
to change social or economic realities, as was done ever after, they sought to
devise political institutions that forced different people and groups together
into one political association, while at the same time splitting up otherwise
powerful clans that threatened to bring imbalance into the system. In doing
so, these reformers provided an example of what democratic politics should
aim for and how to best achieve it—raising important questions about the
proper separation of the social from the political. This chapter also discusses
the many exclusions of classic democracy, especially in Athens.
Chapter 4 seeks to fill the historical gap between classic democracy and
citizenship and contemporary manifestations, originating in the French
Revolution. In the almost 1,800 years in between those democratic experiments, much happened that this chapter cannot possibly account for. This
chapter thus is the place to highlight the limits of such a study as the one
presented here, as there are not enough sources to discuss citizenship in
other, non-European regions. Even the knowledge we have about the 1,800
years covered in this chapter is scant, thus forcing the analyst to once more
focus on those cases where sources exist. Given that the intent of this study
is to critique the Western democratic tradition and to deconstruct some of
its central tenets, I hope that this Eurocentric focus will not be held against
me. In order to reduce all the possible ways in which to discuss such a huge
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span of time, this chapter focuses on the situation of the Jews in Europe,
because they provide a crucial case for the study of European democracy.
Doing so, the chapter detects a pattern, namely, that Christian advance was
routinely achieved by climbing on the backs of the perpetual “others” in
Europe, the Jews. This history is reconstructed all the way from the forceful
baptism of all Jews ordered by the Frankish king Chilperic in 582, to the
granting of civil rights to Jews in Prussia (1886).
Furthermore, this chapter explores one of the few better-documented
examples of medieval citizenship, namely, the one practiced in the medieval Tuscan republics of Florence, Pisa, Siena, Lucca, Genoa, among others,
between the tenth and the fifteenth centuries. The focus in this analysis is
also on the limits and contradictions of citizenship—even though not too
much historical material exists to gain a detailed picture. Citizenship then, it
becomes clear, meant just as much as it did in Athens and was as exclusionary, thus confirming the general theme that the more citizenship meant, the
more exclusive it was held to be.
Chapter 5 then shifts to the birthplace of modern citizenship, France.
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, it discusses the limits of the
liberal discourse that emerged during the French Revolution when black
former slaves in the French colonies sought to apply these discourses to their
own situation. Liberalism quickly found its limits in this situation, to the
point where all those who stood up for black rights found a quick, and often
painful, death at the hands of those whose economic interests were threatened by such ideas. However, once slavery was ended, the problems for free
blacks continued—a phenomenon nicely captured by the title of Thomas
Holt’s (1992) book The Problem of Freedom, as historically privileged whites
now had to devise new mechanisms to defend their undeserved privileges.
This pattern of defending white privilege, a privilege first established
during colonization, is also what makes the bridge to contemporary France,
where nonwhite French citizens face serious and systematic discrimination, especially in the job market. The white majority, which elects its
representatives, has devised many ways to defend these privileges against
nonwhites—which is the theme of the remainder of chapter 5.
Chapter 6 shifts our attention to Portugal, one of the richest and most
interesting cases for any study of European citizenship—yet at the same time
one of the least studied. What makes Portugal such a rich case for exploratory research is its long colonial history and the “colonial entanglements”
it created during this time. As a result of prolonged colonialism, Portugal
first defined its national community as one that included Africans—only to
later reverse this action and define it without Africans. Such maneuvering
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was triggered by the need to justify still having colonies during the 1960s
and 1970s—hence the argument that “those were not colonies, but part of
the Portuguese nation”—and later, after applying for EU membership, the
need to demonstrate that Portugal was not inviting Africa into the EU, or
even that Portugal was not an African-European nation itself at the time
of joining the EU in 1986. There are but few cases where such strategic
maneuverings can be observed with such clarity as in Portugal. Not only
does Portugal allow for a study of the tensions that arise when national
community and civil unity do not overlap; it also provides fertile ground
for a study of what happened to different people and groups in the middle
of these state-led changes. How to get rid of the “African connection” that
so implicated Portugal thus became a major effort of state elites, as did how
to define the African-descendant citizens of Portugal as not really belonging to the nation. This was achieved, as this chapter shows, with much help
from different state and societal elites—including those working as scholars in Portugal’s public universities. This chapter thus shows, as the title
implies, how the Portuguese states made foreigners out of black citizens.
Chapter 7 then finally shifts the focus of the book away from Europe,
and first to Brazil. Brazilians, so the chapter argues, are “specialists in exclusion.” Given this country’s long colonial history and its vast contingent of
black and indigenous people, white Brazilians, who saw and to some extent
still see themselves as the true inheritors of the country as it was handed
down to them by the Portuguese colonizers, had to be especially inventive
when it came to securing their own privileges—especially after democratization in 1985. And creative they were—making Brazil a very rich and
telling explorative case for anybody interested in how exclusion works. The
focus of this chapter has taken me away from the confinements of my own
discipline, political science, and it made me delve into linguistics and the
use of formalism and procedural protocols in order to shield those who
seek inclusion and participation from gaining access and voice. In a country
where access to formal education is still a privilege of relatively few, the historically included have resorted to the use of extremely formal and erudite
language codes—in their speech, but even more consequentially in written Brazilian-Portuguese language. By engaging in such elevated language
games, included Brazilians are able to hold the historically excluded out, or
to silence them if they manage to penetrate such protected societal spheres
where money and power circulate and are negotiated daily. The theme of
this chapter is “the formal against the informal,” as it zeroes in on the different strategies used by the formal sectors of society to uphold and defend
their historical privileges.
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The final empirical chapter of this book is about contemporary Colombia. In 1991, the Colombian state gave itself a new constitution, for the first
time ever recognizing ethnic minorities and investing them with a set of very
specific rights. Law 70, passed in 1993, further specifies some of the general
provisions anchored in the 1991 constitution by making specific references
to the country’s black communities. Colombia thus serves as an exemplary
case for all the other Latin American countries that have passed similar constitutions over the past fifteen years. However, despite all the new laws and
constitutions, the situation of minorities continues to be dire. The central
research question driving this chapter is how such a great gap between law
and reality, especially the reality of Afro-Colombians, can be explained. To
address this question, this chapter explores some of the pitfalls that are inherent in the tradition of legal idealism that normally comes with the code law
tradition. Laws are written without keeping reality in mind, thus presenting
not a reality, but rather a fantasy of those able to participate in the formulation
of such codes—elites. The Colombian case is slightly different in this respect,
because it was not elites, but a popularly elected constituent assembly—a
constituyente—that wrote the constitutional text. The Colombian case
demonstrates how important it is to disaggregate the state when analyzing
state action. It becomes clear that the legislative and executive branches of
the Colombian government are under firm elite control. The judiciary, to the
contrary, has been able to secure a limited measure of independence—even
if constantly threatened. The result is that laws that are passed are then violated by those agencies working for the executive branch, or representing the
interests of those populating the legislative branch. Furthermore, Colombia
provides a prime example of the force of racism in a country that is officially
colorblind. Because racism is so hard to pin down, its influence is not diminished. To the contrary, racist practices are more difficult to expose and to
counteract, so that lawsuits against racist incidents are minimal in Colombia.
This phenomenon of not taking anybody to court is also another crucial
characteristic, not just of Colombia, but of other Latin American countries
as well, including Brazil. Given that here, as everywhere, citizenship has long
been commodified and defined as a set of legal entitlements—or, as Pocock
has argued, “the right to sue and be sued”—such a limited and highly circumscribed access to the court system provides a formidable block to gaining
access to the full range of what citizenship can and should mean.
Chapter 9 provides a conclusion in that it seeks to summarize and weave
together the different threads this book has laid out during the different
empirical, theoretical, and methodological chapters. In it, I also seek to
draw some conclusions of a more general character—for example, about the
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place of exploratory research. The book ends with a note about the importance of dialectical thinking and dialectical research designs that do not
sacrifice knowledge for elegance or parsimony, but embrace contradictions
and focus on these first and foremost, as they provide the deepest insights
into the fabric of social life.

Chapter 1

The Epistemology and
Methodology of Exploratory
Social Science Research
Crossing Popper with Marcuse
If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof ) in the empirical
sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn
from it how wrong you are.
—Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Inquiry, 2002

This chapter seeks to propose a rationale for exploratory
research in the social sciences. Inspired by the recent debates around qualitative methods (Gerring 2001; George and Bennett 2005; Brady and Collier
2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Ragin 2008, to name just a few),
I seek to demonstrate that exploratory research also has a rightful place
within the social sciences. In order to live up to its potential, exploratory
research needs to be conducted in a transparent, honest, and self-reflexive
way—and follow a set of guidelines that ensure its reliability. Exploratory
research, if conducted in such a way, can achieve great validity, and it can
provide new and innovative ways to analyze reality.
In most cases, exploration demands more from the researcher than confirmatory research, both in terms of preparation and in terms of willingness
and ability to expose oneself to foreign cultures and languages, as well as
the courage to engage in a critical and honest self-reflection and critique.
It also requires intellectual engagement with the topic at stake, far beyond
1
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the needs of those running regressions from their office computers. However, exploratory research normally demands less money to conduct, as most
projects can be done by one researcher alone, without the need to mobilize,
train, and pay large research apparatuses. Given the disciplinary power of
elite scholars and academic institutions when it comes to selecting research
through funding and hiring, exploratory research thus has great emancipatory potential, because it can escape the disciplinary power often exercised
by senior “peers” and mainstream funding agencies.
To legitimize and provide a solid epistemological groundwork for exploratory research in the social sciences, it needs to be grounded in a philosophy
of science, it has to be articulated within an epistemological framework, and
it has to formulate a comprehensive methodological framework that justifies
its methods. Thought also needs to be given to the ontology of the social
sciences, as decisions about what counts as real and what we shall accept as
fact necessarily impact our strategy of inquiry.

The Limits of Confirmatory Social Science

Confirmatory social science dominates the field. Most social scientists use
quantitative or qualitative methods in order to prove, or corroborate, their
hypotheses. They expect to confirm laws, regularities, or conditionalities of
the if . . . then . . . sort. Confirmatory research is what graduate students train
for and what qualifies most researchers to get a tenure-track academic job.
Confirmatory research has indeed many advantages—some of which are
also very relevant for exploratory research. Confirmatory research allows for
a clear formulation of a theory to be tested in its application, commonly formulated as hypotheses; it allows for bringing order into the research process
by formulating theories and related hypotheses up front, and developing a
research design and methodological tools best suited to address the research
question, which is also formulated up front. By formulating research questions, theories, hypotheses, a research design, and a method—and by forcing
the researcher to operationalize the involved terms and concepts and think
of indicators to assess them—confirmatory research provides a clear scheme
that is easy to follow and hence easy to teach. If trained appropriately in
confirmatory research techniques, researchers know how to proceed.
By providing schematic and standardized procedures, confirmatory
research also provides a mental map for how inquiry works and what it
can achieve. Taking inspiration from the work of Karl Popper (2002) and
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Carl Hempel (1966), confirmatory research proceeds deductively by testing hypotheses. The great advantage of proceeding in such a way lies in the
clear and well-structured research process that such an approach is able to
secure. Mental models, ideas, or theories are compared to empirical reality and tested for their explanatory power. This allows for an isolation of
an empirical domain and a focusing on one clearly delimited facet of reality. It also allows for a zeroing in on one, or a small number of potentially
causal relationships and mechanisms. This is absolutely necessary for conducting any sort of empirical research, given the high complexity of reality.
In reality, everything potentially relates to everything else—and without a
clear theory and hypotheses, we would not be able to isolate specific causal
relationships in order to analyze their strength and robustness. Theory and
hypotheses allow us to simplify, isolate, and focus on particular aspects of
a reality that, taken as a whole, is far too complex and contingent to be
captured and explained with any degree of precision and reliability. Confirmatory research thus brings guidance and discipline into an endeavor that
would otherwise be impossible and at risk of falling prey to the same kind
of contingency that characterizes empirical reality.
Confirmatory research, more pragmatically, also is what society and
policymakers expect social scientists to achieve, as in the end, scientists
are expected to explain social reality and make predictions that help guide
actions and policymaking. One normally does not get paid to speculate.
With so many advantages, it comes as no surprise that confirmatory research
is the only research that receives external funding and the only research
taught systematically at universities, American or otherwise. But what are its
weaknesses and shortcomings? Several have been identified.
When testing hypotheses, we normally are not pressed to justify where
these hypotheses came from. Popper argues that asking this question is falling prey to “psychologism.” After all, we need to concern ourselves not with
where ideas come from, but how to assess them systematically. This, however,
has led to a systematic neglect of capturing, and considering, the bias that
goes into theory and hypothesis formulation. But, as such feminist scholars
as Sandra Harding (1991) and Donna Haraway (1988) have convincingly
argued, research cannot start from nowhere. Who we are, our interests, backgrounds, training, and culture—influence what questions we ask, how we
ask them, and even what we accept as confirming evidence. Our approach
to knowledge is “situated,” and the worst thing to do is to pretend that it
is not, thus playing the “God trick” (Haraway 1988). Thinking about, and
critically analyzing, where our theories and hypotheses come from must be
included in the research process, else we cannot escape unreflected bias. The
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need to also analyze where our ideas, theories, hypotheses, approaches, and
questions come from, and how this pedigree influences our research and our
conclusions, cannot be achieved with confirmatory research. This aspect of
research needs to be inductive and constructivist—and it triggers the need
for an altogether different approach to conducting empirical research in the
social sciences.
As if this impossibility of scientifically accounting for one’s location and
situatedness were not enough, confirmatory research has another weakness.
As Popper has made very clear, theories cannot be proved. He shows that
“theories are not verifiable, but they can be corroborated” (Popper 2002:
248). Popper concludes his examination of the Logic of Scientific Discovery
by stating that “The old scientific ideal of episteme—of absolutely certain,
demonstrable knowledge—has proved to be an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must
remain tentative for ever” (Popper 2002: 280). In other words, there is no
way to bridge the gap that forever separates the models we formulate in our
minds from empirical reality. All our theories, models, and explanations
about reality will remain forever tentative, because they spring out of our
own minds, and nothing can guarantee that reality conforms to our ideas.
We can find laws—but nature, let alone human behavior, might not follow
any laws. We might detect causal mechanisms, but we have no guarantee
that history unfolds according to linear causes. Independent variables are
mind constructs and not independent in reality. Dependent variables are in
reality dependent on much more than the independent variables we choose
to examine. All we can do—and as a consequence, all that confirmatory
researchers do—is to develop highly reliable procedures and machines to
process the data we feed into them. However, as reliable as our procedures
have become, they are still only able to test our own ideas, theories, and
hypotheses. When conducting confirmatory research, we mobilize great
resources to test the fruits of our own minds—not reality.
The more precise and mathematical these methods and apparatuses, the
more “scientific” they are deemed. By factoring out the human component
from the research process, this research seeks to control for bias—but it fails
to take into account the human impact that informs any research at the
very beginning of the research process, as well as the human condition of
the very phenomena it seeks to explain. Conducting contemporary confirmatory research, especially in the social sciences, is like tapping in the dark
with a high-tech laser beam instead of the old-fashioned broomstick. It still
leaves us clueless about what is in the room and how our own movements
rearrange the objects we touch and influence our findings.
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Hence, Sir Karl Popper has put a heavy burden onto the shoulders of
confirmatory researchers and challenged their work on the most basic and
substantial level. The truth of his assessment becomes evident when analyzing the history of our fields and critically evaluating our achievements.
Confirmatory research has indeed confirmed very little. It spends most of
its energy in developing and explaining new methods, computer programs,
and other machines designed to ensure reliability—but the resulting reliability only applies to the methods, programs, and the machines themselves,
never to the findings. Confirmatory research has become highly efficient in
attesting the reliability of its own methods, but utterly unable to address the
basic problems of reality.
If hard truths about reality, especially about social (that is, human)
reality, are altogether out of our reach, then what can and should science, and social science in particular, do? Exploratory research offers some
attractive alternatives. They rest on an explicit recognition that all inquiry
is tentative; that reality is, in part, socially constructed; that researchers
are part of the reality they analyze; and that the words and categories we
use to explain reality grow out of our own minds and not out of reality.
In other words, what we perceive and how we perceive it has more to do
with us than with the reality we observe. Explicitly taking all these factors
into account and thus debunking the myth of the possibility of neutral,
objective, and value-free research, exploratory social science offers a different research program altogether—one that recognizes the importance,
and indeed necessity, of philosophy for social-science research, and one
that draws the necessary conclusions from the foundations philosophy has
laid out.

The Tentativeness of Inquiry

If “hard” deductive science can only achieve tentative findings and statements whose truths cannot be attested, then we have good reason to
reconsider induction. Induction is prone to be incomplete and faulty, as
a whole Western tradition of philosophy has demonstrated. However, as
it turns out, deduction is equally unable to lead us to “the truth.” Worse,
while focusing our attention on methodology, deduction makes us overlook the very important problem of situatedness and leaves many crucial
assumptions routinely made by researchers unexplained. Deductive, confirmatory research thus throws out the baby with the bathwater. Inductive,
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exploratory research offers a way to save the baby by admitting, up front,
that the kind of knowledge it is able to achieve is partial and tentative.
Observations always run the risk of being incomplete and missing
important events, and we have no assurance that the world unfolds uniformly, thus permitting us to learn from the past. However, we have good
reason to assume that the world unfolds regularly, and if we assume that,
then we can learn from past events. If the world stops unfolding in a regular
way, catastrophe is the most likely trigger, and we will not need any social
science anymore. In the meantime, we should assume uniformity.
Admitting to the tentativeness of findings and explanations of reality
translates into making nonexclusive claims about reality. If our theories and
hypotheses about the world cannot bridge the gap that separates them from
reality, and if those theories and hypotheses have more to do with our own
mental, social, and cultural situatedness, then our theories and ideas only
allow us to make sense of the world for ourselves. Theory-driven empirical
research—and all research is theory-driven—allows the researcher to explain
reality so it makes sense to him or her. If successful, an explanation provides
a fruitful and plausible way to look at and explain reality that also makes
sense to others. It can never be the only possible way to explain it. This,
then, leads to a more humble formulation of claims about reality and how
reality “really” is. Instead of advancing arguments that make claims to be
exclusive truths, exploratory research provides more or less plausible and
hence fruitful ways to examine and explain reality that can be shared, if
successful and plausible, after a critical evaluation. In this way, competing
and even rival explanations can coexist. This does not automatically lead to
relativism. In exploratory research, there are better and worse explanations.
What are the criteria?
Good and valid explanations in exploratory research are those that are
able to demonstrate the robustness and plausibility of the link that connects
a stipulated cause to an effect. If I can demonstrate how exactly investment
in education led to economic growth in a given country over a given period
of time, then I am doing a good job at explaining this claim, while being
aware that education is not the only cause for economic growth. Exploring
the relationship between education and economic growth thus means revealing and unveiling the causal mechanisms that connect one to the other. This
can only be achieved by formulating theories and hypotheses up front.
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A Priori Theorizing

The advantages of a priori theorizing and hypothesizing explained above
apply equally to exploratory research. There is no theory-free perception
of the world, because we can only relate to the world by applying our own
mental categories, words, and frameworks. We simply do not see those
things we do not understand. Hence, a pure exploration that starts from
scratch is impossible. It could only be achieved by someone analyzing a
world unrelated and disconnected—thus not ours. Exploratory research,
similar to confirmatory research, thus needs to start from an explicitly
formulated theory and clear and precise hypotheses. Different from confirmatory research, however, exploratory research does not set out to test these
hypotheses, because they cannot be tested and proved to begin with, as Popper has shown. Instead, exploratory research asks how much a given theory
and a derived hypothesis can explain, and how well it can explain it, or how
much sense this explanation makes. Exploratory research is successful if a
previously formulated theory and hypothesis explains a lot, or if it explains
very little but explains it very well, thus providing a very valid explanation
by elucidating a very strong connection linking a cause to an outcome. In
addition, exploratory research seeks to provide new and previously overlooked explanations, and it can do so by actively engaging the researcher in a
process of amplifying his or her conceptual tools and allowing him or her to
pose new questions and provide new explanations by looking at reality from
a new angle. If research depends critically on our own mental models, available categories, theories, and concepts, then better research can be achieved
by amplifying the mental analytical repertoire of the researcher. This process
is one rightfully called “conscientization.” It is strongly and directly related
to education, more precisely the German Bildung—that is, general, historical, reflexive understanding.
To provide a more detailed and complete introduction to exploratory
research in the social sciences, I will focus on some of the aspects highlighted
above in more detail, and provide some examples to illustrate this approach.

From Words to Reality

Language interferes with our lives in many ways. By wording things, we
give them reality (Searle 1997). As Immanuel Kant demonstrated long ago,
by categorizing phenomena, we create order in the world while not being
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sure if the world has any intrinsic order outside of our categorizing and
naming activities. But this is not a philosophical essay, so there is no need
to address this question and resolve this puzzle here. However, the insights
produced by such authors as Immanuel Kant, John Searle (1997), and Peter
Winch (2008), among many others, must produce an acute awareness that
language and reality are strongly intertwined, yet separate, realms. To confound language with reality is committing a mistake, as all those who grasp
Wittgenstein even just a little bit will understand. Social scientists cannot
afford to ignore this. Language functions as a separate, autopoetic system,
thus reproducing itself, as both Ludwig Wittgenstein (2009) and Niklas
Luhmann (1996) have demonstrated.
However, language, even though it functions as a self-referencing system, is connected to reality in important ways. Words refer to reality. Words
allow us to make sense of an overly complex and chaotic world—a world
that, as I mentioned above, might not make any sense on its own and might
not be well ordered, despite the old Aristotelian belief that the physical
world has an ordering and even developing principle within. We don’t really
know, and I fear we will never be able to find out—simply because we cannot escape our linguistic grasping of the world, our attempts to explain and
categorize it with words and through language. We cannot think, in other
words, about the world without using the very references we have created,
such as “world,” “sense,” “order,” “before and after,” “development,” “evolution,” “people,” “social groups,” among others.
Words not only help us explain and make sense of the world by ordering it, hierarchizing it, and putting it into neat categories to which we then
attribute causal relationships; words also create realities, and they restrict
the possibilities of action. Let me explain: The creative potential of words
has been called “constructivism” in some of the social sciences (e.g., by John
Ruggie [1998] and Alexander Wendt [1999] in international politics). In
sociology, the insight that reality is socially constructed is older and goes
back to the work of Edmund Husserl, Alfred Schütz, and Peter Berger and
Thomas Luckmann (1966). The philosopher John Searle (1997) has convincingly and systematically demonstrated how, and under what conditions,
speech acts create institutional facts. He has argued that “Because the constitutive rule enables the function to be imposed on a speech act, then just
performing that speech act in appropriate circumstances can constitute the
imposition of that function, and thus will constitute a new institutional
fact” (Searle 1997: 54).1
To understand reality as socially constructed merely means to be aware
that there are no unmediated facts—that whatever action we can think of
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is first perceived by someone, then interpreted, and finally used in the perceiver’s own effort to make sense of it by placing it within a framework of
available references. Feminist epistemology, as presented by such authors as
Donna Haraway (1988) and Sandra Harding (1991), has long pointed this
out, along with some sociologists of knowledge (e.g., Latour, Woolgar, and
Salk 1986).
This means that the models, ideas, and theories we know and understand condition the way we perceive reality, or even what reality we perceive
(Musgrave 1993). If the analytical tools that we derive from our theories
and ideas about the world, consciously or unconsciously, only explain one
way to “read,” understand, and make sense of our sensorial impressions,
then this will be the only way we perceive and understand reality, or this
will be the only reality we get to know and understand. If, to give an example, we understand the world in terms of “race,” then race is what we will
see. The same is true for class, gender, religious belief, or such concepts as
markets, equilibrium, etc.
The task at hand, then, inspired by Paulo Freire (1993) and Jean-Paul
Sartre (1994), is to amplify and broaden our conceptual tools and thus be
able to see more, more sharply, more accurately, and from different angles or
positions. Hence, proposing new words, concepts, theories, and hypotheses
allows us to analyze the new realities to which those new words and concepts refer. By looking at and analyzing reality from a different angle, we can
hope to unveil previously hidden facets of reality—if we are able to demonstrate the plausibility and strength of the connection our new approach
establishes. This effort is at the core of exploratory social-science research.
This sort of work, by its very definition, is inductive. Its end result
is that by broadening, amplifying, and diversifying our conceptual tools
and frameworks, we will be able to perceive more, better, and differently,
being able to make sense out of that which previously struck us as nonsensical and simple white noise. This task becomes a bit more complicated
when our interest lies in human (that is, social) behavior, because human
interaction is inherently social and thus meaningful, and it thus constantly
requires interpretation and understanding (Gadamer 1994).

An Exploratory Research Program

We can spend hours debating what “democracy,” or “citizenship” really is.
But this discussion is beside the point. What exploratory research focuses
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on is what reality a word like “democracy” refers to. What does democracy
mean in Colombia today? What does it mean to a poor campesino, a black
Chocoano, or an indigenous tribe member from Vaupés? We need to dissect, to analyze by pulling apart, words from the reality they refer to, and as
exploratory social scientists, we should focus on the reality, not the words.
This means, in most cases, that we need to look for indicators that tell us
something about the reality represented by a word.
This sounds easy enough. However, the trickiness of words and language
goes further and tends to confuse us at deeper levels. Think about a word like
“class.” What reality does it refer to? Do classes “really” exist? Some words
clearly have structured our thinking so much that we use them not only to
talk about the word and make sense of it, but to guide our actions—and to
construct our identities around them. Identity construction, after all, is also a
discursive process—one where we assemble those elements that we recognize
as relevant and use them to construct who we are and who we want to be. To
some extent, we assemble our identities with words, using categories that have
proven helpful to us in other contexts. We think we are “rooted”—because
rootedness resonates with what we want to be, what makes sense to us—
even if such a concept is borrowed from a non-human realm (Stepan 1986).
Think of the word “race” and you get a sense of how much such a category
has offered some of us in terms of ordering the world, and ordering our own
thinking about who we are and how we differ from others.
When doing exploratory research, we need to remain alert to the pitfalls
of reification and avoid any tendencies to essentialize words and categories.
Instead of looking for the essence behind a word or concept, we need to
explore what aspect of reality this word opens up for us, and what a specific
word allows us to see, or what aspect of reality it refers to.
In terms of research design, this necessarily implies that instead of pretending to be neutral, we need to be aware, explicit, transparent, and honest
about our starting position, standpoint, situatedness, or positionality. This,
in turn, requires that we formulate theories about the world, about how
things relate, first, before we initiate any empirical research. We have to
propose a structure of order—an angle, if you will—that allows us to look at
the world in a certain way, or through a certain lens or prism. This, again, is
necessary because there is no neutral or clean-slated perception of the world,
as our perception of reality is influenced and indeed conditioned by the
mental structures, ideas, and theories we already hold about the world. We
only perceive what we already know, what is familiar to us—or in the words
of systems theory, we only perceive that which we recognize as meaningful
and patterned, that which makes sense to us. This is why pure discovery
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of reality is impossible to us. We are utterly unable to look at the world
“theory-free” as we cannot escape approaching reality through words and
categories.
The next best thing to pure discovery and induction, thus, is a gradual
extension and widening of our perception and understanding of the world,
parting from what we already know and have understood. This process
requires the explicit, up-front formulation of explanatory models—that is,
theories.2

What Are Theories For?

Theories are tentative explanations about how the different elements of the
world relate to each other and why. This is not to say that they actually do.
Theorizing about—and hence explaining—the world is an effort to make
sense out of it by ordering it and putting it in causal sequence. Doing so
allows us to shed light on a segment of reality by offering a way to fruitfully interpret discrete events and thus connect them. Good theories lead
to good questions—and good questions allow us to discover new aspects
of reality. The good question never is “how it really was”—or “what really
happened.” What really happened will differ for everybody involved—and
all those involved will only understand what “really” happened after someone has offered a way to explain it after the fact—and others have accepted
this explanation and the implicit framework that comes with it (Goldstein
1983). Once we are aware of the theoretical models and assumptions that
guide our approach to reality, we can then expand and ask different and
new questions that allow us to explore the empirical terrain that surrounds
the empirical segments we initially focused on. Exploratory research thus
becomes an act of gradual, structured, and theory-led heuristic expansion
from an original set of models, explanations, and questions. It does not start
from scratch.
In this context, the good question is one that allows us to see plausible
connections that have previously not been seen, explored, or understood.
Words, because they evoke certain realities, become functional in this
endeavor. As words are separate from reality but refer to it in different
ways, as argued above, new and different words, categories, concepts, models, and theories promise to allow us to see new things, or to see old things
in a different way. Theories thus cannot be true or false, as they have no
ontological status. As thought models, they can be more or less helpful and
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supportive of our constant effort to explain the world by making sense of
it (Popper 2002).
Take the example of such a central social-science concept as “citizenship.”
Instead of explaining what it “really” means, I propose to engage in an effort
to offer new ways of looking at those aspects of reality that fall under the very
broad label of “citizenship.” For example, one can think about something
like “second-class citizenship” not because it really exists, but because such
a concept allows us to explore some easily overlooked corners of the reality
represented by this word. One might also think of citizenship as a social role,
because thinking of it in that way allows us to explore the roles and expectations we commonly associate with this term. Finally, think of citizenship as
a good, or an asset—again, not because I think it really is that, but because
this allows us to explore an aspect of citizenship that is crucial to its reality
and has not been captured and explained well: namely, that citizenship is
worth something, and it might be worth more if not everybody has access to
it. Finally, think of citizenship as something inherently conflictual, embattled, disputed, internally contradictory—and produce your research design
accordingly—and chances are that you will be able to unveil new aspects and
facets of what kind of reality the word “citizenship” represents.
The purpose of doing this is to unveil the different ways in which different people and groups live, experience, and invest the word “citizenship”
with different meanings, and how citizenship is negotiated, embattled,
defended, or upheld and substantiated in social reality and daily praxis. This
is, in my mind, the most that honest social science can achieve. There are
no hard rules or laws to be discovered in social life, and the establishment
of such hard laws and rules comes with a great cost to validity: we can
always only measure the easy things, or the easily measurable aspects of very
complex social phenomena. We can find great rules and laws—that apply
to very little. Or, as I propose here, we can content ourselves with detecting
new and fruitful ways to look at and analyze reality, none of which should
lay claims to be exclusive or true—at least not truer than another, equally
fruitful way to analyze reality.

Some Practical Rules for Conducting
Exploratory Social Science Research

In exploratory social science, the choice of cases is not random. It is predicated by the logic of analyzing the richest, most telling cases and unveiling

Epistemology and Methodology

|

13

the thickest and most telling connection between two variables. Such a
study is, in a strict use of the term, not a comparative case study, where cases
are used to simulate experimental research settings. Instead, cases are chosen
so that each single one can tell a lot about the underlying conditions and
causal mechanisms at work. Instead of focusing on overlap and similarity on
the independent or dependent variables, exploratory research seeks to detect
causal mechanisms, that is, causal propositions that link independent to
dependent variables. Cases are selected to shed the most light on the specific
causal mechanism in focus. The guiding question for such a procedure is:
where can I see and explain this best? Or, in what case is this causal mechanism most evident?
This methodological choice is driven by several insights. First, exploratory studies allow us to think, not just measure—to use our imagination,
experience, insight, and skill to propose new and innovative ways of understanding and interpreting reality. This is, to me, a very important component
of being a social scientist. The best scientists we have had were not the
bureaucratic-minded number crunchers that now dominate some of our
disciplines. Especially in the social sciences, the best of us have been able to
infuse and enrich their work with their life experiences, travels, and innovative ideas. Think of Alexis de Tocqueville as maybe the prime example of a
thoughtful and insightful analyst, who proposed new and innovative ways
of thinking about democracy after traveling for almost one year in North
America with his friend Gustave de Beaumont. Or think of Karl Marx,
whose proposal to think about the unfolding of history in terms of economic power and asset ownership has influenced the thoughts and actions
of millions. Exploratory social science has been more influential by far than
confirmatory social science. It has given ideas, inspired, helped understand
reality in new ways, and shed light on previously not understood phenomena. It has provided new and innovative readings and interpretations of the
world, or facets thereof, without being able to test and predict the hypotheses it has advanced.
Second, exploratory work can be done rigorously. Whenever this is
achieved, it promises to attain a degree of validity that is beyond the wildest dream of any confirmatory researcher, especially researchers relying on
quantitative methods. As stated above, to be rigorous, exploratory work
needs to be honest and transparent. It also demands a high level of selfreflexivity from the researcher (Alvesson and Skoldberg 2009). However, to
be rigorous, exploratory work needs to take into consideration the findings
about epistemology and perception that different philosophers have elaborated on. As explained above, the core insights are that we cannot approach
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reality theory-free. Our very perception, that is, what we perceive as meaningful and how we perceive it, is influenced by what we already know—our
preconceived ideas about the world. If we do not know what a cuacuco is,
we will never see one, never recognize one—even if it passes right in front
of us. Without the idea of a cuacuco, the sensorial information of a cuacuco
is nothing but white noise to us. However, once we know, we will perceive
the passing cuacuco; see it, because we can now make sense of this sensorial information; put it in the category “fish,” and recognize it as such. To
perceive the world, in other words, we must rely on previously established
ideas and theories and we can then expand from there. Once we know the
cuacuco, we are also able to compare and contrast it to other fish and learn
more about the fauna of a given river (Lakoff 2009; Haraway 1988). We
have no other choice but to always initiate our inquiries from an already
formulated theory.
Popper (2002) holds that epistemology must only concern itself with
examining the logical consequence and coherence of new ideas, not where
they come from, which is the task of psychology. Placing something outside of the realm of legitimate reflection does not solve the problem; it
simply avoids it. His own theory of perception and anticipation, called the
“Searchlight Theory” (Popper 1974), nevertheless offers an explanation on
just how new ideas are conceived, namely, through the comparison of new
sensorial information with already available knowledge—which leads us to
anticipate according to past knowledge in a movement of problem-solving
trial and error.
No matter how this epistemological problem is solved, the debate about
it makes clear that we have an innate tendency to anticipate, based on the
limited information we have at our disposal. Under conditions of a lack of a
secure and validated paradigm that would allow us to deduce research questions and programs, we must instead embrace our tendency to anticipate
and formulate clear and testable—that is, falsifiable—hypotheses, instead
of avoiding it. That way, we can put our own anticipations, which spring
from our previous experiences and already accumulated knowledge, to the
test and ask how plausible they are—that is, how much and how well they
explain. This process, if conducted honestly and transparently, allows us
not only to accumulate knowledge about the world by dwelling on our
already gained knowledge and experience—it also makes a collaboration
of scientists possible. If we reach our tentative extrapolations and explanations in a transparent way, we can evaluate them critically—and expose
them to the critical evaluation of others. This is what science can achieve
at its best. Reaching tentative explanations gained from our previous work
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and experience also provides a much more plausible rationale for reaching
new explanatory models than the deus ex machina mechanisms that Popper
(1974, 2002) proposes as a replacement of what he calls “psychologism.”
Indeed, we cannot explain the emergence of new explanatory models with
reference to our own cognitive or psychological structures, just as we cannot
rule out the risk of cognitive solipsism. Structured, self-aware, critical, and
transparent anticipation, however, is not only what we should do as scientists. It is also what we do as human beings: building on previous knowledge,
gradually expanding it, and proposing new explanations that are derived
from our previous knowledge. The knowledge we can obtain in this way is
indeed not 100 percent reliable, as we cannot truly count on a uniformly
evolving history. It is, instead, tentative and subject to critique, revision, and
all sorts of methodological errors—but this is precisely what we are able to
achieve. Claiming to achieve more reliable or more valid knowledge about
human behavior and interaction actually achieves less.
What we can achieve, different from the natural sciences, is to discern,
describe, and explain causal linkages and mechanisms that connect two
or more relevant variables in significant ways. Once this is done, we can
establish an if . . . then . . . relationship that describes a likely pattern or a
probability of consequence, if certain conditions are met or already in place.
It is this sort of limited (or better delimited) and structured anticipation
that makes explicit use of available theoretical models and explanations and
then relies on finding supporting empirical evidence in order to avoid the
pitfalls of an extreme skepticism, that promises to advance our insight and
understanding of the social world. It has this potential because it allows us
to see and understand social reality in different ways, and from different
angles. If done cumulatively, social science can then contribute to a more
complex and complete reading of social reality—and might even aspire to
contribute to the very real process of conscientization that should be initiated in schools and continued systematically in universities.3
The knowledge produced in such a way could also be of more utility to
everyday life than the highly formalistic and extremely technical procedures
activated to conduct confirmatory research today. Most of the techniques
that produce and calculate probabilities of correlations are so sophisticated
that they take up most of the space, physical as well as intellectual, of confirmatory research production and its debate. It is in this process of describing
and explaining not reality but methodology that most social scientists end
up losing most laypeople, as well as uninitiated specialists. Such proceedings would be justifiable if the findings about laws and regularities would
really fall within the realm of the possible in the social sciences—but they
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do not. As explained above, social life is far too contingent and in flux to be
captured by rules and regularities. Put simply: laws do not apply in the social
world—and thus should not be sought for in the social sciences.
The consequence of all this simply is that exploratory, inductive research
can achieve reliability under certain conditions. Proceeding in such a way
allows for a clearly defined starting position in the process of knowledgebuilding and gaining understanding and familiarity with a subject or
problem. It also allows for a delimitation of the empirical field that is relevant to a given research question—as purely exploratory research would
otherwise be endless and lead into the traps of infinite regression.
Different from a purely deductive research design, such a proceeding
also allows for a revision of the initial hypotheses, and even for the reformulation of the research question—in a process of slowly and gradually making
oneself familiar with all of the phenomena associated and related to the
problem in question. This deductive-inductive research design thus starts by
entering a hermeneutic cycle of creating understanding and expanding this
understanding up to the point where all the phenomena related to a given
problem and research question can be explained (Gadamer 1994).
Induction thus becomes part of a deductively initiated research project
and allows for a pressing forward of findings up to the point where the
causal mechanism previously established through a theoretical framework is
explained. In other words, the outer limits of how far such a research process
should reach need to be established by a previously formulated theory and
hypothesis, as otherwise this process would be endless. This research process
ends not when “everything” is explained (which is impossible), but when
the research question is successfully answered.
The exploratory character of social-science research refers to the very
domain of what can be detected, described, and explained. Given that our
naming, wording, categorizing, and hierarchizing of the world is intrinsically
linked to our perception of the world, all we can aspire to as social-science
researchers is to offer new categories, models, and theories that allow us to
analyze a specific phenomenon in a new and fruitful way. Instead of examining the content of words and categories, our efforts should be geared towards
holding interpretative models and reality apart and thus avoiding the pitfalls
of reification that lurk at almost every corner of inquiry into a meaningfully structured social reality. If we did the structuring in the first place, we
should not take our own categories as given, or invest them with an ontological status they have only acquired through our own action of naming.
Instead, we need to propose new, or newly composed, models that approach
reality differently, in new and innovative ways and from different angles. As
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social reality constantly changes, this endeavor is endless, as someone else
can describe and explain the same segment of reality I have described today
differently tomorrow. However frustrating this might be, it is the only way
to produce truly reliable knowledge about the social world—a world that is
socially constructed and reproduced continuously by the same people who
seek to explain it.
In a strict sense, exploratory research, just like confirmatory research, is
thus only able to test the strength and plausibility of a causal link previously
established by a theory or model—hence by the researcher. This makes any
research self-referential. Instead of exploring the world, scientific inquiry in
the social sciences only tests the validity, reliability, or to use less technical
terms, robustness and strength, of previously established causal links, which
are derived by theoretical models and hypotheses. This implies that any
research project can only claim to examine one explanation at a time.
This automatically means that the given explanation is never the only
explanation possible. Reality is far too complex for such a claim. A scientific
explanation rather provides one way to look at reality, one way to make
sense of one particular segment, previously established, of reality. It necessarily simplifies and it can never claim completeness, as social reality is in
constant flux, thus creating new constellations that can be examined and
explained differently, from different angles and by using different prisms.
“Really” or “fully” explaining something is thus impossible. Exploratory
research is over once the empirical reality referred to by a concept or theory
is explained so that “it makes sense” to the researcher. Such an explanation
is successful if others find this individual sense-making effort fruitful, helpful, or insightful, so that his or her sense-making overlaps with theirs.4 The
practical process of conducting exploratory research thus necessarily follows
the pattern of the hermeneutic circle, as described by Hans Gadamer (1994)
(see Reiter 2006).

The Emancipatory Potential
of Exploratory Research

Exploratory research has an inherently anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic
potential, because in most cases it does not require the mobilization of, and
payment for, a huge research apparatus the way that most “systematic” confirmatory research does. Confirmatory research, because of its claim to be
systematic, in most cases requires much time, effort, and money, which is
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why most systematic research projects are conducted by scholars working at
elite universities, who receive funding from highly selective, and highly disciplining, funding agencies such as the National Science Foundation or the
Social Science Research Council. The review processes involved in selecting research projects and publications almost never support “unsystematic”
research, which in most cases translates into research not conducted within
the established, quantitative confirmatory paradigms. Disciplined in such a
way, it comes as no surprise that new findings are rarely produced. The stifling process of review by powerful and hegemonic mainstream institutions
and “peers” if anything narrows the array of what is possible and doable
in the social sciences. They function as a disciplinary power par excellence
(Feyerabend 2010). Indeed, as Paul Feyerabend has argued, “Twentiethcentury science has given up all philosophical pretensions and has become
big business. It no longer threatens society; it is one of its most powerful
supporters. Humanitarian considerations are at a minimum, and so is any
form of progressiveness that goes beyond local improvements. Good payment, good relations with the boss and colleagues in their unit are the chief
aims of these human ants who excel in the solution of tiny problems but
who cannot make sense of anything transcending the domain of their competence” (Feyerabend, quoted in Motterlini 1999: 114).
It should not be surprising that the most systematic research seems to
originate from ivy-league professors. The same researchers able to conduct
expensive research projects are oftentimes also involved in the decision making about who should receive funding for what sort of research, so that the
whole enterprise runs the risk of becoming self-serving, narrowing down
what research is.
Exploratory research, to the contrary, does not require the mobilization
and payment of big research apparatuses. It can be conducted alone, oftentimes with nothing more than access to a library and a voice recorder. It
often involves travel and knowledge of another language, thus demanding
more intellectual preparation and courage to expose oneself to other peoples
and cultures from the researcher, yet less money and institutional support.
As such, it offers interesting opportunities, especially for young researchers
and graduate students, who otherwise have to rely on the disciplinary power
of their senior colleagues. In short: exploratory research has emancipatory
potential and promises to unveil new relations and causal mechanisms that
escape the disciplinary scrutiny of the established research apparatus.5
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Dialectics

A strong rationale for choosing an exploratory research design is that exploratory social science has the potential to be more insightful than confirmatory
research by applying dialectical thinking. Dialectics, explains Theodor W.
Adorno (1973), means “to achieve something positive by means of negation” (Adorno 1973: xix). The systematic treatment of dialectics goes back
to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and his Phenomenology of Spirit, first
published in Germany as part 1 of his System of Science in 1807. Hegelian
dialectics has three components—namely, circularity, where all existence is
constituted by its own negation, thus forming a whole only through this
circle; the contradiction and its resolve (Aufhebung); and idealism (Sarlemijn 1971: 4). In 1841, the young Karl Marx famously “put Hegel back
on his feet” by stripping his work of its idealistic component and proposing
a dialectical materialism instead (Marx [1841/42]: 1971: 28). It is this version of dialectics that inspired the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School,
especially T. W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert Marcuse. Instead
of Hegel’s ontological dialectics, what interests exploratory social scientists
today is the analytical methodology that emerges alongside its ontological
counterpart.6
According to Marcuse (1960), “The power of negative thinking is the
driving power of dialectical thought, used as a tool for analyzing the world
of facts in terms of its internal inadequacy. . . . ‘Inadequacy’ implies a value
judgment. Dialectical thought invalidates the a priori opposition of value
and fact by understanding all facts as stages of a single process—a process
in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined only
within the subject-object totality. All facts embody the knower as well as
the doer; they thus ‘contain’ subjectivity in their very structure” (Marcuse
1960: viii).
In other words, there can be no objective or neutral social science,
because the researcher is always and automatically involved and implicated
with the object and the subjects of his or her inquiry. Dialectical thinking—
that is, thinking about inherent contradictions, and understanding progress
not as a linear process but a gradual unfolding of oppositional forces—
provides a fruitful way to conduct social science, even more so if and when
social scientists accept that they themselves are part of history’s unfolding
and deeply involved in the reproduction of the knowledge they seek to analyze, which is what Marcuse suggests in the quote above. A prime example
of such thinking is provided by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848) in
their attempt to describe and explain the revolutionary power of markets in
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the Communist Manifesto, as well as by Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944)
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Both books, despite their shortcomings in terms
of producing adequate predictions about the future, still stand as powerful diagnoses of our times. The depths of their insights have secured these
documents a place in history. Consider, for example, this passage from the
Dialectic of Enlightenment:
In the enlightened world, mythology has entered into the profane. In its blank
purity, the reality which has been cleansed of demons and their conceptual
descendants assumes the numinous character which the ancient world attributed to demons. Under the title of brute facts, the social injustice from which
they proceed is now as assuredly sacred a preserve as the medicine man was
sacrosanct by reason of the protection of his gods. It is not merely that domination is paid for by the alienation of men from the objects dominated: with the
objectification of spirit, the very relations of men—even those of the individual
to himself—were bewitched. The individual is reduced to the nodal point of
the conventional responses and modes of operation expected of him. Animism
spiritualized the object, whereas industrialism objectifies the spirits of men.
Automatically, the economic apparatus, even before total planning, equips
commodities with the values which decide human behavior. (Horkheimer and
Adorno 1997: 28)

Horkheimer and Adorno detect in the project of demystifying the world,
which they trace back to ancient Greece and term “enlightenment,” the very
seeds of its reversal into an even worse state of affairs, where individuality
succumbs to mass society, and human desires and actions blindly follow the
dictates of empty consumerism. Thus the project of rationalization turns
into irrationality, and freedom from the powerful grip of nature and vengeful deities, which restricted lives during antiquity, is substituted with an
even worse unfreedom: that of the market and the fetishism of products we
seem compelled to buy, knowing that they will not bring us happiness or
peace of mind.
As this example demonstrates, dialectical thinking aims at exploring the
internal contradictions of phenomena. In seeking to do this, one can follow
Herbert Marcuse’s (1955) prescription, namely, that “Any particular form
can be determined only by the totality of the antagonistic relations in which
form this relation exists” (Marcuse 1955: 26).
In a slight variation to the initial dialectical tradition, which is still
burdened by Hegel’s legacy in that it suggests history itself unfolds dialectically, exploratory research uses dialectics as an analytical tool and way to
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look at reality. It does not claim that history itself unfolds dialectically, but
that thinking about and analyzing history through the prism of dialectics
allows for new insights and angles of observation. When thinking about
citizenship, for example, dialectical thinking leads one to look for inherent
contradictions and negations that together fall under the label “citizenship,”
and the reality for which this label stands. Thinking about citizenship in
terms of its internal or inherent contradictions thus promises to produce
fruitful ways of analysis, allowing for deeper insight and understanding.
Such a dialectical thinking about citizenship allows us to go beyond the
very common simplistic, dualistic models that dominate the social sciences.
Instead of focusing on dualisms and discrete phenomena, dialectics points
our gaze towards processes and those connecting elements that link different phenomena, which translates into a search for internal, and maybe
inherent, dynamisms, contradictions, and different forces pulling in different directions.
Hence, by approaching reality dialectically, one can analyze a reality of
connectedness, entanglements, and mutual continuations, which allows for
a depiction of reality as a space where privilege and access are constantly
negotiated and fought over. The resulting depiction of reality promises to be
much richer and more telling than those strangled by dualistic approaches—
as Thomas Holt’s The Problem of Freedom (1992) or Gary Wilder’s The
French Imperial Nation State (2005), to name but two supreme examples,
can amply attest to.

The Problem of the Research Domain

A final, procedural word about the research domain and the unit of analysis
of this endeavor is called for, given the differences, maybe even contradictions, between everyday knowledge and language and academic lifeworlds,
with their specific and technical language and methodologies.
In exploratory-research design, cases are selected to demonstrate a high
level of clarity when it comes to the unveiling of connecting mechanisms
and links. They should convey a richness and saturation of empirical information that allows for a clear depiction of how something comes about and
why. The implications of assuming such a position from the very start are
many, and I shall pinpoint some of the more common and consequential.
When conducting social science under the awareness that the ordering
of reality is as much a product of our own minds as a result of the reality
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“out there,” then exploratory cases should be selected because they offer
analytical richness, not because of their historical specificity. The aim of
exploratory research is to establish plausibility among different variables,
previously defined by the researcher—not to add to the factual, historical
knowledge. Exploratory research is thus firmly committed to a constructivist view of reality. The outcome of a successful exploratory-research project
is to propose a new, insightful, fruitful, and plausible way to think about
and explain reality—not to detect new material facts.
Furthermore, exploratory research is by its very nature interdisciplinary,
and should freely borrow from the various social sciences. It is precisely by
adopting, comparing, and trying out a linguistic, ethnographic, anthropological, geographical, sociological, economical, or political-science gaze that
new insight can emerge and rich exploration can occur.

Conclusion: Exploratory,
Deductive-Inductive, and Dialectical

In this chapter, I have sought to argue and demonstrate that reliable inductive, exploratory, dialectical research can be achieved if conducted in the
structured, transparent, and honest way described above. If successful, the
findings and insights produced in such a way can help shed new light on
phenomena that have already been explained partially and in different ways.
Furthermore, if successful, exploratory research can help to conscientize
those that read it by unveiling previously unthought-of connections and
causal mechanisms. Given that the procedural apparatus able to generate
the findings presented here is not a sophisticated computer program or a
mathematical model operating at high levels of abstraction, exploratory
research also addresses non-specialists and non-academics, offering to them
the same sort of knowledge produced from reflexive, self-critical, transparent, and dialectical research. There are no secrets or complicated procedures
that require years of initiation. Instead there is engaged dedication to the
phenomenon under scrutiny, and prolonged, systematic inquiry—paired
with reflection, comparison of different cases, formulation of tentative
explanations, revisions, dialogue, and finally, the formulation of new and
hopefully fruitful ways to look at the reality represented by such words as
“citizenship,” “democracy,” and the like.

Chapter 2

Conceptualizing Citizenship
Disjunctive, Dual, Divided,
Entangled, or What?
Theory is theoria: the gaze that puts us face to face with something and
inspects it . . . I can elucidate my relation to language, but I cannot
abstract myself from it and “look at” it, nor can I “construct” it from
the outside. I cannot make a “theory” out of the institution, for I am on
the inside. . . . There is therefore a deep-seated dependence, in respect to
language, between what I think and what I say.
— Cornelius Castoriadis, 1985

In his seminal work on C itizenship and S ocial C lass , T. H. Marshall ([1950] 1992) argued that in Europe, civil rights preceded political
rights, and once both these rights were achieved, social rights would follow. Marshall predicted that the twentieth century would see an expansion
of social rights, which he defined as “the whole range from the right to a
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full
in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the
standards prevailing in society. The institutions most closely connected with
it are the educational system and the social services” (Marshall 1992: 8). For
him, the state was called upon to reduce the risks associated with capitalism
for the poorest citizens (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 3). As explained by Jones
and Gaventa, this state action would lead to an “overarching sense of community and civilization” (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 3).
When the twentieth century came to an end, it became clear that
23
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Marshall’s prediction was too optimistic. In 2012, many European citizens
are effectively still excluded from social rights, to the point where some analysts argue that Europe is developing an apartheid system (Balibar 2004).
Especially, nontraditional, nonwhite European citizens see their civil rights
curbed by the forces of prejudice and racism. In many countries, they are
treated as foreigners and intruders despite their legal citizenship.1 Instead
of social rights following civil and political rights, it rather appears that the
exercise of civil rights depends on the previous achievement of social rights,
as racism is undermining the effectiveness of civil and political rights of all
those stigmatized as “others within.”
Racism is at the core of this exclusion, and it is Marshall’s underestimation of the power of racism that led him to formulate overly optimistic
predictions about Europe’s democratic future. In Europe, as elsewhere, racism continues to be functional for the maintenance and reproduction of
privilege. Worse, under conditions of increased market competition, characteristic of advanced capitalist systems, the importance of racism might
grow. Racism becomes more pronounced when different actors compete
for scarce, and thus highly desirable, goods (Winant 2001). Under such
conditions, whiteness functions as additional capital, bestowing competitive
advantages on those able to claim it with success (Reiter 2010).

Citizenship

Citizenship is a broad concept. According to Webster’s definition, it is “the
status of being a citizen.” T. H. Marshall (1992), in turn, defines citizenship as “a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community.
All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties
with which the status is endowed” (Marshall 1992: 18). Tom Bottomore,
who wrote the essay “Forty Years On,” which together with T. H. Marshall’s own essay constitutes the publication through which Marshall’s work
is accessible (1992), already points out that citizenship in our day (his were
the days of the 1990s) faces new challenges, some of which Marshall could
not have foreseen. Among others, he mentions the problems triggered by
increased migration, thus causing greater ethnic heterogeneity among European citizenry and posing new challenges to citizenship. To capture these
new challenges, Bottomore proposes a distinction between formal and substantive citizenship—a distinction introduced by Rogers Brubaker (1989,
1992). He quotes Brubaker, who had argued that “formal citizenship is

Conceptualizing Citizenship

|

25

neither a sufficient, nor a necessary condition for substantive citizenship”
(Brubaker 1992: 36, quoted in Bottomore 1992: 66).
Several authors have disputed the notion of citizenship as a status. For
communitarians such as Michael Sandel (1998), citizenship is more than
a right, it is an obligation and a calling to participate and actively engage
in one’s community. Civic republicans, such as Jürgen Habermas (1998),
have stressed that what makes one a citizen is the ability to participate in
collective decision making and thus fulfill one’s role as an active constituent of popular sovereignty. According to Jones and Gaventa, “At the centre
of much contemporary writing is the need to conceptualize citizenship as
both a status, which accords a range of rights and obligations and an active
practice” (Jones and Gaventa 2002: 5). Several authors have since tried to
expand the notion of citizenship, and they have proposed alternative ways
of conceptualization. Margaret Somers, for example, has defined citizenship
as “a set of institutionally embedded social practices” (Somers 1993: 589).
More recent treatments of citizenship, e.g., those collected in Tulchin and
Ruthenberg (2007), follow this focus on citizenship as a practice. James
Holston (in Tulchin and Ruthenberg) proposes “to study the full experience
of citizenship, and not only its political aspect” (Holston, in Tulchin and
Ruthenberg 2007: 77). In his book Insurgent Democracy, Holston (2008)
indeed applies an anthropological framework to the analysis of how citizenship is experienced in everyday life.
However, these recent efforts to adequately capture and explain what
citizenship effectively is, and what it means to different people, have not yet
produced a conclusive framework, and Frances Hagopian’s call (in Tulchin
and Ruthenberg 2007) to focus on citizenship, especially when studying
such “disjunctive democracies” (Holston 2008) where political and civil
rights do not necessarily go hand in hand, still stands.
To be able to do so, we first need a useful analytical framework—a lens
that allows us to focus on and delineate what kinds of realities and practices the word “citizenship” stands for. The elaboration of such a framework,
able to capture the empirical phenomena and practices associated with the
term “citizenship,” is the aim of this chapter. “Citizenship” is but a word,
and fighting over words, to me, is time wasted. The real question is what the
word refers to, what slice of reality is represents, how this section of reality
works, and how it articulates with broader society, the state, the economy,
inequality, and the like. I shall, hence, be careful to avoid the very common pitfall of reification, as my exercise in this chapter is merely one of
conceptual tool building so that they can be applied to examining reality.
Conceptual tools help us to analytically separate an overly complex and
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synthetic reality. The categories so created have no ontological status; they
do not exist “out there.” The scientific game is necessarily one of simplification, reduction of complexity, and schematization aimed at detecting
patterns, important connections, and causal mechanisms. The purpose of
this chapter thus is to propose analytical tools that allow us to make fruitful
and insightful inference into the reality of democracy and citizenship. I will
leave the empirical application of this framework for later.
I first propose to accept Brubaker’s distinction of formal and substantive
citizenship, and in this chapter I shall further elaborate on the meaning of
substantive citizenship. What exactly is substantive citizenship, and how
can we, as social researchers, assess it? My main argument is that substantive
citizenship has two important dimensions—namely, substantive citizenship
as a social role, and substantive citizenship as a relational asset. Indicating the relative presence or absence, as well as the quality, of possession on
both dimensions allows us to gain a deeper, more specific, more precise, and
hence more accurate and valid capturing of the empirical reality represented
by the concept of citizenship.
Hence, this chapter proposes that the concept of citizenship and the
rights associated with it has two important dimensions yet unexplored—
or rather, not yet applied systematically to the study of democracy. First,
citizenship is not just a legal status; it needs to be a practical and practiced
reality for it to have any impact on people’s lives. As such, citizenship is
associated with a certain role—namely, the role of being a citizen invested
with certain rights and duties, and protected by the state that makes and
enforces the rules and laws that define citizenship. Citizenship, then, is best
understood as a social role, as Brazilian anthropologist Roberto da Matta
(1987) has long pointed out and James Holston (2008) has more recently
highlighted again. If some citizens are not treated as citizens, citizenship
remains an empty concept. Second, citizenship is also an asset, and just like
any other asset, it is disputed. As an asset, the value of substantive citizenship is relational—that is, its value is derived from how much substantive
citizenship one person or group has, compared to another person or group.
Having access to the asset of citizenship when most people do not bestows
extra value on its possession.2
The main claim I seek advance here, thus, is that we can explore hitherto unexamined realities associated with the concept of citizenship by
focusing on its dimension as a social role, and its dimension as a relational
asset. Doing so promises to produce answers to what I consider the most
important question we need to ask when discussing citizenship—namely,
why democracy has gone hand in hand with so much inequality, consistent
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exclusion, and, as a result, a widespread disillusionment with democratic
systems worldwide. Focusing on citizenship as a social role and a relational
asset promises to provide new, richer, more complete, and more insightful
answers to this important question.

Substantive Citizenship as a Relational Good

As stated above, the concept of “substantive citizenship,” as proposed by
Brubaker and discussed by Bottomore, provides a specification of the
more general term “citizenship” as it contrasts with the formal aspects
of citizenship. But what makes citizenship substantive, and how can we,
as social scientists, assess and measure the amount of substantiveness of
citizenship?
The first step in this endeavor must necessarily consist of recognizing
and treating substantive citizenship as belonging to the realm of the social.
In other words, substantiveness cannot merely be a formal and hence legal
issue. Once citizens hold formal citizenship, the question becomes how this
formal status translates into everyday practice, and how a formal status of
equality under the law is used and applied by individuals and groups in their
struggle for social mobility, status, access, and power.3 Substantive citizenship is a contested status, and for it to translate into reality, it needs to be
defended, upheld, substantiated, and negotiated vis-à-vis the state and other
individuals and groups who share the same formal status. To adequately
capture this dimension of citizenship, I propose to approach the quality of
citizenship by treating substantive citizenship as an asset. The asset dimension of citizenship exposes it to problems of scarcity and competition. To
some people it might be worth more when—and as long as—others do
not possess it. Citizenship as an asset thus behaves like a positional good, a
concept developed by the American economist Fred Hirsch (1976). In a nutshell, Hirsch argues that certain goods only deliver the sought-for benefit as
long as not everybody possesses them, and once more people possess them,
more goods are needed to fulfill the same function. Educational degrees are
a case in point. If everybody has a college degree, having a college degree
no longer guarantees access to good jobs, and educational requirements will
rise. Hirsch points out that in advanced capitalist markets, competition for
“positional goods” increases as capitalist development advances. According
to Hirsch, positional goods derive their value not from their absolute utility,
but rather from their relative position to others. At the same time, the costs
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in terms of investment required to have the same outcome steadily rise, in a
process he calls “screening” (Hirsch 1976: 41).
A very important corollary of this theory is that those who have a historical advantage will always lead the race for more restricted goods. As
Hirsch demonstrates, the maintenance of the privilege of access resides on
a better starting position. When applying this insight to the relational good
of “scenic property,” Hirsch explains that “What matters in the acquisition
of scenic property is less one’s own present income than the present and past
incomes of other people. To secure the objects in the auction catalogue, it is
relative rather than absolute income and wealth that count. A head start in
this competition for relative ascendancy accrues to those who acquired such
assets in earlier, less expensive auctions” (Hirsch 1976: 36).
This logic, I contend, applies not just to real estate and education,
the cases Hirsch focuses on. It also characterizes access to substantive citizenship, because one can get more out of being a citizen if others do not
share the same status. On a more concrete level, this logic has already been
applied to the job market, where Roediger (1999) has demonstrated that
ethnicity has helped American whites to secure access to scarce jobs. We
are also becoming more aware that the, at times, vehement reaction against
affirmative action can be explained by this logic, because affirmative action
undermines the advantage that historically privileged groups have been able
to accumulate, thus providing them with a better starting position (Brown
et al. 2003). Applying this concept to the case of citizenship in general, we
can deduce that thinking about citizenship as a relational good allows us
to understand it as a competitive practice. Seen under this lens, if everybody has access to the same rights, then those rights lose value. This way
of thinking about citizenship makes it possible to make sense of its exclusionary character by focusing on its internal contradictions and inherent
tradeoffs. Analyzed in such a way, it becomes clear that for the historically
privileged, rights were never perceived as equal rights for all, but rather as
a privilege for themselves, and at best a favor granted to dependent others. Equal rights threaten to undermine the whole patron-client system that
allows the privileged not only to perpetuate their own advantage, but to
transform the underprivileged into their servants and clients. Stated bluntly,
rights are worth much more if they are privileges. Not only do privileges
reduce the number of equals and thus reduce competition; they also ensure
the reproduction of clients—dependent people who can be used, exploited,
or rewarded depending on one’s likings and needs. If rewarded, of course,
clients can become loyal subjects and potential supporters and thus a highly
valued resource in any system that relies on the support of others. In the

Conceptualizing Citizenship

|

29

language of Hirsch, “Positional competition, in the language of game theory, is a zero-sum game: what winners win, losers lose” (Hirsch 1976: 53).
Furthermore, this author explains that
What the wealthy have today can no longer be delivered to the rest of us tomorrow; yet as we individually grow richer, that is what we expect. The dynamic
interaction between material and positional sectors becomes malign. Instead of
alleviating the unmet demands on the economic system, material growth at this
point exacerbates them. The locus of instability is the divergence between what
is possible for the individual and what is possible for all individuals. Increased
material resources enlarge the demand for positional goods, a demand that can
be satisfied for some only by frustrating demand for others. The intensified
positional competition involves an increase in needs for the individual, in the
sense that additional resources are required to achieve a given level of welfare.
In the positional sector, individuals chase each others’ tails. The race gets longer
for the same prize. (Hirsch 1976: 67)

I agree with the logic this analysis unveiled over thirty years ago, although
I contend that Hirsch’s approach was too cautious. The positional logic
does not just characterize late capitalist markets, as he thought. It indeed
characterizes a majority of human interaction—whenever this interaction
is competitive. Most goods and assets are indeed worthier the scarcer they
are—which is what makes them worthy in the first place. Hence most goods
are positional in that they benefit from being exclusive.
This insight is based on my reading of such authors as Norbert Elias
(2000), who has argued that what is called “civilizational progress” is indeed
a struggle over cultural forms and norms in a constant striving for distinction and the production of privilege. Privileged groups constantly invent
new mannerisms, mores, or customs, not because they are qualitatively better, but because they serve the purpose of setting themselves apart from
the mainstream. As soon as elites invent such new forms and manners, the
middle classes seek to imitate and copy them in order to claim in-group
status. Hence, to some extent, the form is the content; emulating and adapting upper-class behavior constitutes the upper class. Furthermore, according
to Elias, forms, manners, and customs fulfill important gate-keeping functions, as they are able to regulate who rightfully belongs and who does not.
Another basic insight about the social world as one constituted by a continuous struggle over privilege, where individuals and groups use whatever
means they have at their disposal, comes from Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu
(1987) very convincingly shows that the social world is indeed reproduced,
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structured, and hierarchized through the constant efforts to position oneself higher up on the social structure based on one’s material possessions
(financial capital) as well as symbolic capitals (social, cultural, and, I suggest,
racial), via the idea of habitus, that is, the way one consumes and displays,
or performs, this consumption.
According to Henri Tajfel, group difference and identity are constituted
together. This insight goes back to Hegel’s discussion of the master-slave
relationship. According to Tajfel (2010), groups constitute themselves in
relation to other individuals and groups. A sense of identity is fostered
through the drawing of borders that separate those inside from those outside. This drawing of borders not only permits the effective separation of
one group into two or more, it also constitutes each group with reference to
the others. Tajfel’s main dialectical insight was that one group can only exist
by defining itself as different from another.
Furthermore, as Rogers Brubaker has demonstrated, groupness is a
variable and not a constant. As such, it cannot be presupposed. Brubaker
(2004) argues that we should think of groupness as events and projects,
oftentimes proposed and pushed through by “ethnopolitical entrepreneurs”
and the organizations they control and manipulate. Behind many of these
group projects stand very tangible power interests. Brubaker also highlights
the potentially tricky relationship between groups and categories—be they
social-science categories or census categories. He asks, for example, “how
categories become groups.”
Taken together, these authors present a vision of the social world as
one of perpetual struggle over positional goods, assets, or capitals, which
individuals and groups use to position themselves higher up on the social
hierarchies of their societies. By doing so, those same social hierarchies are
created and molded—hence the overlap of form and content—in a process
that Anthony Giddens (1986) has called “structuration.”
Applied to the study of citizenship, these basic insights about the working and constitution of the social world lead me to think about citizenship
as a relational asset. As such, its value is constituted by the fact that its
possession is not readily accessible to all in the same amount. From this perspective, substantive citizenship is best described as a contested good, which
implies that those who have citizenship have strong incentives to ensure
that not everybody is able to substantiate their citizenship, transforming it
into effective claims. If this logic applies, then we are likely to end up with a
spectrum of citizenship, with first-class citizens on one end and second-class
citizens on the other. With increased international exposure and interdependence, there is no reason to believe that the competition for substantive
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citizenship will not assume global dimensions and become more embattled
as the world is growing closer together. After all, substantive citizenship is a
very desirable asset that most people on this globe want to possess, or possess
more of, in those countries where citizenship has already reached high levels
of substantiation. As the competition over citizenship sharpens, there is no
good reason to believe that we will eventually reach a point where most of
the world’s population enjoys equal access to substantive citizenship rights.
There is, to the contrary, more reason to believe that the struggle over substantive citizenship will get harsher as more people compete for the rights,
privileges, and entitlements it promises.4
A complicating, yet important question with regard to the asset character of substantive citizenship leads away from analytical frameworks towards
empirical reality. The analytical conceptualization of substantive citizenship
as an asset is so powerful because it allows one to make sense of historical
developments. When applying this lens, one is able to see how citizenship
has indeed undergone a gradual change from being considered an obligation and responsibility, to a right and even an entitlement. John Pocock, as
discussed below, has hinted at this change of the original Athenian meaning of citizenship as early as under the Roman Republic. Such authors as
Hannah Arendt have also pointed out that citizenship has lost its original
meaning of a public obligation and become a mere right, for which citizens
now seek enforcement. Although there is not enough space to examine how
exactly citizenship lost the component of responsibility and obligation, the
end result of such a development is that once transformed into a right without obligations, citizenship has indeed become a commodity and an asset
that can be requested. In the extreme case, probably experienced in its purest form in the contemporary United States, the rights associated with one’s
citizenship have indeed become commodified to such a degree that their
enforcement is advertised by the media. U.S. lawyers thus actively seek to
recruit all those whose rights have been violated so that they can help them
reclaim them (and make some money in the process). In terms of a genealogy of citizenship, this represents a thorough transformation of citizenship
as a public obligation, which grew out of being a full member in a polis, to
citizenship as a social status (as described by T. H. Marshall), to the kind
of citizenship that characterizes most contemporary liberal democracies,
namely, citizenship as an asset.
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Substantive Citizenship as a Social Role

Substantive citizenship is not only relational. By locating the domain of
struggles over its effectiveness in the social realm, we need to take a closer
look at citizenship as a practice that relies on mutual validation. Some
citizens, even though the state grants them equal rights, might still face difficulties when exercising those rights because they suffer from restrictions
created by fellow citizens. Hence, any discussion of citizenship must address
the question of whether citizens are respected and treated as citizens—not
just by the state, but also by their fellow citizens. To adequately capture the
effectiveness of citizenship, we necessarily enter the social domain, where
access, respect, and status have to be negotiated among citizens in their daily
routines, and their meaning has to be substantiated by daily practice.
Substantive citizenship is also very fruitfully analyzed as a social role that
needs to be learned, accepted, and validated by others. Roberto da Matta
(1987), writing about Brazil—where the struggle for citizenship rights has
long occupied social movements and produced many academic treatises
about the limits of citizenship, as well as its different contestations—has
pointed out that citizenship is indeed a social role and, as such, it needs to
be learned. According to da Matta, Brazilians treat anything related to the
state with suspicion, even the role of being a citizen. During his empirical research, conducted during the late 1980s in Rio de Janeiro, da Matta
found that Brazilians always used the word “citizen” in negative situations,
to demarcate the position of someone who is at a disadvantage or inferior. Da Matta further found that invariably, Brazilians, when asked, “How
would you classify a person who obeys the laws in Brazil?” answered negatively. The general tone of the answers provided to this question, according
to da Matta, was that a person who follows the law in Brazil is considered
an idiot (da Matta 1987: 318). Da Matta thus demonstrates that citizenship
is a social role that needs to be learned. He also shows that the role of being
a citizen can vary greatly—depending on the kind of specific socialization
that formal citizens experience when learning the meaning of this attribute.
In the Brazil of the 1980s, as da Matta shows, being a citizen meant very
little, and it did not include such things as having basic rights that are protected and enforced by the state. But whereas da Matta uses his analysis to
ponder about the penetration of private social relations into the realm of the
public, for the purposes of this chapter it is important to retain the basic
insight that substantive citizenship is indeed a social role that needs to be
validated in order to have concrete consequences for a citizen.
James Holston (2008) has more recently termed this quality of citizenship
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“everyday citizenship.” Holston argues that “The quality of . . . mundane
interaction may in fact be more significant to people’s sense of themselves
in society than the occasional heroic experience of citizenship like soldiering
and demonstrating or the emblematic ones like voting and jury duty. Everyday citizenship entails performances that turn people, however else related,
into fellow citizens related by measures specific to citizenship” (Holston
2008: 15).
According to da Matta and Holston, then, democracy is faltering when
the concept of citizenship, although theoretically understood and anchored
as a core principle in a constitution, has not developed into an everyday
practice. Applied to the case of Brazil, this insight highlights the fact that
many Brazilians do not know what it means to act as citizens, nor do
they know what kind of treatment a citizen can and should expect from
other citizens and from the state. In Brazil, as these authors demonstrate,
citizenship is but a word. To the rich and privileged, called the “owners
of power” by another astute Brazilian social scientist (Raymundo Faoro
[1957] 2001), citizenship is a privilege and something the privileged access
whenever needed, thus making it their private domain. To them, citizenship is a special right, which requires money and influence in order to give
it a practical dimension. As Holston and Caldeira (1998) explain, “The
protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of elite
social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words,
appreciated as common rights of citizenship” (Holston and Caldeira 1998,
in Agüero and Stark 1998: 276).
In order to take advantage of civil rights and liberties, one needs either
to have money, or to know the “right” kind of people. All those unable
to count on this capital are subject to a system that consistently denies
basic civil rights, or at least severely complicates access to them. Corrupt
executive branches, and yearlong, often decade-long delays in the judicial
system—which is also plagued by innumerable accounts of impunity for
the well-off—have undermined the quality of Brazilian citizenship to the
point where its dimensions, effectiveness, and reach are not experienced by
average citizens and hence not perceived as rights. To the poor, indigenous,
black, and excluded, citizenship is but an empty concept, as to them, neither the state nor the majority of citizens respect their autonomy, value their
opinions, consider their political preferences, or treat them as equals.
Brazilian elites are not only above the state, they perceive the state and
any state-related services as instruments of their whim. Brazilian elites, in
other words, have privatized the state and the public realm and use them
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as instruments to control, co-opt, appease, or, if pressured, serve the ordinary people. This service, if it exists at all, is always treated more as a favor
than a duty and it is, more often than not, of bad quality. But the Brazilian
example is just that: an example introduced here to illustrate the fruitfulness
of thinking about, and analyzing, citizenship also as a social role.
However, the effectiveness of being a citizen depends on the recognition
of individual autonomy and the possession of inalienable rights by oneself,
by others, and by the overarching institutions that exercise power over one’s
life—first and foremost the state. The implications of this argument are not
readily apparent, but they are far reaching. On a very basic level, this argument goes directly against the idea that citizenship rights can be created by
decree. No law or legal framework can possibly create effective, that is substantive, citizenship. Equal status under the law, in short, is a necessary but
not sufficient condition of effective citizenship. According to Jürgen Habermas, “Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the
confines of class and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can the potential of an unleashed cultural pluralism
fully develop” (Habermas 1998: 308). I shall develop other implications of
the social dimension of citizenship below, especially when discussing the
Colombian and Brazilian cases.

The Dialectics of Citizenship

Thinking about citizenship as a social role and a relational asset already
implies adopting a dialectical analytical framework, as it focuses the analyst’s
gaze away from fixed and static phenomena onto the dynamics and tensions
that result between given extremes and ideal types. A dialectical analysis
instead focuses on process, negotiation, and tensions. Applying such a
perspective alerts us to the fact that citizenship went hand in hand with
exclusion from its very conception in democratic Athens. Indeed, it is hardly
coincidental that citizenship lost much of its substance as soon as it was
applied to a larger group of people. In democratic Athens, we can observe
a dialectical relationship between the amount of rights and privileges that
citizenship granted and the degree of its exclusivity. As soon as citizenship
gained more meaning after the successive reforms by Solon, Cleisthenes,
and Ephialtes, Pericles, who succeeded these important democratic reformers, labored to restrict access to citizenship rights. According to Ober, “In
451/0 a new law, advocated by Pericles, limited citizenship to those who
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could demonstrate that they were sons of Athenians on their mother’s as
well as their father’s side. Formerly, sons of non-Athenian mothers had been
allowed to become citizens” (Ober 1989: 81). Furthermore, “An attempt in
403/2 to limit franchise to property owners was rejected, as was a proposal
to broaden the franchise by granting citizenship to slaves who had helped
in the revolution against the Thirty. The Athenians thus reasserted both
political equality among citizens and the exclusivity of the citizen body. . . .
Allowing slaves to be citizens would deny the linkage between patriotism
and citizen blood. Homonoia, ‘same-mindedness,’ demanded both equality
and exclusivity” (Ober 1989: 97f ).
This restriction of the citizenry happened in response to important
democratic reforms conducted some fifty years earlier—reforms that deepened the rights associated with citizenship. According to Ober, “In 462,
an important, if somewhat obscure, series of reforms crippled the direct
political power of the elite. A certain Ephialtes led a movement to strip the
‘extra powers’ from the Areopagus council . . . the Areopagus probably lost
some of its legal powers, including the authority to review and set aside as
‘unconstitutional’ decisions of the Assembly” (Ober 1989: 77). Thus, when
elites lost privileges and citizenship gained in importance, it also became
more exclusive.
The development of citizenship and its relation to exclusion also becomes
very clear in the Roman Republic and during the Empire. According to John
Pocock, in Rome, “citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it
rights to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps
expectations—available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable
to many kinds of persons for many kinds of reasons” (Pocock, in Beiner
2007: 36). It no longer meant what it had in Athens, where “citizenship is
not just a means to being free; it is the way of being free itself ” (Pocock,
in Beiner 2007: 32). Thus it appears citizenship lost its muscle whenever it
was extended to a greater number of people. For Pocock, the legalization
of citizenship conducted under the guidance of the Roman lawyer Gaius
(c.e. 130–180) was the beginning of possessive individualism and the rise
of “homo legalis”—a person whose rights and political power were defined
by the amount of assets he commanded. It was also the beginning of stripping citizenship of its aspects of obligation and responsibility. The more
citizenship came to solely mean access to rights and entitlements, the more
it became subject to the logic of competitive markets, where most assets
were worth more if others did not possess them. More than the legalization of citizenship, this transformation meant a gradual commodification of
citizenship, and its mutation into a possession and a good that only the rich
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and powerful could afford. In 1981, Pocock wrote: “It begins to look, however, as if the characteristic tendency of jurisprudence was to lower the level
of participation and deny the premise that man is by nature political. . . .
As the polis and res publica declined toward the level of municipality, two
things happened: the universe became pervaded by law, the locus of whose
sovereignty was extra-civic, and the citizen came to be defined not by his
actions and virtues, but by his rights to do things” (Pocock 1981: 359f ).
These classical examples amply testify to the fruitfulness of conceptualizing citizenship in terms of relational assets and social roles, especially
when considering the nature, reach, and conditions of citizenship in relation to exclusion. Seen from this angle, citizenship and exclusion are indeed
intimately connected, or even mutually constitutive, and hence causally
entwined.
Modern examples of the dialectical relationship between citizenship
and exclusion equally abound. The last European constituencies practicing
direct democracy, some Swiss cantons, also controlled the right to be a citizen very closely, in some cases excluding women from being full citizens.
Once full suffrage was achieved across all of Switzerland (in 1971), direct
democracy started to mean less, and it underwent a similar transition—
described by Pocock when discussing the transition from the strong sense
of citizenship that prevailed in Athens to the weaker legal notion that characterized Rome. As a result, more and more of the decisions previously
made by citizen assemblies are now conducted by specialized agencies, and
direct democracy in Switzerland is gradually changing and morphing into a
representative system, while those cantons that retain direct rule are among
the most exclusionary (Kriesi 2008). Citizenship, it appears, is indeed best
thought of as constantly negotiated and heavily embedded in social interactions. As a privilege and an entitlement, it is not equally distributed and
not easily socialized.

Racism and the Power of Whiteness

To add further validity to my proposal of analyzing substantive citizenship through the lens of social roles and asset distributions, I shall focus
on another, very pervasive way in which the substantiation of citizenship
is denied to some individuals and groups by their fellow first-class citizens,
namely, through racism. For many minorities, racism translates into secondclass citizenship, as it undermines trust in public institutions and exposes
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those stigmatized to the discriminatory practices of their fellow citizens. The
remainder of this chapter explores some of the ways in which the distinction
between first- and second-class citizens is upheld by those benefiting from
it. As stated above, I seek to demonstrate that one of the most significant
and far-reaching ways to defend first-class citizenship vis-à-vis second-class
citizenship is racism.
Accepting the assumption that substantive citizenship is at the same
time a social role and a relational asset leads me to the third component of
my argument—namely, the importance of racism in conditioning and constraining the effectiveness of citizenship for racialized subjects.
An important dialectical relationship exists between two key aspects of
racism—namely, the relationship between the normalization of whiteness,
where whiteness functions as a symbolic capital, and the racialization of
nonwhites, and their transformation through this process into “others” (Harris 1993; Reiter 2010). Successfully claiming to be white, at least in those
societies structured by European colonialism, and under conditions where
citizenship finds foremost expression in rights and entitlements, whiteness
functions as a symbolic capital that marks one’s belonging to the group of
the historically privileged—those who have rights and can give favors. It
also demarcates the boundary between the privileged and the others—all
those who have to depend on favors and protections. The process through
which this structuring of social hierarchies works not only separates people
into two groups—the “deservingly” privileged and the undeserving rest; it
is through this very process that “the rest” become “others.” In this process, whiteness is anything but a biological reality, but a negotiated symbolic
good and a capital. To those who are able to claim it successfully, it offers
important tools with which to uphold and defend privilege.5
Michel Foucault has termed this process “normalization,” because
by applying whiteness as a criterion to structure social space, whiteness becomes the norm and nonwhiteness the exception. Furthermore,
through this process, whites become the moral majority and nonwhites
minorities and “others”—even in societies where whites actually represent
a numerical minority. As whites become the norm, nonwhites become
problems and objects of scrutiny, preoccupation, and desire—but they
never become equals. Whiteness, to be sure, is not a biological attribute,
but a symbolic good that has to be negotiated and validated socially. As
such, it works in increments, so that some people are able to claim more
of it than others, irrespective of their biological background. In most
societies, successful claiming to be white is a matter of financial capital,
behavior, language, and dress code, among other things.
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Hence, this process of ordering and hierarchizing social space by using
whiteness as a criterion is at the same time one of racialization and normalization. Applied to the case of citizenship in the part of the world colonized
by Europeans, claiming to be white is one of the central tools used by historically privileged groups to explain their own privilege and justify their
privileged access to rights. It is also the main resource for explaining and
justifying the exclusion of all “others.” According to Reiter (2010),
Whiteness constitutes capital in addition to the other types of capital, namely
financial, social, and cultural. Their importance, however, does not follow a
simple additive logic. One type of capital rather connects to the others and
together they determine the social place an individual will hold in a society.
This allows for some flexibility, as one form of capital can be used to partly
compensate for the lack of another, although this flexibility is limited precisely
by the lumped condition of the different capitals. In that way, as Bourdieu
points out correctly, each single form of capital tends to over-determine the
social position of its carrier, as the presence or absence of each single one is
perceived as being indicative of the presence or absence of the others. It is in
this sense that whiteness over-determines its carrier, bestowing him with a social
position that might not be warranted. In other words, because of the composite
character of the different forms of capital, whiteness signals the presence of
other forms, even though they might not be present. (Reiter 2010: 29)

The result of upholding whiteness as a criterion for privilege and using it
as a demarcation to separate first- from second-class citizens is that a formidable barrier to achieving general, substantive citizenship is created. It tends
to place nonwhite citizens living in Europe, and the part of the world colonized by Europeans, outside of the realm of effective citizenship. Despite
their formal citizenship, they are treated as second-class citizens or even foreigners, as Etienne Balibar (2004) has argued for France, and Reiter (2008)
has demonstrated for Portugal. In countries like Brazil, where nonwhites
account for over 40 percent of the total population and where blacks predominate in some regions and cities, the same tendency prevails, as Brazilian
historian Beatriz Gois Dantas (1988) has convincingly shown. To the white
elites of the Americas, nonwhites are not really part of “their” nation; they
remain suspicious, foreign, alien, and “others within,” in the case of blacks,
and a nation apart, or “others outside,” in the case of indigenous people.
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Conclusion

Europe’s difficulties in integrating non-Europeans, and the trumping of
nationalism over citizenship, as well as the related trumping of particularism
over universalism, put it in company with other regions and countries of
the world that face similar challenges of redefining belonging under conditions of ethnic and cultural diversity, increased transborder migration, and
heightened market competition. Europe’s difficulty in dealing with “others”
thus invites international comparison, which proves helpful to finding new
and innovative ways to analyze citizenship. Analysts of Brazilian democracy
James Holston and Teresa Caldeira (1998), for example, argue that in Brazil, “the protections and immunities civil rights are intended to ensure as
constitutional norms are generally perceived and experienced as privileges of
elite social statuses and thus of limited access. They are not, in other words,
appreciated as common rights of citizenship” (Holston and Caldeira 1998:
276). Etienne Balibar (2004) reached a similar verdict for Europe in general,
and for France in particular. Lessons learned from studying the limits of
citizenship in Brazil thus prove helpful to the analysis of French citizenship
in particular and European citizenship in general—and vice versa.
At the center of the limitations of citizenship, be it in contemporary
Europe, Latin America, or the ancient world, seem exclusive definitions of
community. The struggle over privilege always seems to be a struggle over
holding “them” out, so that “we” can enjoy our privileges undisturbed. In
this very process, who counts as “us” and who as “them” are enacted and
reinforced. Once the question of who “they” are is settled, the identity of
“us” follows by default. In its modern manifestation, this logic takes the
form of nationalism—but before nation-states emerged, the struggle over
erecting, justifying, and defending exclusive communities was no less fierce,
as I shall demonstrate below.
Hannah Arendt stated wisely that “Of all forms of government and
organizations of people, the nation-state is least suited for unlimited growth
because the genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely,
and is only rarely, and with great difficulty, won from conquered peoples”
(Arendt 1966: 126). In her analysis of The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt
further argues that
Conquest, as well as empire building had fallen into disrepute for very good
reasons. They had been carried out successfully only by governments which,
like the Roman Republic, were based primarily on law, so that conquest could
be followed by integration of the most heterogeneous peoples by imposing on
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them a common law. The nation-state, however, based upon a homogeneous
population’s active consent to its government (“le plebiscite de tous les jours”),
lacked such a unifying principle and would, in the case of conquest, have to
assimilate rather than to integrate, to enforce consent rather than justice, that
is, to degenerate into tyranny. Robespierre was already well aware of this when
he exclaimed: “Perissent les colonies si elles nous en coutent l’honneur, la liberté”
(Arendt 1966: 125).

Edwige Lefebvre (2003), in turn, argues that “Homogeneity is the
precondition for the unity of the pouvoir constituant, and the goal of the
constitution is not the organization of the life of the nation, but the establishment of government rules” (Lefebvre 2003: 18). Gary Wilder (2005)
proves this argument to be right by demonstrating that the French imperial
nation-state was never able, or willing, to expand full and equal citizenship
rights to its conquered peoples in the Caribbean. According to Wilder,
“Republicanism, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and colonialism were
internal elements of an expanded French state that were articulated within
an encompassing imperial system” (Wilder 2005: 26). On a similar note,
Laurent Dubois (2004) depicts the difficulties that the First Republic
encountered in accepting and integrating its former slaves in Guadeloupe.
His detailed historical analysis of the years immediately following the
French Revolution allows us to witness not only the racist bias of colonial
masters, who had much to lose by granting slaves citizenship rights, but
also some mainland revolutionaries who sought to uphold culturally biased
definitions of the “universal rights of men.”6
In the Western world, citizenship, it appears, was contested from its
very beginning and contrasted with the second-class citizenship of those
rendered “others” by nationalist power politics that sought to restrict substantive citizenship rights in order to secure the privileges that European
descent could provide. Making former colonial subjects formal citizens
without ever including them in the “imagined community” of the nation,
and without extending the concrete and substantive rights and entitlements
of citizenship to them, thus offered the “perfect solution” to uphold social
hierarchies. This move signaled the beginning of white double standards
and guilt, as well as black double-consciousness and indigenous apartheid.
This diagnosis also casts a deep shadow over the reach and depth of the
modern principles of universal rights advocated by the French Revolution,
as fraternité appears to have had a restrictive meaning from its very beginning. Beginning with the French revolutionaries, European colonizers and
their descendants did not imagine nonwhites to truly be brothers. The
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genealogy of these dialectics of exclusion can be traced back all the way to
the beginning of citizenship in classical Athens.
In this book, I thus propose to examine the quality and substantiveness
of citizenship and democracy by analyzing it through the lens of citizenship and second-class citizenship, rights and duties, inclusion and exclusion,
belonging and remaining an outsider, being a national and a foreigner.
Instead of arguing that reality is indeed structured by these dualisms, I propose to only use these categories and words as lenses, or angles, that allow
us to analyze reality in innovative and fruitful ways. This endeavor is the
more fruitful the more this angle is able to capture the dynamics that bind
the above dualisms together, and the more it is able to focus the analysis
on the mutually constitutive dimensions of these analytical pairs. Reality,
to be sure, is not structured around dualisms. It is complex, heavily interdependent, and contingent along a multiplicity of factors. Nothing can be
said that “truly” captures reality, be it the reality of citizenship or any other.
However, by proposing to analyze the reality of citizenship by focusing on
its everyday dimensions, its substantiveness, its relational character, and its
social embeddedness, I propose a theory-driven and hence simplifying angle
that puts this segment of reality into a certain order, thus allowing it to make
sense. Any order, as Immanuel Kant knew, springs out of our own minds
and is not inherent to nature, let alone to social reality. The worst way to
deal with this potentially disturbing fact is to ignore it and pretend that our
understanding of reality is direct and unmediated, neutral, objective, and
not influenced by our own situatedness. Second worst is to argue that reality is indeed structured by the categories and theories we use to explain it.
Doing so means falling prey to reification and risking the analysis of oneself
while claiming to analyze the world.
Equipped with the ontological, epistemological, conceptual, and methodological tools elaborated in chapters 1 and 2, I should be able to steer
free from all the potential pitfalls already discussed, and I am now ready to
apply the analytical tools and insights I have created to empirical reality.
In what follows, I will thus apply this analytical apparatus to several cases
in order to illustrate their usefulness and fruitfulness for producing insight
and understanding about the workings and conditionalities of effective
citizenship. As explained above, the cases presented here do not serve the
purpose of testing my hypotheses. They are also not selected according to
a traditional case-study rationale. Instead, each case serves the purpose of
highlighting one central theme, or facet, of how citizenship is lived and
experienced by different peoples at different times and under different circumstances. If similarities and patterns emerge—and I hope to be able to
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demonstrate that they do—then these regularities are more an unveiling
of the human condition when living in society, or otherwise organized in
groups, than they are an unveiling of regularities, or even laws, of nature
or behavior. In essence, each case study focuses on one particular way in
which citizenship is lived, experienced, performed, and implicated by other
factors external to it, so that by the end, the reader should have gained a
relatively complex and well-rounded picture of the different realities hiding
behind the term “citizenship.” After reading this book, he or she should also
be in a position to formulate specific questions about citizenship regimes in
different places and at different times.

Chapter 3

Classical Citizenship
The Political and the Social
In a quarter century, Greek self-knowledge passed from the idea of a
divine anthropogony to the idea of man’s self-creation. The stasimon from
Antigone and, with it, consubstantially and unsurpassably, Thucydides’
Funeral Oration, which comes twelve years later, give this self-knowledge its
most striking forms.
— Cornelius Castoriadis, 1991

This chapter focuses on classical citizenship as practiced
and experienced in Athens and the Roman Republic. To do so, for a political scientist, is to venture onto thin ice, as I have to rely almost entirely
on secondary sources and a few translated primary sources. The chapter is,
however, a necessary part of this book, as it allows me to add a historical
dimension to the problem of democracy, citizenship, and exclusion. Exclusion from citizenship, as well as the establishment of second-class citizenship
as a contrast to full, or first-class citizenship, is not new, as this chapter will
show. It reaches back to the very beginnings of democracy—at least to those
democracies of which we have records.1
A thorough critique of the Western democratic tradition and the ideas
associated with it, such as liberalism and republicanism, the way I intend
to conduct it here, would be incomplete without an analysis of classical
Athens and Rome. By including these cases, as well as the chapter to follow about citizenship in medieval city republics, I also seek to provide
a genealogy of citizenship. If exclusivity and discrimination were indeed
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integral parts of every historical example of citizenship we know of, as I
seek to demonstrate, then it is safe to say that citizenship and exclusion
are indeed mutually constitutive of each other to the point where one has
never existed, and in all likelihood cannot exist, without the other.
This chapter, then, focuses on Athenian citizenship when it first
emerged, in 594 b.c.e., with the reforms instituted by Solon. It develops
several themes: first, what democracy and citizenship meant to Athenians;
second, whom it excluded and how; third, how societal inequality was dealt
with in Athens; and fourth, what happened to Athenian democracy once it
was absorbed by Rome.
The analysis of the Roman Republic is crucial to one of the central
arguments of the whole book, namely, the commodification of citizenship,
which started, according to John Pocock (1995) as early as the second century c.e., when the Roman lawyer Gaius started to codify Roman law, thus
changing the character of citizenship from political to legal. The second
part of this chapter will thus focus on the Roman Republic and the relationship between a codification of laws and the resultant depoliticization of
democracy.

Democracy and Citizenship in Athens

The descriptions of ancient Greek democracy by Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon,
Herodotus, Polybius, and Pericles, and the many modern and contemporary scholars who have made ancient Greece their field of study, allow us to
reconstruct how democracy was practiced in Athens and surrounding Attica
between 507 b.c.e., when Cleisthenes reformed Athenian governmental
institutions in such a way as to avoid the concentration of power among the
elites, and 338 b.c.e., when Athens came under the control of Philip II of
Macedon, after the battle of Chaeronea, and joined the League of Corinth
in 337 b.c.e., effectively ending its independence.
The ancient Greek polis sought to nurture its members’ sense of moral
responsibility towards the collective. Accordingly, the chief benefit of living
in a polis was justice and moral improvement, as, according to Aristotle, the
polis “enunciates what is just, thereby allowing man’s best qualities to flourish” (Manville 1997: 45).
Aristotle explains in his Politics: “To be fellow citizens is to be sharers
in one polis, and to have one polis is to have one place of residence” (Pol.
1260b40–1261a1) According to Aristotle, the citizen of the polis is one “who
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enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative or judicial office” (Pol. 1275b18–
20). Thus, according to the words of one analyst, Athenian citizens were not
taxpayers, but shareholders in a corporation whose profits were moral excellence (Manville 1997: 45).
To be a full Athenian citizen thus did not mean to have influence
in the doings of the state, but rather to be part of the state. Athenian
democracy provides not only the strongest example of direct democracy,
but also an example of a political system where ruling and being ruled
overlapped considerably. The core of Athenian democracy consisted of
not separating rulers from ruled. Indeed, Athenian citizens all participated
in the ruling of their polity. To ensure that this setup remained in place,
Athenian statesmen devised several means, such as appointment to office
by lot. In addition, several institutions were created for the purpose of
avoiding a concentration of power among state officials. The strong commitment to avoiding a system where something like a political ruling class
emerged becomes evident from many of the formulations Aristotle uses to
describe Athenian democracy; for example, when he explains that since
some people are not superior to others, “it is clear that, for a variety of
reasons, all must share alike in the business of ruling and being ruled by
turns” (Aristotle, Pol. 1332b12, 1992: 432).

The Character of Athenian Citizenship

According to Manville (1997), “Citizenship was membership in the Athenian polis, with all that this implied—legal status, but also the more
intangible aspects of the life of the citizen that related to his status. It was
simultaneously a complement of formal obligations and privileges, and the
behavior, feelings, and communal attitudes attendant upon them” (Manville 1997: 7).
In fact, Athenian full citizens had plenty of rights and even more obligations. Once they reached legal adulthood, all young Athenian male citizens
were expected to serve in the military. Citizens also were entitled to participate in public cults, festivals, and religious worship. They had the right
to attend, speak, and vote in the popular assembly (ekklesia). They could
serve (after the age of thirty) as a juror in the law courts (dikasteria). Very
importantly, depending on age and eligibility, they could exercise elected
and allotted offices (archai). They were entitled to redress and receive protection from the laws. They were allowed to own land in Attica. Finally, they
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were entitled to receive public disbursements for services provided (Manville 1997: 9).
Thus, Athenian citizenship consisted of a set of rights and obligations
and duties towards the collective. It was not a set of legal entitlements only,
but rather a political system of breaking down the barriers between ruling
and being ruled as much as possible. For Ostwald, “the Greeks tended to see
citizenship more in the context of sharing and being part of a community
on which the individual depends for his or her sense of identity” (Ostwald
1996: 49). In Athens, citizens ruled themselves. According to Josiah Ober,
“For the first time in the recorded history of a complex society, all native
freeborn males, irrespective of their ability, family connections, or wealth,
were political equals, with equal rights to debate and to determine state
policy” (Ober 1989: 7).
To clarify: Classical citizenship, rather than a right, instead focused on
responsibilities and duties. In his famous speech, Pericles emphasizes the
duties and responsibilities of Athenian citizenship when he states, “For we
alone regard the man who takes no part in such things not as one who
minds his own business (apragmona), but as one who has no business here
at all (achreion). (2.40.2)” (quoted in Manville 1997: 15).
Athenian citizenship thus meant a lot to all those who were citizens.
It made them power holders and rulers of their own destinies. How could
such a system be achieved and sustained? The successive reforms conducted
under Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes provided the institutional framework that made Athenian democracy possible.

Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes:
Counterbalancing Societal Inequalities
through Political Institutions

Aristotle says of Solon (c. 638 b.c.e.–558 b.c.e.): “By setting up courts
drawn from the entire body of citizens, he did establish democracy in Athens” (Aristotle 1992: 161). For Aristotle, popular participation in the courts
(dikasteria) was the core element where popular sovereignty ultimately
rested. Martin Ostwald, the renowned scholar of ancient Greece, agrees,
arguing that “Solon established popular power by opening membership in
the law courts to all” (Ostwald 1986: 5). Ostwald further explains that “From
pre-Solonian times on, there were in Athens two kinds of law courts. Most
private litigation fell within the jurisdiction of one of the nine archons, each
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in charge of his own tribunal and each within a well-defined sphere of competence, authorized to judge lawsuits in their own fight, and not, as they do
nowadays, merely to conduct the preliminary inquiry” (Aristotle, Ath.Pol.
3.5). Other cases regarded as private were tried before the Areopagus—that
is, the council of ex-archons with considerable power across several jurisdictions, which had, at all times in Athenian history, jurisdiction in all cases of
homicide, of wounding or poisoning with intent to kill, of arson, and such
religious matters as the care of the sacred olive trees (Ostwald 1986: 6f; also
Sealey 1964: 12).
Aristotle credits Solon for the introduction of the procedure of eisangelia
and explains, “A characteristic feature of eisangelia in classical times was
that it could be initiated by any citizen, usually before the Council but on
occasion also in the Assembly (Aristotle, Ath.Pol. 43.4)” (Ostwald 1986:
9). Most specialists agree that the core of the Solonian reforms consisted of
three measures. First, the prohibition against giving loans on the security of
the person of the debtor, thus providing important safeguards against losing
one’s freedom, and thus establishing very basic rights of unalienable personhood for Athenian citizens; second, the right to take legal action on behalf
of an injured party, independent from one’s social standing; and third, the
institution of an appeals procedure (ephesis) and a new court (the heliaia) to
hear appeals, which provided a check against the arbitrary administration of
justice on the part of the aristocratic establishment and made the people the
court of last resort (Ostwald 1986: 14f ).
Democratic reform in Athens was advanced even further by Cleisthenes (c. 570–507 b.c.e.). Cleisthenes’s reforms were mentioned by the
historian Herodotus, who credits him with the true establishment of Athenian democracy. The central question that Cleisthenes addressed was how
to prevent societal inequalities from spilling over into the public realm.
In contrast with modern reform proposals that target societal inequalities and seek to achieve equitable political influence by equalizing society,
Cleisthenes took societal inequalities for granted and instead sought to
devise ways to diminish their importance in the political realm. The main
way Cleisthenes pursued this goal was by breaking ethnic loyalties and
replacing them with civic ones. This was achieved, in the main, by dividing Attica into three regions—city, coast, and inland—and then creating
small administrative units, called demes. Above the demes, Cleisthenes
created thirty trittyes and above those, ten phylai. Each phylus (tribe) contained three trittyes, one trittye from each of the three regions (Jones 1999:
155). The system that emerged from the Cleisthenic reforms is depicted
in the figure.
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Source: University of Oregon.

This institutional design provided a way to neutralize the political influence of dynastic clans, family factions, and regional loyalty by diluting them
and forcing different regional groups (pedieis, the faction of the plains;
paralioi, the faction of the coast; and hyperakrioi, the faction of the hills
[Ellis and Stanton 1968: 98]) together into new associations. Furthermore,
Cleisthenes created six new trittyes, that is, regional associations, amplifying
them from the previous four and populating those new trittyes with demes
from different regions, with different social and economic standing. This is
the mixed form of government that Aristotle talks about in his treatise on
politics (Ostwald 1986: 19).
However, according to Ostwald, even after Cleisthenes’s reforms, the
Athenian upper class still controlled several important political institutions,
thus giving it supremacy and control over the ordinary citizens. Particularly,
the treasurers still had to be members of the highest property class, and the
nine archons, or governors, of the highest two. Furthermore, the Aeropagus,
that is, the high court of appeal for both criminal and civil cases, was still
dominated by societal elites (Ostwald 1986: 26f ).
However, Cleisthenes also sought to weaken the power and influence
of the Aeropagus by shifting authority of certain cases over to the lesser,
less elite-dominated court of the heliaia (Ostwald 1986: 28). Considered
as a whole, the Cleisthenian reforms created the basis for political equality
among citizens through enforcing, institutionally, the principles of political
equality, or isonomia (Ober 1989: 70).
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The final measures towards establishing true political equality among
citizens are associated with the third of the Athenian reformers, Ephialtes.
Ostwald explains, “Just as political isonomia implied that no legislative
measure could be valid without the approval of the Assembly, so a judicial
isonomia was introduced, either by Cleisthenes himself or soon after his
reforms, in crimes against the state, in which the verdict of the people as a
whole acted as a counterweight to what had been the sole jurisdiction by
a body composed of the rich and well born. Ephialtes’ achievement was
to complete the process by giving the people full sovereignty in handling
crimes against the state” (Ostwald 1986: 39f ).
According to Ober, “In 462, an important, if somewhat obscure, series
of reforms crippled the direct political power of the elite. A certain Ephialtes
led a movement to strip the ‘extra powers’ from the Areopagus council . . .
the Areopagus probably lost some of its legal powers, including the authority to review and set aside as ‘unconstitutional’ decisions of the Assembly”
(Ober 1989: 77; also Rihil 1995).2 Ostwald provides some more detail on
the reforms introduced by Ephialtes. He explains that
The transfer of judicial powers in political cases from an aristocratic body,
the Areopagus, to the Council of the Five Hundred, in which every deme of
Attica was represented, to the Assembly, of which every adult male citizen was
a member, and eventually to the jury courts, on which every adult male was
eligible to serve, did not, to be sure, place executive power into the hands of
the demos. The highest offices in the state remained the preserve of the higher
property classes, and even the opening of the archonship to the zeugitai as of
457/6 b.c. (Aristotle, Ath.Pol. 26.2), which was a further step toward a more
complete democracy meant only that this office no longer ranked as a major
magistracy. Still, by transferring jurisdiction in political cases from the Areopagus to popular organs, Ephialtes gave the demos an effective control over the
executive offices that is tantamount to guardianship over the state; by extending to judicial proceedings the isonomia that Cleisthenes had given the people
in legislative matters, he created popular sovereignty, which was justly called
demokratia. (Ostwald 1986: 49)

Each deme annually sent a fixed number (based upon its population) of
individuals to serve on the new advisory Council of 500, which replaced the
Solonian Council of 400, and by doing so, the elite lost its veto power over
the decisions of the masses (Ober 1989: 78). In this Council of 500, every
Athenian citizen had the right to speak, called isegoria, thus making it the
basis of popular sovereignty.
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After 462, Athenian democracy saw a lowering of property qualifications
for office holding, as well as the introduction of pay for government service
(Ober 1989: 79). In 457 all offices, including the archonships, were opened
to the zeugitai, that is, manual workers (Ober 1989: 80). This movement
away from property qualification was indeed gradually expanding during
the fifth century b.c.e., so that by the fourth century there were no more
property qualifications for office holding, and even thetes, that is, landless
peasants and agricultural laborers, could hold public office—and in fact
many did (Ober 1989: 80).
In sum, Athenian citizens learned, through practical political participation, how to rule themselves and their polity, leading Ober to the conclusion
that “At Athens the masses ruled, and the decisions of the majority were
binding upon the minority . . . the absence of property qualifications for
the exercise of citizenship rights was a basic principle of the Athenian political order. Pay for office holding and for political participation, selection
of magistrates by lot, and the right of free speech in the Assembly—all of
which were guaranteed by the binding nature of mass decisions upon the
entire populace—made domination of the state’s political apparatus by rich
citizens more difficult” (Ober 1989: 193).
However, given that Athenian citizenship bestowed so many rights and
duties on every citizen, it is not surprising that Athenian citizenship was
highly circumscribed and exclusive. Furthermore, the more rights and duties
became associated with Athenian citizenship, the more restrictive it became.
The relationship between the depth of citizen rights and responsibilities and
its exclusivity deserves some further inquiry.

Differentiated Voting Rights and
Xenophobia under Pericles

Max Weber (1968) provides a rather skeptical assessment of the degree to
which average poor citizens were able to wrest power away from the hands
of the rich and aristocratic. According to Weber, in Athens, “the political
equality of the free-born citizenry was vitiated by the gradation of voting
rights and office eligibility, originally in terms of ground rents and armed
service capabilities and later according to wealth” (Weber 1968: 1311).
Indeed, in Athens, the right to be elected into certain offices was restricted,
first by descent and later by wealth, and then again, during the time of
Pericles, by descent, which is commonly attributed to the increased influx
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of foreigners (xenoi) into Attica—some of whom would be eligible for office
if wealth had remained the criterion to regulate active citizenship.3
In the years 450–451, Athens introduced payment for judicial officeholders, as well as for all those serving in the boule, thus making it possible
for the poor, and all those dependent on their daily income, to take time
off in order to attend to issues of public interest. However, this measure to
popularize political participation and office holding was counterbalanced
by measures aimed at restricting the definition of who counted as a citizen.
A typical dialectical tradeoff was set in motion, one that would make
reappearances throughout the history of democratic rule and, as a consequence, appears in several chapters of this book. When citizenship is
valuable to those who have it, they will seek ways to restrict access to it.
The asset character of citizenship becomes clear in all these maneuverings.
When citizenship means little and promises few tangible benefits, access is
relatively open. When, however, citizenship is invested with more rights,
privileges, and entitlements, those who have it tend to seek to limit the
number of people with whom they wish to share the benefits. Athens is but
one example of many—but it is certainly the oldest one on record.
During the time when Pericles (495–429 b.c.e.) was exercising much
influence on Athenian politics, in the 450s, citizenship was restricted to
those who descended from both an Athenian father and mother—whereas
before that time, having an Athenian father was sufficient. As John Thorley
(1996) points out, during the time of Pericles “the advantage of being an
Athenian citizen and the feeling of power it gave were very real” (Thorley
1996: 66). Thorley is referring to the export and import taxes paid to Athens
at the harbor of Piraeus. Furthermore, Pericles’s time was one of expansion
and establishment of colonies in Italy and Thrace, and hence the appearance
of colonial subjects. Under such circumstances, Athenian citizens moved to
secure their privileges by shielding them against foreigners (xenoi) and what
today are termed legal resident aliens, metics (metoikoi).
By classifying and separating political rights from civic responsibilities,
and reserving rights to some while demanding responsibilities from others,
Athens also gave birth to a regime of differentiated first- and second-class
citizenship.
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Exclusion and Second -Class
Citizens: Xenoi and Metoikoi

Even after the reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes, Athenian citizenship remained heavily circumscribed. Aristotle argued that “The citizen
must not live a mechanical or commercial life. Such a life is not noble, and
it militates against virtue. Nor must those who are to be citizens be agricultural workers, for they must have leisure to develop their virtue, and for the
activities of a citizen” (Aristotle, Pol. 1328b24, 1992: 415). For Aristotle,
women, slaves, foreign residents, visitors, and manual workers (banausoi)
did not deserve full citizenship rights. Banausoi could participate in assemblies, but they were not allowed to hold office. Explains Aristotle: “But the
best state will not make the mechanic a citizen. But even if he is to be a
citizen, then at any rate what we have called the virtue of a citizen cannot
be ascribed to everyone, not yet to free men alone, but simply to those who
are in fact relieved of necessary tasks” (Aristotle, Pol. 1277b33, 1992: 184).
Indeed, after 450, Athenian citizenship was restricted to those of double
Athenian descent, while women, slaves, and resident aliens—the majority of the total adult population—remained excluded from participation
in political life (Ober 1989: 5). According to Ober, “In 451/0 a new law,
advocated by Pericles, limited citizenship to those who could demonstrate
that they were sons of Athenians on their mother’s as well as their father’s
side. Formerly, sons of non-Athenian mothers had been allowed to become
citizens. The immediate concern prompting the reform may have been the
tendency of Athenian clerouchs [that is, Athenian citizens residing in one of
the colonies] . . . to marry foreign women while abroad” (Ober 1989: 81;
also Walters 1983: 332).
As mentioned above, it was indeed after the reforms of Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes that foreigners (xenoi) and resident aliens (metoikoi)
saw their citizenship rights further curtailed, or eliminated altogether.4 This
limiting of citizenship happened precisely at a time of increased foreign
presence in Athens. Explains Ober (1989), “An attempt in 403/2 to limit
franchise to property owners was rejected, as was a proposal to broaden the
franchise by granting citizenship to slaves who had helped in the revolution against the Thirty. The Athenians thus reasserted both political equality
among citizens and the exclusivity of the citizen body. . . . Allowing slaves
to be citizens would deny the linkage between patriotism and citizen blood.
Homonoia, ‘same-mindedness,’ demanded both equality and exclusivity”
(Ober 1989: 97f ).
According to Peter J. Rhodes (2004), in the Athenian polis of the fifth
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and fourth centuries b.c., “making a decision was entrusted to the citizens
directly, in an ekklesia, assembly, open to all citizens (some kinds of business required a quorum of 6,000, perhaps 10 percent of the citizens before
the Peloponnesian War of 431–404 and 20 percent after), guided, but not
seriously limited by the boule, council, numbering 500, a representative
body whose membership changed each year” (Rhodes 2004: 3). Rhodes
also explains that “There was no property qualification for the enjoyment
of political rights (but even Athens had a qualification for office holding,
still enforced in the 5th century but not in the fourth, when the number of
citizens was lower), and the stipends made it easier for the poorer citizens to
exercise their rights; and the assembly was not dominated by authorities but
was a powerful body and one in which all the citizens could play an active
part” (Rhodes 2004: 4).
After Athens had lost the Peloponnesian War in 413 b.c.e., which
brought economic hardship to Athens and stripped it of its regional supremacy, Athenian citizenship became even more restrictive. In the 370s, the law
regulating citizenship was as follows:
If an alien shall live as husband with an Athenian woman in any way or manner whatsoever, he may be indicted before the Thesmothetae by anyone who
chooses to do so from among the Athenians having the right to bring charges.
And if he be convicted, he shall be sold, himself and his property, and the third
part shall belong to the one securing his conviction. The same principle shall
hold also if an alien woman shall live as wife with an Athenian, and the Athenian who lives as husband with the alien woman so convicted shall be fined one
thousand drachmae. (Demosthenes 59.16)

This new, more restrictive regulating of access to the benefits of Athenian
citizenship gives further evidence of the apparently inherent tradeoff between
the quality of citizenship rights and the inclusiveness of such a regime.

Lessons from Athens

The most important lesson from Athens is that Athenian citizens established “the political” as a central part of citizen life. Politics, government,
governance, and the state were all integral to Athenian citizens’ everyday
lives. There was no alienation from politics or from the state, because the
citizens literally were the state. For Aristotle, humans thus were political
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animals by nature and vocation. “Politics” in such a world was not a separate
reality, conducted and controlled by a special group of people, and neither
was the act of lawmaking. To the contrary, making the laws that govern the
community was at the heart of this model, highlighting its strong commitment to self-rule and autonomy. This is the time and place that triggered
Protagoras to say that “Man is the measure of all things.” It was also the
time of Sophocles, who wrote Antigone in 442–43 b.c.e. and, according
to Castoriadis (1991), his anthropology “presupposes nothing: there, men
create these capacities and possibilities themselves; simply, clearly, and insistently, it posits humanity as self-creation. Men have taken nothing from the
gods, and no god has given them anything whatsoever. That is the spirit of
the fifth century, and it is to this tragedy that the Athenians gave the laurel
wreath” (Castoriadis 1991: 22ff ).
An exploration of the Athenian case under the analytical angle of citizenship as a social role and a positional good, as well as from the perspective of
autonomy, allows us to see that Athenian citizens indeed planted the seed
for self-rule, and also found a way to counteract the economic and social
inequalities that divided them to establish political equality—particularly
with the reforms of Ephialtes. The most defining element of ancient Greek
democracy was precisely the lack of distinction between ruler and ruled.
The citizens were the state and the government. Citizenship, although
highly circumscribed and restricted, meant falling under the rule of law and
making those laws at the same time. No passive sense of citizenship existed.
This is what sets Athenian democracy aside from most, if not all, democratic
models to follow.
Athenians ruled themselves, and they found ways to organize and preserve this self-rule against the ever-present threats posed by aristocrats,
oligarchs, and by sheer numbers. Over 30,000 Athenian citizens were
effectively able to practice self-rule in a time when means of transportation
and communication were precarious, if measured against contemporary
possibilities. Despite strong social, cultural, economic, and educational differences among citizens, they devised a system where many of them had to
be involved in running public affairs. On top of the institutional design,
which broke up regional and tribal ties into boules and required a very active
and frequent presence in public meetings, discussions, and decision making,
the Greeks also shunned those who did retreat into private life.
However, the Athenian case also points at the conditionalities for establishing such a form of self-rule, and we can see that from its very invention,
citizenship was highly exclusive, circumscribed, and disputed. Even in this
early example of democratic rule, we are able to detect the struggles over
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popular access to the different branches of government. Only some 10 to
20 percent of the population living in Attica during the time of Athenian
democracy were citizens, thus highlighting its exclusiveness.
It appears that the division between those with rights and those with
duties was born with democratic citizenship, and analyzing Athenian citizenship as an asset thus provides some insight into its dynamics and the
ways in which it was lived and experienced. As John Davies (2004) points
out, Athenian citizens were not merely a descent group, but also an interest
group, because being an Athenian citizen came with very tangible privileges. Davies hints at the relationship between the value of citizenship and
its exclusiveness when he states, “Citizenship was a valuable privilege, both
economically and politically, and became more so as Athens’s power grew
in the fifth century and as the prerequisites of citizenship became more
valuable, more frequent, and more pervasive: to open citizenship to all who
wanted it would devalue it unacceptably” (Davies 2004: 25).5
The Athenian case thus sets the stage for a drama that unfolds at different stages of human history. We do not know exactly how much of
the knowledge about Athens influenced subsequent acts—but that is not
important for the purpose of this book. Similar to the Athenian case, each of
the cases discussed in this book allows us to see and discuss another aspect of
democratic citizenship and the limits to the struggle over self-rule, allowing
us to assemble a puzzle where every piece is different and tells a different
story; but together they provide a detailed picture of the conditions, limits,
and inherent contradictions of citizenship.
The strong connection between making rules and living under them
indeed started to wither once the Athenian model was transplanted to
Rome. The Roman Republic (509–27 b.c.e.) already represented a form
of governance that lacked what was at the heart of the Athenian system,
namely, the element of direct citizen rule. Representation came to replace
the principle of direct self-rule, and it was this already modified version of
democracy that became the Western democratic model par excellence. This
being the case, a deeper look at democracy as practiced under the Roman
Republic is warranted.

The Roman Republic

From its very inception, the Roman variety of democracy differed significantly from the Athenian model. Representation combined with pronounced
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societal inequalities, and no institutions to block the spilling over of these
inequalities into the public and political realms, produced a system where
some ruled and others, the majority, were ruled and had no active saying in
the making of the rules and laws by which they had to live.
Well before the beginnings of the Republic, commonly dated at
509 b.c.e., Roman society was divided into patricians and plebeians. Adcock
(1969) explains that “The patrician body . . . was united in tradition and
social consciousness; small as it was, by its military and landowning character and its clientele it went far to justify the position of privilege which it
enjoyed” (Adcock 1969: 20).
The change from the rule of the people to elite rule through representation and with elections was, however, not a necessary development, as I
shall argue here, and not precipitated by increased numbers. Rather it was
a development actively advanced by those who had much to gain from it:
Roman elites, especially those represented in the senate.
The Roman Republic was established when the early monarchy was terminated in 509 b.c.e., and it lasted until the year 27 b.c.e., when Octavian
was named Augustus and became emperor. Under the Roman Republic,
sovereignty rested with SPQR, “Senatus Populusque Romanus”—the senate
and people of Rome (Shotter 1994: 4). However, the people of Rome were
highly stratified and divided into several property classes (Vanderbroeck
1987: 18). According to specialist Paul Vanderbroeck, “At the bottom of
society were the (male) free citizens, who had the right to vote and who
participated in the popular assemblies. Among this group large differences
could exist. . . . A special phenomenon of Roman society was that freed
slaves were enfranchised. The relationship between members of the upper
strata and the lower strata is mostly to be qualified as a patron-client relation. Vertical ties permeated all status groups and existed in multifarious
forms” (Vanderbroeck 1987: 20).
Rome had two types of popular assemblies. The Centuriate Assembly
was divided into five property classes, which were subdivided into 193 centuries. The Comitia Centuriata decided on war and peace and elected the
highest magistrates. The Comitia Tribute, in turn, decided on most legislation, elected the lower magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs, and in
jurisdiction could serve as a court of appeal. The tribal assembly was divided
into thirty-five tribes (residential districts), four for the city and thirty-one
for the countryside. The number of citizens in a century varied. The highest census class had seventy centuries, while the unpropertied citizens were
packed into one century and therefore only had one vote in the Centuriate Assembly (Vanderbroeck 1987: 17f ). The Social Wars of 90–87 b.c.e.
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between Rome and its Italian allies (the socii) were resolved largely by Rome’s
extending citizenship to all those south of the river Po in 90 b.c.e. A census
conducted in the year 70 b.c.e. indicates that by then, Roman citizenry had
reached the number of 910,000 (Millar 1998: 28).
Roman citizenship was thus split into two groups—patricians and
plebeians. Plebeians had access to sovereignty and could be elected to the
senate, but political office was not remunerated, which made it practically
impossible for average plebeians to serve. Popular sovereignty rested in the
assemblies—three comitia and the Concilium Plebis. However, according to
Shotter, “There was neither freedom of debate nor power of initiating business from the floor. The people’s function, in other words, was limited to
that of voting” (Shotter 1994: 5).
The senate, dominated by the rich, exercised broad clientelistic power
over the common people, and “senatorial endorsement (senatus consultum)
was considered a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of popular sovereignty” (Shotter 1994: 5). Plebeian citizens had the right to protest senate
decisions (provocatio) and they could elect their own tribal leaders, called
tribunes. In the Concilium Plebis, binding decisions could be made that
became law once the two consuls, elected from within the senate, agreed.
However, in the third century b.c. the decisions of the plebeian assembly
were given the independent force of law (Shotter 1994: 7). This strengthening of popular sovereignty has led one of the foremost scholars of Republican
Rome, Fergus Millar (1998), to conclude that “The populus Romanus was
not a biological descent group, but a political community defined by rights
and duties (the latter consisting predominantly of military service in the
legions), and it was formed above all by the progressive extension of Roman
citizenship throughout Italy, and by the distinctive Roman custom of giving
citizenship to freed slaves. Participation as a citizen was not limited by considerations of wealth or class (though the holding of elective office certainly
was), but it will have been far more profoundly affected by distance. The
unaltered convention that the citizen could exercise his rights only in person, by voting in the Forum or the Campus Martius, gave an overwhelming
predominance in the politics of the late Republic to those ‘representatives’
of the wider populus Romanus who lived in and around the city” (Millar
1998: 211).
During the early republic, when Rome still had no standing army,
Roman citizens had the following rights: “In 197 b.c., the ‘right to appeal’
was extended to the citizen on campaign, thus freeing him from his commander’s ultimate sanction of summary execution. Second, by a law of 177
b.c., Roman citizens were given a greater proportion of war booty” (Shotter
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1994: 11). Overall, however, the scale of participation in the Roman Republic remained very limited. According to Henrik Mouritsen (2001), only a
few percent could actually attend the meetings and assemblies, and often
the level of attendance was much lower. As a result, a large majority of the
population never took part in the political process. For Mouritsen, “The
Roman system was, in other words, based on the few rather than the many”
(Mouritsen 2001: 128). The same author finds that the cause for this shortcoming was not distance itself, but rather “the particular position of the
influence which the system reserved for the elite. The mere existence of a
permanent body of nobles, who monopolized all political initiative, experience and authority in the Roman state, would inevitably have threatened
the powers held by the comitia” (Mouritsen 2001: 129).
Thus, whereas the Athenian polis categorically excluded women, slaves,
and foreigners from being active citizens, during the Roman Republic property was the main, even if not the only, criterion for exclusion from the
political community. Furthermore, it was also during the Roman Republic
that the principle of electing representatives to decide for oneself became the
dominant practice of democratic rule. According to Frank Adcock (1969),
“In terms of political power the closed body of patricians became as it were a
state within a state, with special rights protected by custom if not conferred
by statute, and no doubt a strong corporate sense” (Adcock 1969: 22).
Plebeians, however, had legislative authority in their conciliums, and
the tribunes elected from these had significant power. They could veto laws,
elections, and the actions of other magistrates they felt were against the
interests of the plebs. In the middle of the fifth century, Rome passed a legal
code that added protection to plebeians. The very same legal code that protected them by establishing the rule of law also institutionalized the division
of society by outlawing marriages between patricians and nonpatricians—
although this prohibition was revoked a few years after its passing into law.
Nevertheless, the mere attempt to institutionalize status difference points to
the importance of this societal division in Rome.

The Watering Down of Citizenship:
From Responsibilities to Rights

John Pocock (1995) asks whether exclusion from full citizenship rights
are “accidental or in some way essential to the ideal of citizenship itself ”
(Pocock 1995: 31). He finds in the redefinition of citizenship under Gaius
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(130–180 c.e.) the deciding moment where the character of citizenship
shifted from being a political concept, as inherited from Aristotle, to a
legal concept. For Pocock: “the origins of possessive individualism” (Pocock
1995: 35). Pocock explains that in Rome, “Citizenship has become a legal
status, carrying with it rights to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps expectations—available in many kinds and
degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds of persons for many kinds
of reasons” (Pocock 1995: 36). Once citizenship was defined in terms
of legal rights and the protection of one’s property, political rights were
transformed from the right to decide one’s destiny and the destiny of the
community in which one lived, to the right to elect representatives, who
from now on decided for the community.
According to Peter Brunt (1971), “In democratic Athens, the ordinary
citizens met frequently in popular assemblies open to all, which decided
every question of policy and closely supervised the executive officials; each
citizen counted for one and not more than one. Rome, too, had popular
assemblies, though they were not based, like the Athenian, on the principle
of equality. . . . Only at the very end of the Republic was provision made for
70,000 to vote together, about 6 percent of the total citizen body” (Brunt
1971: 8). Brunt further argues that “The Romans themselves contrasted
favorably their liberality in granting citizenship with the exclusiveness of
Athens. It is perfectly true that their liberality gradually did much to win
the loyalty of subjects first in Italy and later, from Caesar’s time, in the provinces. This policy could only have succeeded because the Roman system was
undemocratic” (Brunt 1971: 9).
In other words, had Roman citizenship meant more and provided
more rights and entitlements, access would have been far more restrictive.
Although sovereignty ultimately belonged to the people—as the people
elected magistrates, declared war, made treaties, and passed laws—the people could “meet only on the summons of one of the higher magistrates, vote
only on the proposals he chose to submit, select candidates from a list he set
before it, and say only ‘Yea’ or ‘Nay’ to a law he proposed; it might contain
hundreds of clauses, but no amendment was possible” (Brunt 1971: 46).
Brunt also explains that “The assemblies of the people were also far from
democratic. A majority was obtained not by counting heads but by counting units. . . . Citizens who had virtually no property, the proletarii, formed
only a single century, which voted last, if at all” (Brunt 1971: 46).
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The Legalization of Citizenship

In 451–450 b.c.e., Roman law was first codified. The codification of rights
had an unintended side effect, changing the very character of citizenship.
Instead of being associated with the ability, and indeed responsibility, to
participate in the making of rules, citizenship now became associated with
a set of codified rights and protections. Access to this system, however, was
complicated and demanded prerequisites. Legal procedure was a secret of
the pontiffs, and a litigant could be nonsuited for using a single wrong word
in a formula (Brunt 1971: 54). This development is highly relevant to the
argument of this book, as it not only signals the beginning of the separation
of the state from society—which then triggered the codification of rights
and protections from the state—but also signals the depoliticization of the
life of citizens, which thus opened the door for their separation and alienation from politics, government, and the state.
John Pocock (1995) has focused his attention on the Roman lawyer
Gaius (130–180 c.e.) as one of the main agents in this process of legalizing the political—but we must suppose that this process started much
earlier, namely, when Roman law started to be codified. I thus follow
Pocock’s logic, without necessarily following his timeline. Pocock explains
that Gaius was instrumental in shifting the meaning of “citizen” from a
political being to a legal being. According to Pocock, after Gaius, citizens
defined themselves vis-à-vis their possessions, and they carried these definitions into the public realm. For Pocock, this represented “the origins of
possessive individualism” (Pocock 1995: 35). Pocock further explains that
in Rome, “citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights
to certain things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps
expectations—available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds of persons for many kinds of reasons” (Pocock 1995:
36). What emerged was, in Pocock’s words, a “homo legalis”—that is,
no longer a political man, actively involved in making the rules of his or
her community, but instead a person subject to the rule of law, where the
law was not of his or her own making. This change indeed profoundly
altered what it meant to be a citizen. Instead of being part of the state and
the authority, Roman citizens, especially the less fortunate ones, had to
live under a system not of their own making and needed to address any
wrongdoings against them to the judicial assembly, instead of addressing
them in the legislative assembly, to which they no longer had access. At
the same time, as Pocock also demonstrates, property and the right to
property became a legal condition for citizenship, which resulted in the
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characterization of groups that owned no property as “savages,” who were
then placed outside of citizenship.

Lessons from Rome

Romans extended citizenship to a far larger group of people—after conquering them. In doing so, they secured their allegiance. However, extending
citizenship rights to so many triggered a countermovement that had two
related dynamics: first, it led to the establishment of a political class of rich
and powerful citizens who became first-class citizens, and degraded ordinary citizens to a second-class status; secondly, a system of representation
was established so that the first class of citizens made decisions for and no
longer with all the people who lived under the jurisdiction of the laws they
passed. Democratic elite rule was thus established, and the true seed of
democracy—namely, self-rule—was killed. The motivation to concentrate
political power in the hands of the few was not triggered by larger numbers
of citizens per se, but by the will of those who had privileged access to the
spheres of power to preserve their advantages, as Mouritsen (2001) seems
to think and as the violent reactions by elite senators against the democratic reforms proposed by the Gracchi brothers further demonstrate. In
133 b.c.e., when Tiberius Gracchus proposed land reform and an extension
of Roman citizenship to Latin allies directly to the popular assembly, thus
sidestepping the senate, he was clubbed to death by Roman senators (Stockton 1979, Syme 1956, Scullard 1982).
This movement away from self-rule, which makes sense if analyzed under
the prism of citizenship as an asset, was further strengthened, it appears,
by the codification of laws and the transformation of political citizenship
into legal citizenship that this process automatically produced. Even though
Pocock (1995) focuses on a time when the Roman Republic had already
given way to empire, his analysis still proves insightful in that it highlights
the change of character that such a process potentially entails. As a result
of the codification of law, political aspects of citizenship were transformed
into legal ones. Because the channels for self-rule and direct participation
were restricted, the legalization of politics finally closed off the realm of
politics to ordinary citizens. From now on (even though we do not know
with certainty when this now exactly was), the majority of Roman citizens
became bystanders and audiences of the political life exercised by the few in
their name and, supposedly, on their behalf. Democracy as self-rule and as
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a way to live with, maybe even within, politics had given way to a system of
representation by political elites, who were, at the same time, the social and
economic elites of the society they controlled.

Conclusion

Societal inequalities present a formidable obstacle to democratic self-rule. If
societies are deeply divided, and if some of its members are not recognized
as full members, democracy runs the risk of producing a concentration of
power in the hands of what we might call a “structural minority”—that
is, in the hands of one class of people. This risk becomes an even further
threat when democracy is exercised merely in the form of representation, as
representation automatically implies not only that some people will decide
for others, but also that some people remain outside of, and are potentially
alienated from, the political process. Under conditions of extreme and normalized inequality—that is, where some people are perceived as “natural
leaders,” “superior,” or a “political class”—there is great risk that democracy
decays into elite rule, where the rulers dominate public and political affairs
and serve their own interests. The more general problem out of which this
phenomenon emerges is that societal inequalities have the proclivity to spill
over and contaminate the political process of a democracy.
One way to confront this risk is by targeting societal inequalities. Marxist approaches confront societal inequalities in order to achieve political
equality. The cost of this strategy has become apparent in all those countries
where the state started to regulate and control private affairs for the sake of
the common good. At this stage in time, it is fairly safe to say that this strategy has failed, because the price we have to pay for achieving societal equality
is too high. Even the less radical social-democratic welfare approaches that
characterize most advanced capitalist systems aim at ameliorating economic
inequalities in order to achieve some degree of distributional justice. However, these, too, do not successfully address political equality, as even after
these measures are taken, the remaining inequalities tend to spill over into
the political realm. Furthermore, any measure aimed at economic redistribution necessarily creates a conflict between collective, distributional justice
and individual justice (Rawls 1999). Furthermore, economic redistribution
creates economic disincentives, which create not only economic problems,
but political ones as well.
However, the severest shortcoming of economic strategies is that they
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do nothing to address the political inequalities that characterize all contemporary democracies. If political equality of voice and citizenship is
our aim, then our strategy must focus on those—and not on economic
inequalities, as it is utopian to the extreme (and undesirable indeed)
to think that we will one day achieve total economic equality. Even if
we could, there is no guarantee that out of economic equality political
inequality would result.
Cleisthenes approached this problem from an altogether different angle,
one that was more strictly political. Cleisthenes recognized that Greek society
was economically divided and hierarchically structured. Instead of seeking
to fight inequality in society, Cleisthenes sought to first devise institutions
that cut across the ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic bonds that structured Greek society, and second to design institutions that blocked a spilling
over of societal inequalities into the political realm. By designing collective
decision-making institutions that overlapped and cut across existing societal cleavages, he designed a system where people of different backgrounds
had to come together and make collective decisions. Combined with the
older practice of assigning public offices by lot, the ancient Greek model of
democracy not only broke down the distinction between rulers and ruled,
it also sought to ensure that societal cleavages and associations would not
lead to the consolidation of a ruling class. Concretely, according to Jones
(1999), “The new phylai, trittyes, and demes, but especially the demes, it
is argued, were set up as rivals to an already existing network of regionally
based aristocratic cultic associations. The democratic units were meant to
bypass, divide, duplicate, or otherwise neutralize their aristocratic predecessors” (Jones 1999: 55; also Finley 1962: 4, 16).6
Democracy and citizenship thus started strong in Athens—and because
it was so strong and meant so much, it was highly restrictive and exclusionary. Only a minority could enjoy the rights that came with it. It is also clear
that the rights and entitlements of being an Athenian citizen were considerable and thus coveted. However, inseparably linked to the rights of being
an Athenian citizen came considerable responsibilities. One was busy as a
citizen, and citizens could not escape the duties their status demanded, as
many offices were drawn by lot. Alienation from politics, under such circumstances, was virtually impossible. The people were the government and
the people were the state. There was no “us” versus “them”—at least not in
the political realm. There was, however, great societal inequality and vast
inequalities of wealth. Instead of seeking to undo those, which would have
required invading the private sphere of the household, such politicians as
Solon, Cleisthenes, and Ephialtes rather sought to address them in a strictly
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political way: by devising institutions that aimed at neutralizing societal
inequalities in the sphere of politics.
The guiding principle for all three Athenian statesmen analyzed here
was that of justice. The core principle here was that of mixing. Mixing
meant forcing the rich to share political associations with the poor. This
was accompanied by splitting: splitting up family clans so that civic bonds
could replace family bonds—and one can easily extend this logic and apply
it to clan, descent, “blood,” or ethnic bonds. Democracy, to these reformers,
then meant that the people ruled on an equal basis, and that no other bonds
interfered or even replaced the bond that connected them to the polis, that
is, the other citizens.
This provides the first important lesson we can learn from classical Athens, something that the contemporary French philosopher Jacques Rancière
(2004 and 2007) has also alerted us to more recently, namely, the clear separation of the social from the political realm. According to this logic, most
problems are of a social nature, but the political is the realm where these
social problems can and should be addressed. There are indeed few purely
political problems, and most of them are not that serious. Problems of social
inequality, however, tend to be very consequential politically.
Clearly, we have moved far away from these principles. While the Left
has sought to undo social inequalities, thus violating people’s individual
rights and invading their private spheres, the Right has let go of any attempt
to achieve civic bonds altogether.
Athens also provides important insights into the apparently inherent tradeoff between the quality of rights and the exclusivity of access to them. The
more Athenian citizenship ensured tangible benefits, the more restrictive it
became—a phenomenon that was worsened by the economic scarcity caused
by defeat in the Peloponnesian War in 413 b.c.e. This confirms that thinking
of citizenship as an asset allows for discerning new aspects of its regime.
The other important lesson from classical times comes from Rome.
It appears that when extending citizenship to the many, powerful elites
sought, and were able, to secure their own privileged access to the political system by introducing the idea of representation, and by legalizing
citizenship rights. Living in the Roman Republic no longer meant ruling
oneself. It meant having certain rights—and more of them if one was rich
and powerful, as access to the legal system was complicated and dependent
upon one’s ability to hire the assistance of legal specialists who dominated the very formalistic language of the codes, as well as the forms and
protocols that had to be followed in order to address the courts. This
shift towards the codification of laws must be seen as the end of political
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citizenship. People no longer ruled themselves, and a distance separated
them from the government, the state, and politics. This is also the beginning of even the possibility of feeling and effectively being alienated from
politics, government, and the state.
It is this version of democracy and citizenship we have inherited and
still practice today. The very few attempts at establishing something more
direct have always been deemed radical and been quickly subdued. And
radical it was, considering that in the Roman Republic we can also witness
a very familiar phenomenon indeed: the rule of the rich. Starting in Rome,
the rich ruled and did what they thought, and indeed knew, was best for
the state, the country, or later the empire. And as they were the state, the
country, and the empire, they did what was best for them.
Athens and Rome thus set the tone for how democracy and citizenship
developed in the years, decades, and centuries to follow, and the parameters for the struggle over power, influence, control, rule, and exclusion were
already set.

Chapter 4

Medieval European Citizenship
Christian Rights and Jewish Duties
Without neglecting the fantastically rich and polyphonic complexity of the
historical universe unfolding in Western Europe from the 12th century
onwards, the most appropriate way to grasp its specificity is to relate it to
the signification and the project of (social and individual) autonomy. The
emergence of this project marks the break with the “true” Middle Ages.
— Cornelius Castoriadis, “The Retreat
from Autonomy: Post-modernism as
Generalised Conformism,” 2001

It would certainly be wrong to say that democracy succumbed after the collapse of the Roman Republic. The problem is rather
one of historical sources—and the lack thereof. Democratic experiments
in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, or the Pacific region are simply not as well
documented to base an analysis of the dialectics of citizenship on them.1
The history of medieval European city-states, however, provides a rich case
of analysis within the context of this book, as it allows for a highlighting of
the advances of democratic self-rule on one side, and the contrasting exclusion from these city-states on the other.
Following the logic and rationale established earlier, which is not to compare cases, but rather to explore each one separately for salient characteristics,
this chapter takes a closer look at the developments in Western Europe after
the decline of the Roman Empire in the West in the sixth century c.e. Thus,
whereas the previous chapter focused strongly on the included and what
citizenship meant to them, this chapter takes a closer look at the excluded,
67
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how their exclusion was constructed and justified, and what their exclusion
meant to them and to the democracies that practiced and enforced it.
Of special interest is the situation of the excluded group par excellence
during this time period: Jews. The first focus in this chapter thus consists
of an analysis of the relationship between Christian rights and Jewish duties
and exclusion. The second interest pursued in this chapter is the analysis
of the internal dynamics of the emerging, mostly Florentine, democratic
republics, as they provide an example for a renewed attempt at self-rule and
the pursuit of autonomy (Castoriadis 2001). This focus also allows me to
continue the theme of a critique of the Western tradition.
In the West, with the decline of the Roman Empire came a decline of
democratic principles and institutions, and feudalism dominated the political landscape. Roman Catholic religion became the universal eschatological
principle, and around it, the Roman Catholic Church constructed a Manichean world of good and evil; believers and heathens; Christians, Jews, and
Saracens; pious religious followers and rebellious witches. It was only when
the Reformation started driving a wedge into the solid power of the Catholic
Church, thus considerably weakening it, that democracy again found some
space to expand, giving gradual rise to modern democracies and their dominant manifestation in nation-states (Zakaria 2003). Before that, democracy
and citizenship were practiced only on a very small scale for a very limited
period of time—for example, in a number of relatively small city republics
in northern Italy, emerging around the late tenth century.
The scarcity of sources and the scantiness of our knowledge about what
citizenship meant concretely during the long stretch of time from 44 b.c.e.,
when Julius Caesar effectively ended the Roman Republic and made himself dictator, to the late eighteenth century, when the American, French,
and Haitian revolutions brought citizenship and democracy back to the
European map, allows for only a very sketchy depiction of the dialectics of
citizenship.

Christian Rights, Jewish Duties

According to Leonard Glick (1999), during the eleventh century the
development in Europe was marked by a double movement: as Christians
prospered, Jews slid into a precarious situation. To some analysts, animosity
and mutual hatred was such an integral part of medieval life that they called
it a “structural fact of social and legal existence” (Bossy 1998: 54). Indeed,
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exclusion of such “others” as Jews was functional in strengthening the bond
that united all those coming together to form communities during medieval
times (Smail 2001: 94).
The question I seek to explore here is what were the causal relations that
linked Christian prosperity and expanding citizenship to Jewish exclusion.
According to Glick (1999), “For Christians the changes were in the form
of remarkable social and economic advancement, while for Jews precisely
the opposite was true. In other words, just as life began to improve for
Christians, it began to worsen for Jews” (Glick 1999: 77). This chapter
argues that the growth of Christian prosperity, which in part rested on the
acquisition of civil and political rights in emerging free cities, was indeed
causally connected to the decline of Jewish prosperity that occurred at the
same time.
Under the title “Laws and Legal Status,” Glick (1999) discusses the restrictions imposed on Jews in the kingdoms and states emerging at the fringes of
the decaying Roman Empire. Jews had lived in the lands that came under
Frankish, that is, Merovingian rule before Catholicism became dominant in
the Roman Empire (after the conversion of Emperor Constantine in 336) and
before Clovis, the Merovingian king of the Franks who followed the Roman
model in 500.
Under Roman law, since Constantine had granted freedom of religion
in 313, Jews were granted the freedom to practice their religion. However,
by the end of the fourth century, when Catholicism became the official
religion of the Roman Empire, the situation of the Jews, together with that
of other religious minorities, changed. Now, special provisions had to be
enacted to regulate the treatment of these groups. In 388, Roman law prohibited intermarriage between Jews and Christians. In 423, it outlawed the
ownership of Christian slaves by Jews. Frankish law followed suit, outlawing Christian-Jewish intermarriage in 533 (Glick 1999: 34f ). According
to Bachrach (1977), the growing number of restrictions against Jews that
occurred towards the end of the Roman Empire is due to the fact that Jews
“grew in power and prestige” during the sixth century (Bachrach 1977: 64).
In 582, Chilperic, then king of the Franks and heir to the Merovingian
throne, ordered all Jews of the kingdom to be baptized (Glick 1999: 37).
Although this campaign was not entirely successful, it forced Jews to hide or
move, and the baptism campaigns continued (at least up to the last of the
Merovingians, Dagobert, in 629).
The beginning of the First Crusade abounds with stories of massacres
of entire Jewish communities—for example, those living in the cities of
Speyer, Worms, Mainz, and Cologne, all of which happened in the year
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1096—all conducted by crusaders under the command of Count Emicho,
described as “a minor landholder in Upper Loraine” and “a man of very ill
repute on account of his tyrannical mode of life” (Glick 1999: 95). Emicho’s
band never made it to Jerusalem, and most were killed in Hungary, on their
way east. The Christian chronicler Albert of Aix provided this comment
about Emicho: “So the hand of the Lord is believed to have been against the
pilgrims, who had sinned by excessive impurity and fornication, and who
had slaughtered the exile Jews through greed of money, rather than for the
sake of God’s justice, although the Jews were opposed to Christ” (quoted in
Glick 1999: 102).
As this comment amply demonstrates, the religious fervor sparked by
the call for a holy war, uttered by Pope Urban II in November 1095 in
Clermont, France, offered many opportunities to become rich by stealing
money from Jews. While some Christians resorted to simply killing Jews in
order to take their money and property, others—mostly those in situations
of power, such as bishops, priests, and lords—used the occasion to ask the
Jews for ransoms in order to protect them from the incited mobs. One way
or another, Jewish wealth thus passed into Christian hands, and in most
cases, the paying of fees and giving of gifts to which the Jews resorted in
order to save their lives did not prevent their eventual killing by the crusaders and all those inspired by their example.
During the twelfth century in general, “as Christians progressed and
prospered, Jews became pariahs” (Glick 1999: 115). Glick argues that
this was particularly the case for Jewish political rights. Whereas European Christians were able to carve out more political and civil rights for
themselves (although still of limited nature), the advance was negotiated by
pushing the Jews among them into a status of dependence—a dependence
that was used to extract money from them in return for protection and tutelage. For Glick, “The clearest evidence for this trend was in their changing
political rights. The charters that had been issued to Jews earlier—Louis’s
ninth century charters to individual Jewish merchants, for example, or the
Speyer charter of 1084 to an entire community—had one thing in common: The Jews were assumed to be independent persons, free to decide
where they lived and on what terms. But now they were becoming dependent; they were assumed to be helpless, in need of protection and obliged
to please their protectors” (Glick 1999: 115).
By declaring the Jews in need of protection, the Christian kings and
dukes who passed such measures relegated them to a second-class citizenship
status—a status they shared with women and children. It was also during
this time that Jewish business activity was by decree restricted to money
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lending, which thus created a situation of even higher risk: confined to lending money and dependent on the protection of their overlords, Jews needed
to pay for their safety and were always at risk of falling victim to pogroms
whenever their payment was not enough and their overlords thought that
more money could be gained by simply taking it from them. On top of that,
Jews were now constantly at risk of being accused of usury. As Christian
rights progressed, Jewish rights became more and more restricted.

Free City Republics

Citizenship is invariably linked to the development of cities. This was the
case with classical citizenship as practiced in Athens and Rome, and it was
again the case in post-imperial Europe, once the unifying institutions of the
Roman Empire had faded (Holston and Appardurai 1996). Once more, out
of the political power vacuum created by absent or distant overlords, people sharing a location started to press for political autonomy and self-rule,
thus opposing the claims of feudal lords for authority over land and people.
However, much as was the case in Athens and Rome, the reemerging citizenship of early medieval Europe was heavily circumscribed and exclusive;
after all, and following the theoretical approach developed earlier, citizenship was, and continues to be, a highly disputed good, precisely because it
provided those able to claim it with privileges and special rights. However,
according to the classic study by Bella Duffy in 1892, these emerging communes “were not, as at one time believed, the lineal descendants of the
Roman municipalities” (Duffy 2011: 1). Instead, something qualitatively
new emerged in medieval Europe.
City republics emerged from the power vacuum left by the crumbling
Carolingian empire, towards the end of the ninth century. Into this vacuum,
Catholic Church officials stepped, ordering not just religious life, but commercial, military, and civic as well. However, not everybody was happy with
the rule of kings and bishops. According to Daniel Waley and Trevor Dean
(2010), there were three causes that led to the emergence of city republics in
northern Italy, where this phenomenon took root the most. First, emperors
were too distant and unable to provide the kind of governance that some
thriving commercial centers needed. Second, the secular power of bishops
was challenged from within by the ecclesiastical reform movement, which
demanded a retreat of the Church to things religious. Finally, as transregional
trade expanded, different people from different places started coming, and
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settling, in such emerging commercial centers as Milan or Siena. These newcomers did not readily accept the authority of the bishop and oftentimes
rebelled against it.
Indeed, the development of city communes was intimately linked to
trade. According to Max Weber (1968),“The circumstance that the city was
a market with relatively permanent opportunities to earn money through
commerce or the trades induced many lords to exploit their slaves and serfs
not as workers in their own houses or enterprises but as sources of annuities;
they trained them to be artisans or small merchants and permitted them to
pursue their livelihood in the city in return for the payment of a body rent
(Leibzins); at times (as in Antiquity) they also equipped them with working
capital” (Weber 1968: 1238).
Trade, as stated above, brought newcomers to town, and among those
newcomers were also traders from further away. To the south, once the
Saracens had conquered southern Italy in 823, Muslim traders introduced
new products and offered new outlets—including slaves (Duffy 2011: 8).
Among the new traders were also Jews, who were especially active and present in coastal towns. As a result, the free towns constituted themselves in
the north of Italy as communities of faith (Weber 1968), and they also
emerged as homogeneous communities against an increased populational
heterogeneity.
The communes that emerged slowly wrested power from kings and bishops, via concessions. Such was the case, for example, with Lucca, which
secured a concession from Henry IV in 1081 not to build castles within
six miles of the city, and no building within its city limits. “Henry also
renounced jurisdiction within the city of Pisa and promised to name no new
marquis in Tuscany without the consent of the Pisans” (Waley and Dean
2010: 9f ). Apparently, such concessions were preferable to the violent uprisings that some cities had organized when their claims were denied. To Waley
and Dean (2010), “Communes filled these gaps, providing effective connections between political power and local elites” (Waley and Dean 2010: 10).
The ways other communes emerged in this region are very similar. “First,
we have the Marquis, or his representative the viscount, of Teutonic origin,
presiding in the courts, surrounded by his Scabini, or judges, who, although
in one sense imperial officers, seem nevertheless to have been chosen usually from among the inhabitants of each town and territory, and not to have
travelled about in the suite of the overlord” (Duffy 2011: 3). According to
Duffy, these relatively independent Scabini gave the starting impulse for
further independence.
Duffy also highlights the fact that such a development occurred
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in northern Italy precisely because the bishop was less influential than
elsewhere—and the German overlord, in the figure of the marquis, was
relatively distant. What emerged in Tuscany, as a result, typically was a
relatively small commune of free citizens, who regularly met in a popular
assembly and, so assembled, elected “twelve principal citizens, who are variously distinguished as Buoni uomini, Sapientes, or Majores. Thirty years or
so later, these Buoni uomini are fewer in number, and have received the
title of Consuls” (Duffy 2011: 6).
Once these communities had reached maturity, the people of the lower
classes were able to challenge the dominance of the richer merchants and
craftsmen, especially by creating powerful guilds. Social parties and associations also started to emerge. In fourteenth-century Florence, for example,
social parties formed around income and social standing, thus constituting
a party of the upper-middle class (Grassi), one of the middle class (Mediani), and one of the lower class (Minuti). High-ranking officials were now
elected from those three. According to Duffy (2011), “In little more than
one year Florence had undergone four changes of government, the final
result of which was to strengthen the power of the two lower classes at the
expense of those rich and powerful members of the community who, whenever the grandi succumbed, had remained the dominant faction” (Duffy
2011: 162f ).
Indeed, in the first half of the fourteenth century, Florence’s rich and
powerful citizens lost so much influence in the administration and management of city affairs that many withdrew to the countryside out of
frustration. However, this rise of the lower guilds was soon met by concerted efforts of the higher guilds, who sought to control the power of the
lower classes by establishing an oligarchy. According to Duffy (2011), “In
1371, the supremacy, thus obtained, of the Ricci and Albizzi, was felt to
be so intolerable that the people named a commission, or Balia of fifty-six
members, for the express purpose of excluding those two families entirely
from office” (Duffy 2011: 174). Continued discontent among the people
of Florence finally led to a violent popular uprising, in June 1378, through
which the lower classes of Florence secured their influence in city politics.
Their influence lasted until 1433, when Cosimo de’ Medici’s tyranny finally
ended the communal republic of Florence. Towards the end of the fifteenth
century, all of the citizen republics of northern Italy finally succumbed to
the competing influences of Pope Francesco della Rovere, Sixtus IV, and
Lorenzo de Medici, the Magnificent (Duffy 2011: 298f ).
According to Max Weber (1968), “To develop into a city-commune, a
settlement had to be of the nonagricultural-commercial type, at least to a
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relative extent, and to be equipped with the following features: 1. a fortification; 2. a market; 3. its own court of law and, at least in part, autonomous law;
4. an associational structure (Verbandscharakter) and, connected therewith, 5.
at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, which includes administration by
authorities in whose appointment the burghers could in some form participate” (Weber 1968: 1226).
One of the core features of these free cities was their relatively small
size. Very few had more than 20,000 inhabitants. This small size was also
grounded in the conviction that for a community to work, its members had
to know and be able to discuss daily affairs with each other. Just like Plato
and Aristotle, medieval city leaders thought that 100,000 inhabitants was
the upper limit of viability for a republic (Waley and Dean 2010: xxi).
Weber also explains the principle of “Stadtluft macht frei”—“city
air makes free,” because the economic opportunity that cities offered
allowed many to purchase their freedom from slavery or serfdom and
join the commune of free citizens (Weber 1968: 1238). Indeed, according to Weber, “The urban citizenry therefore usurped the right to dissolve
the bonds of seigniorial domination; this was the great—in fact, the
revolutionary—innovation which differentiated the medieval Occidental
cities from all others. In the central and northern European cities appeared
the well-known principle that Stadtluft macht frei, which meant that after
a varying but always relatively short time the master of a slave or serf lost
their right to reclaim him” (Weber 1968: 1239).
In most cases, the time it took to actually become a free member of
the city commune was not so short—typically one year and one day, but
sometimes much longer than that—and it was also bound to a series of conditions, such as buying a house and thus becoming a resident and being able
to pay a minimum amount of taxes. It was also conditional upon a whole
list of duties and responsibilities. Still, free city communes offered a way to
escape the rule of the feudal lord and to become a free citizen.
In fact, citizenship in the early Italian city republics implied more duties
than rights—and it was not enough to be a formal citizen in order to be
eligible for administrative office (Waley and Dean 2010: 62). The requirements and duties of citizenship included loyalty to the commune, obeying
its laws and officers, performing military service, attending meetings, paying
taxes, and others. Citizens in these city republics were required to regularly
participate in the great assemblies, called arengos, which met regularly to
decide major collective matters. The size of such arengos varied from some
two hundred up to four thousand (Waley and Dean, 2010: 36).
In addition, citizenship meant active office in one of the many civic and
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military organizations responsible for conducting and regulating city life.
Waley and Dean (2010) stipulate that similar to the Athenian democracy,
in the medieval north Italian city republics, about one third of citizens held
office every year (Waley and Dean 2010: 65f ).
In most cases, citizenship also required owning a house in the city. Such
was the case, for example, in Parma and Pisa. In Pisa, effective residence
of at least nine months of the year was another condition for citizenship.
According to Waley and Dean (2010),
Pisa also demanded a birth qualification (the citizen or his father had to be born
within the city or contado) and a period of residence, originally twenty-five
or twenty years, though later this was reduced to ten and even three (1319).
(Waley and Dean, 2000: 63)

Furthermore, in most cases, citizenship required a certain income and
excluded certain groups due to their lack of ability to pay taxes, or lack of
regular residence (such as sailors, agricultural laborers, landless men, and
herdsmen). In Florence, for example, participation in the general assembly,
which constituted a parliament, excluded “the working classes and lower
orders or plebs as well as the inhabitants of the contado [municipality]”
(Duffy 2011: 56) during the twelfth century. The exclusion of women, serfs,
Jews, Muslims, and slaves in the twelfth century was perceived as so “natural” that it went without mentioning.
Citizens, in the city republics we are looking at, tended to be internally divided into at least two main factions, namely, nobles and populari
(Waley and Dean 2010: 128). Nobles were those landholding aristocrats
and knights who were actively present and engaged in city business. Nobles,
in many Italian republics, had their own association, the societas militum, or
association of knights, and the cities relied on the knights, particularly at the
beginning of these communes, for protection. These knightly associations
existed alongside—and often in opposition to—the ones of the commoners, called societas populi. Blanshei (1976) has shown that in the commune
of Perugia, most internal conflict was rooted in the attempts of traditional
families to defend their inherited privileges against the newcomers who
sought to ascend politically, after having already ascended economically. For
Blanshei, conflict arose when reform programs, aimed at integrating these
newcomers, “conflicted with the older established families’ privileges and
immunities” (Blanshei 1976: 11).
The nobles residing in the city, together with their allies who controlled
the country, were able to take control over all Italian city republics during
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the fourteenth century, thus effectively ending the republican experiments
in this region and substituting them with feudalism.
Furthermore, and paralleling the general pattern of Christian ascent
bought with Jewish oppression, free cities were first and foremost religious
communities that relied on sharing worship as a central means of strengthening and renewing the horizontal bonds that united all citizens against
aristocratic owners of lands and peasants. According to Weber, “The fully
developed ancient and medieval city was above all constituted, or at least
interpreted, as a fraternal association, as a rule equipped with a corresponding religious symbol for the associational cult of the burghers: a city-god
or city-saint to whom only the burghers had access” (Weber 1968: 1241).
Typically, Jews were thus not allowed to become members and citizens of
the commune. As in the case of Venice, they were indeed only permitted
to settle within the city limits once the republic had fallen, in 1509 (Finlay
1982: 140).
In Antiquity,
membership in one of these associations remained the distinguishing mark of
the citizen with full rights, entitled to participation in the religious cult and
qualified for all offices which required communication with the gods (in Rome:
participation in the auspicial). It was the need to qualify for participation in the
religious rites which made such membership indispensable, for an association
with claims to legitimacy could rest only on the basis of the traditional, ritually
oriented organizational forms such as the clan, the military association (phratrie), and the political tribal association (phyle), or at least had to create such
a basis by fiction. All this was quite different in the medieval “founded” cities,
particularly in the North. Here, at least in a new foundation, the burgher joined
the citizenry as an individual, and as an individual he swore the oath of citizenship. His personal membership in the local association of the city guaranteed
his legal status as a burgher, not his tribe of sib. (Weber 1968: 1246)

Jews, thus, could not be full members and were relegated to the status of
guests. As Weber explains, “The ritual exclusion of connubium—otherwise
foreign to the Occident—and the actual impediments to table community
between Jews and non-Jews, but above all the absence of a common share
in the ritual of the Lord’s Supper, effectively prevented fraternization. The
medieval city, after all, was still a cultic association. . . . The Jews, therefore, remained from the beginning outside the burgher association” (Weber
1968: 1246f ).
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From City States to Feudal States and Empires

During the fifteenth century, European city-states fell prey to imperial expansion, and most were defeated and integrated into the emerging empires.
However, not all of them vanished. As late as in the seventeenth century,
there were some 4000 of what Mack Walker has called the German “home towns,”
most of them with between 750 and 10,000 inhabitants. Altogether, these towns
housed a quarter of the entire German population. Thus, the history of one German in four in the seventeenth century is not that of the major territorial states,
but that of Freudenstadt, Nordlingen, Esslingen, Braunschweig, Hildesheim,
Bamberg, Eichstatt, Würzburg, Tübingen or a host of others. In towns such as
these, guilds and craft organizations remained the basis of social and economic
life. Nahrung—social justice, or more specifically the protection of a just standard
of living through economic self-sufficiency—remained the ideal of such organizations. (Mackenney 1989: 37)

Prime examples of cities that maintained political autonomy also include
London, Leiden, Hamburg, and Frankfurt. City-states thus survived in
Europe, even though democratic city-states were rare and their degree of
“democraticness” limited. Guilds played an ambivalent role in this regard:
On one hand they were the powerful organizations representing the interests
of the burghers, that is, of craftsmen and traders—against feudal lords and
the Church. At the same time, however, “the guilds opposed any attempt to
ease the entry of members of the minority groups into the ranks of citizens,
which meant that the limited civil liberties of immigrants were never translated into political freedoms” (Mackenney 1989: 37). And even though in
some places the power of guilds was broken, as in Frankfurt, where all guilds
were abolished after the artisan uprising of 1612–16, “the crafts retained
immense influence” (Mackenney 1989: 38). Medieval guilds thus exemplify the dialectical dynamics between wresting rights away from overlords
and replacing them with horizontal bonds among common citizens, only
to replace such a regime of vertical dependence with one that is even more
exclusionary. Once a community of equals is established, membership to
this community becomes a matter of extreme dispute and circumscription.
Just as in earlier times, Jews, made to reside outside of Christian communes
and relegated to do the one trade that Christian observance forbade—money
lending with interest (that is, usury)—remained outsiders. Christian citizens
wanted their money and relied on their international connections—the fruit
of age-old persecution and the resultant dispersion—but did not grant them
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equal status. The same remained true for women, the poor, the landless, and
all those not owning their own homes. Thus, not much had changed since
Athens and Rome, where the luxury of citizenship was equally bought with
the free labor of slaves, women, serfs, and foreigners. The situation of European Jews thus provides but one example of a more pervasive phenomenon.
It is, however, a very telling example, and the history of Jewish pogroms and
gzeirots are indeed too numerous to count. In this respect, Austria-Hungary
is a particularly telling case, due to its significant Jewish population. In
1744, for example, Maria Theresa, monarch of Austria, ordered a gzeirot,
the “total and immediate expulsion of the distinguished and long-settled
Jewish community of Prague. It was to be carried out almost immediately.
It was to be followed in short order by the expulsion of all Jews from all of
Bohemia and Moravia” (Vital 1999: 1).
Although the Jewish community of Prague was able to avoid expulsion
in 1744 by paying lots of money, the history of Jews in Europe is full of
similar episodes—and so is the expectation that Jews needed to pay dearly
for their survival, peace, or to remain in a given city, county, or land. At one
point or another, Jews were expelled, be it from emerging medieval citystates or from the emerging nation-states of England (1290), France (1306),
Germany (1348), Lithuania (1445), Spain (1492), and Portugal (1497).
According to Vital (1999), “Underlying everything was the central fact
that under the old regime no Jew was, or could be, a member of (civil) society. No matter how learned or wealthy or contingently influential he might
be within or without Jewry itself, a Jew was held to belong to a moral and,
of course, theological category inferior to that of the meanest peasant” (Vital
1999: 6).
Even though in 1782, Joseph II, emperor of Austria, passed a patent
of tolerance (Toleranzpatent) and thus lifted many of the professional and
social restrictions his mother had imposed on the life of Jews, none of these
concessions came with citizenship. Vital (1999) explains that “The emperor’s rescript specifically laid down that the right of admission to certain
occupations and institutions did not carry with it the right of citizenship
and craft mastership. From these the Jews ‘remained excluded’ [wovon sie
ausgeschlossen bleiben]” (Vital 1999: 36).
Jews were never treated as equal members in prerevolutionary Europe,
no matter where one looks. The reason everywhere was that they were not
trusted as members of faith—be it the Christian faith, or the faith and allegiance to the sovereign (Kim 2004). In the words of Vital (1999), “The
difficulty about the Jews was that, over and above all the old objections
to their presence, they seemed to present an insuperable obstacle to the
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establishment of just such a coherent, smoothly operating centrally directed
social order as was striven for” (Vital 1999: 32).
When considered at all, they were discussed for what could be obtained—
and more often than not squeezed—from them, which in most cases meant
money. However, while newly emerging and rationalizing European states
sought to increase their control over Jews by forcing them to conform,
their evaluation was always predicated by deep-seated prejudice. According to Vital (1999), “Nothing was rarer than for those who for one reason
or another addressed themselves, however briefly, to the matter of the Jews
than to begin, at least implicitly—and as often as not explicitly—with the
proposition that they were not only hopelessly stubborn and difficult to deal
with, but in many ways depraved, ignorant, and unclean” (Vital 1999: 33).
The tropes about uncleanliness, being unfit to join a “civilized community,” of being depraved and sexually overactive, repeat themselves in
history and seem to stem from the same motivation to establish pure and
“clean”—that is homogeneous—communities that ethnic and religious
“others” threaten to pollute, penetrate, and violate. Others are always those
who are not only physically close, but with whom the hegemonic group is
intimately connected and thus dependent on. Hence the sexually loaded
language (Bauman 2001). This reality also hints at the need to establish,
and maintain, a tight-knit community able to retain sovereignty. The more
power it wielded, the more anxious its members were to defend it against
any form of “penetration” or “pollution” from outsiders.

The Special Case of Poland

There are a few examples where Jews were given rights, and it is thus worth
taking a closer look at these cases. In 1264, the Polish prince Boleslaw the
Pious decreed the privilegium principle, which declared that Jews did not fall
under the same legal code as Christians, effectively giving Jews a special status.
Some one hundred years later, this special status was extended to the whole of
Poland by Casimir the Great. Under this privilegium, Jews were given the right
to handle all civil cases involving only Jews themselves, through rabbinical
courts. Hence, the Christian Church, the Christian nobility, and the Christian urban patriciate could no longer judge Jews in cases that only involved
civil disputes among themselves. According to Vital (1999), “Considering
that in Old Poland, as elsewhere in the Middle Ages, judicial authority was
a prime symbol of government as well as one of its major instruments, these
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were remarkable concessions. They highlighted the formal separation of the
Jews from the rest of the body politic” (Vital 1999: 8).
Indeed, in many of the Polish estates, Jews could look back at a long history of tolerance—even if the application of royal tolerance or privilege decrees
depended on the local sovereigns that controlled the different estates making
up the Polish territory. This was of particular importance during the many
times when unity under one king was lost and Poland consisted of a series of
dukedoms. In general terms, however—as the quote above demonstrates—the
condition for tolerance was that Jews kept themselves apart and did not integrate, or even mingle, with Christians (Teller, Teter, and Polonsky 2010). This
only changed in the late eighteenth century, when Polish Jews were granted
civil rights and released from constraints. They were even permitted to purchase and own land and housing. They were also allowed to retain a degree of
juridical autonomy and permitted to wear their characteristic dress and beards
(Polonsky 2009). However, even this integration came with a price—in the
concrete sense of the term. “The money by which the nobility, the Church,
and the burghers—and the crown itself—were to be paid off in exchange for
their acquiescence in this radical change would come from the Jews themselves” (Vital 1999: 73).
In eighteenth-century Poland, the nobility had been opposed to giving
non-Catholics political rights. They were only admitted to municipal citizenship in 1775 (Vital 1999: 74). However, the strongest opposition to all
changes in the status of the Jews was voiced by the middle-class burghers,
because they perceived urban Jews as competitors and thus strongly pressed
for their exclusion from urban citizenship rights. Urban citizenship, especially in those towns that did not belong to the Christian Church or to some
landlord, brought with it the right to join a guild and thus to be allowed to
conduct business in the town, be it as a craftsman or a merchant. As elsewhere in Europe, urban citizenship also brought the right to participate in
the making of municipal law, voting, and holding public office. It was precisely in those free towns that the burghers opposed Jewish membership the
most, confirming the general pattern detected thus far—namely, that the
value of Christian citizenship was established, at least in part, by contrasting
it with Jewish non-rights and exclusion.
Reforms to Jewish citizenship only came after 1789, in the wake of
much broader Polish state formation. However, even then, Christian power
holders and political elites in general perceived it as entirely normal that
Jews had to pay—and pay heavily—for whatever right or entitlement they
wanted to have.
Later developments in those European states that counted on relatively
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strong Jewish communities all follow a similar pattern. In the AustroHungarian Empire, after 1818, the state relied heavily on extra payments
made regularly by Jews, and it was taken for granted that Christian privileges and rights had to be sustained and financed through Jewish special
duties. So even after the French Revolution, Jews remained “a people apart,”
and their admittance to the community of Christians was dependent on
what they had to offer in return—thus instrumental, and not driven by a
genuine will to integrate them and give them equal-citizen status.
Jewish citizenship in Europe remained tenuous and tentative, continuously threatened and invaded, its substantiveness challenged or invalidated
in daily interactions. In nineteenth-century Prussia, for example, Jews were
granted formal citizenship only in 1869, and formal citizenship was a far cry
from substantive citizenship and being able (and allowed by one’s “fellow”
citizens) to actually live and practice the social role of being a full citizen. As
Vital (1999) argues, “While the principle of full equality was conceded in
principle it was only grudgingly and incompletely accorded in practice: the
unwritten, but almost total, ban on the inclusion of Jews into the official
civil and military hierarchies (with the partial exception of the lower judiciary) was retained” (Vital 1999: 177).
The French Revolution changed little in this respect. If anything, as the
European developments of 1933 to 1945 demonstrate, once Jews became
effectively more secularized and more integrated, the irrational fear of
sneaky pollution and hidden penetration only increased (Bauman 2001).

Conclusion

After citizenship succumbed to empire in Athens and Rome, it reemerged
in several, mostly small, cities in Tuscany. Before these cities were able to
declare themselves sovereign, limited citizenship rights were granted by
kings, emperors, marquises, dukes, and the like to their subjects. After the
Tuscan city republics were swallowed up by the Catholic Church and the
worldly powers with which it was at times united, the situation fell back to
a granting of certain, although limited, rights to subjects. In this chapter, I
have sought to analyze all three of these scenarios: citizenship before the city
republics, during the city republics, and afterwards.
The situation of the city republics allows us to detect clear parallels to
the classical period, especially Athens. In places like Florence, citizenship
meant a lot to all those who were citizens. More than rights, it implied
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duties. However, the rights and entitlements derived from citizenship were
also considerable—and valued enough to be under constant dispute and
siege. Similar also to the classical examples, citizenship in one of the Tuscan towns was very exclusive and circumscribed. Slaves, serfs, women, and
generally the poor were not granted membership. Particularly the poor, at
least those residing within the city walls, constantly challenged their own
exclusion and were able to carve out more rights for themselves—as happened, for example, in fourteenth-century Florence. However, the ascent of
the lower classes to power almost always marked the beginning of the end of
these republics, as it gave rise to violent reactions by the rich citizens.
When citizens were internally divided, it became easier for their much
more powerful outside enemies to succeed, so that the rise of the lower
classes during the fourteenth century brought the end of those republics.
A constant of any self-ruling community in Europe, from classical
times to modern states, was its faith-based character. Faith, as Kim (2004)
explains for England, was the number one condition for membership: faith
in the same God, and at the same time faith in the sovereign and in the rules
emanating from the sovereign—even if the collective was the sovereign, in
which case “allegiance” would be a more adequate term. The sharing of
Christian ritual, as Max Weber explains, sealed the pact that the members
of such communities made and gave it strength.
This is precisely where the exclusionary character of such pacts emerges.
As during most of Europe’s history, civic pacts were religious pacts, and Jews
were not allowed to join. How exactly this exclusion of the Jews unfolded
before, during, and after the city republics is highlighted throughout this
chapter. It becomes clear that the Jews provided an important background
against which the privilege of Christian citizenship was constructed. Whereas
slaves, women, serfs, and the poor provided the labor, the Jews allowed for
an active engagement in commerce and trade. They were also functional in
the construction of the first banks. But more than fulfilling instrumental
roles that allowed for the accumulation of profits, Jews served the purpose
of contrasting the “pure” inside group of fellow Christians to their “impure”
outsider status. This is because such tropes as homogeneity and purity can
only work if contrasted to something else, and nothing and no group can be
pure and homogeneous by itself.
What emerges, then, from this succinct genealogy of citizenship is its
inherent contradiction, which manifests itself in its exclusionary trait. The
following cases, focusing on contemporary democracies, will add validity
to this characteristic and further explore the different facets and limits, or
tradeoffs, of democratic self-rule.

Chapter 5

France
Liberalism Unveiled
People always talk about Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, and yes, there is
freedom, but not everywhere and for everyone. Remember, we’re French; we
were born here. Our grandparents fought in wars to defend France. Back
then, they were considered unsuitable, and today so are we.
—Siyakha Traoré, “Open Letter to France,” 2006

France is a crucial case in this study. France presents itself—
and is widely imaged—as being the next step from, or the natural
continuation of, the ancient Greek invention of democracy. France thus is
important historically. It is, however, also important conceptually, as France
to this day stands out as a nation that has held onto the liberal republican
traditions that motivated the French Revolution. The Fifth Republic still
is a place where special rights and associations, and the privileges that such
association could represent, are actively undermined. The unitarian French
state only recognizes individual citizens and is weary of the special interests
that easily grow out of secondary associations.
The history, and justification, of such a philosophy and the public policies it triggers can easily be found in French history. As Alexis de Tocqueville
(1955) explains, “The revolution set out to replace feudal institutions with
a new social and political order, at once simple and more uniform, based on
the concept of the equality of all men” (Tocqueville 1955: 20). Aristocrats
and the Catholic Church had, of course, created powerful associations that
claimed significant privileges for themselves. Aristocrats did not pay taxes
and towards the end of the eighteenth century had very few administrative
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tasks—thus living in a situation with many privileges and few, almost no,
obligations. The situation of the Roman Catholic Church was no different.
This institution, too, had important privileges that were not matched by
concrete responsibilities towards the collective.
The French revolutionaries did away with the privileges of the aristocracy and the Church. Their associations were prohibited, their special rights
to land, taxes, and rent-derived income canceled. Many aristocrats and clerics died swift deaths delivered the modern way, by the guillotine. The New
France decided not to tolerate any interest groups and associations; no “special” groups with special rights and privileges survived. The Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen was adopted in August 1789 by the
National Constituent Assembly. It was the first step toward writing a new
constitution for France, which was ratified in 1791. The declaration of 1789
became the preamble of the new constitution. The whole emerging system
was strongly influenced by the motivation not to provide the aristocracy
with any opportunities to dominate the political system—hence the option
for unicameralism.
Probably the most important philosophical godfather of the new constitution was Jean Jacques Rousseau, with his Social Contract, first published
in 1762. In it, Rousseau had established popular sovereignty as the basis for
modern democratic legitimacy (Rosanvallon 1992: 26). Among other statements, Rousseau declared that “The legislative power belongs to the people,
and can belong to it alone” (bk. 3, chap. 12: “How the Sovereign Authority
Maintains Itself ”). With regard to the law, Rousseau highlights the same
principle: “Every law the people have not ratified in person is null and
void—is, in fact, not a law” (bk. 3, chap. 15: “Deputies or Representatives”).
Central to the establishment of “one person, one vote” was Rousseau’s
work on the general will. Indeed, Rousseau’s thinking on this issue provided
the blueprint for article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen. It reads:
The law is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the right to contribute personally, or through their representatives, to its formation. It must be
the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. All citizens, being equal in its
eyes, are equally admissible to all public dignities, positions, and employments,
according to their capacities, and without any other distinction than that of
their virtues and their talents.

This focus on the equality of all individuals, as long as they were citizens,
and the aversion to any kind of special interests, groups, and associations
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still characterizes the French republic today. This chapter examines some of
the implications, as well as shortcomings, of this republican tradition. My
focus is on two specific shortcomings: first, the very foundational problem
of who counts as a Man, and secondly, the related problem of how such a
tradition is translated into contemporary politics. This chapter will demonstrate that nonwhites were not considered Man by the French metropolitan
forces that dominated the political scene in revolutionary France. From
the very beginning, the supposed radicalism of the French Revolution was
thus severely flawed. More than universal principles, it expressed Western
white principles that were, in addition, further limited by their gender bias.
I further argue that this ambivalence is still characteristic of contemporary
France, so that the supposedly neutral framework of “one man, one vote”
serves the purpose of perpetuating privilege while prolonging second-class
status for nonwhites. The relation between defending privilege while producing exclusion is indeed dialectical in that one constitutes the other.
Methodologically, the best place to unveil the mechanisms that constitute
privilege through exclusion and second-class citizenship are at the very margins of the French polity—there where the regime ran thin. Before delving
into the politics of contemporary France, I will thus explore the situations in
some of the French colonies.

Colonies: Where Liberalism Hits the Fan

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, France assumed a mandate
of what today is Syria and Lebanon, which lasted until 1946. France had
indeed acquired experience in the “Orient” after Napoleon’s conquests of
Egypt in 1798—and was thus deemed well suited by the League of Nations
for this task. During that time, “the French established a tacit pecking order
of access to state jobs and other economic benefits. In Lebanon, Christians
obtained a disproportionate number of civil service jobs, despite the constitution’s promise of equitable access” (Thompson 2000: 81). Once it became
clear, through the 1932 census, that the French colonial administration was
biased against Muslims and for Christians, the French did what they still do
to this day: they stopped collecting ethnic and religious data in the census
(Thompson 2000: 82).
One can observe similar contradictions in other corners of the French
colonial empire. There, as elsewhere in the colonized world, racism was
integral to domination, as Ann Stoler has so vividly explained when stating,
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“Racism is an inherent product of the colonial encounter, fundamental to
an otherwise illegitimate access to property and power” (Stoler 2002: 24).
In the French Caribbean, for example, revolting slaves did not find the
sympathy and support from the revolutionary champions of fraternité and
égalité back in the colonial motherland. Even Robespierre, as radical as he
was, did not push for the de facto emancipation of slaves—even if he favored
it in theory (James 1938: 59).
To the contrary, such influential public figures as Condorcet, while
favoring abolition in theory, argued for a gradual investment with citizenship rights, because at the time of the French Revolution, the “stupidity
contracted through slavery by the corruption of their morals (the necessary
result of their masters’ influence), the slaves of the European colonies have
become incapable of fulfilling the duties of free men” (Condorcet, quoted
in Dubois 2004: 181).
When emancipation was proclaimed in Haiti in 1794, after the slave
revolt, French colonial administrators sought for ways to block the full
political emancipation of blacks and instead proposed a gradual transition that would not endanger the economic structure of the island (Dubois
2004: 183).
In Haiti, when nonwhites raised the banner of liberty, they were quickly
dealt with. So in 1790, when “Lacombe, a Mulatto, claimed for his people [mulattos, not blacks] social and political rights. The whites of Le Cap
hanged him on the spot” (James 1938: 49).
Many similar stories are found in the classic study of the Haitian Revolution by C.L.R. James. There is the case of M. de Baudière, a French
colonial administrator in Haiti, who also in 1790 proposed a “moderate
petition for some Mulattoes seeking to improve their status” (James 1938:
49). He was lynched by the local whites, his body “shamefully mutilated”
(James 1938: 49).
Back in Paris, where the taking of the Bastille and the passing of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen inspired the masses, it
quickly became clear that blacks and mulattoes were not included among
the Men and Citizens. Abbé Grégoire, spokesman for the “Friends of the
Negro,” as well as a member of the French National Assembly, proposed that
the declaration thus gave mulattoes (not blacks!) the right to vote. To this, “a
San Domingo deputy protested. Another deputy moved that the discussion
be closed. De Lameth, the same who had chirped so noisily three months
before, agreed that Gregoire’s ‘indiscreet proposal’ should not be discussed,
and the House decided not to discuss it” (James 1938: 55). By denying
political rights to mulattoes and not even considering blacks, the French
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Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen indeed made nonwhites
nonhumans—a point stressed by Frantz Fanon in 1956. In his resignation
letter to the French colonial minister in Algeria, Fanon wrote: “What is the
status of Algeria? A systemized de-humanization” (Fanon 1970: 63).
Indeed, as C.L.R. James (1938) shows, Haiti could only achieve emancipation for its slaves by breaking with France. Napoleon had sent his own
brother-in-law, Charles Leclerc, to Haiti to restore slavery and bring Haiti
back to France, so that it could continue to produce the riches France so
desperately wanted. The biggest army Napoleon had ever sent abroad was
given the mission to reinstate slavery for the land of universal freedom and
brotherhood. However, almost all of the 34,000 French soldiers found their
death in Haiti.
Clearly, as Etienne Balibar (2004) has argued, the European Enlightenment not only accepted racism—it indeed constituted it. To claim cultural
heights for Europeans rested on the previous establishment of civilizational
hierarchies that were profoundly racialized. This view assumed that Europeans had climbed to the cultural heights that gave them specific rights
and entitlements, whereas non-Europeans had not achieved this stage yet
and thus lacked the intellectual, cultural, and hence civilizational qualities
that provided the groundwork on which liberalism rested. Since Kant, this
groundwork was comprised of rational, autonomous individuals whose reason and intellectual autonomy allowed them to decide for themselves, and
whose individual preferences could then be amassed and translated into collective decisions (Rosanvallon 1992). In particular, Africans provided the
necessary contrast to these European achievements (Eze 2008). Africans
were classified by European analysts as not rational or autonomous enough
to have their voices heard and considered. They instead needed tutelage. As
Frantz Fanon has argued, the colonized were part of the realm of dehumanized *non-being (Fanon 1967: 10).
The constitutive function of black backwardness as the measure for
white advancement, which translated into white rights and black obligations, found expression not just in the French First Republic. In the Second
Republic, after slavery was abolished again (in 1848) and blacks obtained
formal rights, Antillean social rights were restricted and labor coercion instituted (Blackburn 1988). Indeed, after slaves in Guadeloupe, Martinique,
Guyana, and Réunion declared their freedom, the National Assembly in
Paris voted not to facilitate their integration, but to compensate their former
masters (Blackburn 1988: 501).
When the Second Republic embraced industrial production in the
form of usines centrales for the massive industrial production of sugar in
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the Caribbean, it searched for a way to force the newly freed blacks to
fuel these new, emerging machines—a task not easily achieved during
the short-lived Second Republic. When the republic gave way to the Second Empire, “the Bonapartiste regime endeared itself to the planters and
sugar companies by taking immediate and vigorous measures to ensure a
larger and more disciplined labour force. In February 1852 an imperial
edict suppressed all colonial representation and self-government; Guadeloupe’s Le Progrès had already been banned. Draconian labour legislation
was introduced. Every adult was obliged to carry a livret with details of
employment and residence; those failing to comply could be subjected
to penal labour. Subsequent regulations stipulated that those occupying
plantation lands should render labour services to the planters, for which
they might receive nominal payment” (Blackburn 1988: 502f ).
According to Blackburn, “The slave had been forced to work by the
whip; the ex-slave was forced into an unequal contract by the need to
prove gainful occupation or to pay a capitation tax” (Blackburn 1988:
503). Indeed, bonded laborers for Senegal soon replaced the former
slaves in the French Caribbean. In 1852, such bonded labor contracts
were allowed by imperial decree. This regime operated until 1860, bringing a total of 16,000 Africans to the French Caribbean (Blackburn 1988:
503). Even though African indentured labor was ended in 1860s, “some
77,000 Indians, 1,300 Chinese and 500 Vietnamese were introduced to
the French Antilles”—all as indentured, that is, unfree, laborers and serfs
(Blackburn 1988: 503).
Then, under the Third Republic (1870–1940), “the Antillean people’s
rights were nominally reinstated, even as they were also subject to an authoritarian colonial administration that governed a racially organized society.
During the century following emancipation, rationalized bureaucracy,
modern agro-industrial production, and republican colonialism became
interdependent” (Wilder 2004: 37).
In one way or another, postrevolutionary France used nonwhite colonials and postcolonials to construct economic power, which was then used
to justify the claim of high cultural, intellectual, and civilizational standing
for themselves. Indeed, this hierarchy became so ingrained in the French
Selbstverstaendniss, the way of thinking about oneself, that it arguably still
informs French nationalism and mainstream representation. To this day,
as the next section will demonstrate, the condition for integration into the
French mainstream is to assimilate, that is, to become French, which easily
translates into climbing up to the cultural heights of the French. As Tyler
Stovall and Georges Van den Abbeele explain in the introduction to their
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French Civilization and Its Discontents (2003), “No proponents of these missions of French civilization ever expected that cultural exchange to be in
any way bidirectional. France’s ‘missions,’ forged by the Jacobin heritage
of the Revolution, have seemingly always understood its ‘universalism’ to
be coterminous with the assimilation of specifically French identity and its
republican values” (Stovall and Abbeele 2003: 4). For the French, their mission civilisatrice was to make the world under their rule more French. Only
then could they be admitted as equals. The problem, since the very beginning of French colonialism, was and continued to be that some people and
groups were deemed unassimilable. The same authors just quoted explain:
“In practice, though, especially that concretized under colonial rule, limits
were drawn with some folks considered worthy of being civilized while others were termed ‘unassimilable’ and doomed to never-ending barbarism”
(Stovall and Abbeele 2003: 5).
Under colonial rule, this distinction translated into a classification of
natives into “indigène” and “assimilé,” with different institutions and treatments for each. For Gary Wilder (2005), such a bifurcated system bore
several inherent contradictions, namely, “socioeconomic individualism
without juridico-political individuality, social development without civil
society, citizenship without culture, nationality without citizenship” (Wilder
2005: 5). After decolonization, and with the onset of migration from the
former colonies to France, this distinction carried over to a classification
of first- and second-class citizens. In today’s reality, as Pap Ndiaye (2008)
explains, racism comes in many forms, and even if the cruder form of biologically determined racism was dismantled after the Second World War, it
has survived in the form of a discrete, yet very real colonizing mission and a
very dominant paternalism (Ndiaye 2008: 428).
Liberalism, as coined by the French Revolution, thus bears an inherent
contradiction. On one hand, it declares itself “universal” while really only
reflecting a particular French-European experience, which becomes evident
in its differentiated evaluation of different civilizations, where their own is
“naturally” the one superior to all the others, which hence need to be “civilized” (Chakrabarty 2000). On the other hand, it does not even live up to
the very mission it declares, as it rejects some groups and cultures as outright
“unassimilable,” hence justifying their exclusion from a regime of French
rights. Both these strategies reveal the deep bias and the inherent contradictions of the kind of European liberalism emerging during the eighteenth
century in Europe. Uday Singh Mehta (1999) has highlighted this contradiction for the British case when explaining that liberalism and empire were
indeed linked. According to Mehta,
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The historian in James Mill, the legislator in Bentham, the educator in Macaulay, and the apostle of progress and individuality in J.S. Mill, all, I believe,
fail in the challenge posed by the unfamiliar; because when faced with it they
do no more than “repeat,” presume on, and assert (this where power becomes
relevant) the familiar structures of the generalities that inform the reasonable,
the useful, the knowledgeable, and the progressive. These generalities constitute the ground of a cosmopolitanism because in a single glance and without
having experienced any of it, they make it possible to compare and classify the
world. But that glance is braided with the urge to dominate the world, because
the language of those comparisons is not neutral and cannot avoid notions of
superiority and inferiority, backward and progressive, and higher and lower.
(Mehta 1999: 20)

Similar exercises to deconstruct the great European thinkers of liberalism
and enlightenment, such as Hegel and Kant, render similar results, revealing
deep Eurocentric bias (Dussel 1993). However, Mehta (1999) concludes,
and I agree with this assessment, that
[The] point is not that the existence of the empire and the political thought
or even more specifically the liberal thought that emerged concurrently with it
were obviously in contradiction. That claim is neither obvious, nor, I believe,
ultimately true. In any case the language of contradictions is too precise an
instrument to say anything of interest about generalities that range across centuries and involve the complicated intersections of ideas and practices, not to
mention the different logics of domestic and international imperatives. Moreover, contradictions, if they do exist, do not close the space on the complexities
that emerge from the extended link between liberalism and empire. They should
be taken as an invitation to that space. (Mehta 1999: 7)

This space between liberalism and empire (or even the one between
republicanism and racism) indeed constitutes the most fruitful unit of
analysis for a critical examination of democracy and citizenship, because it
reveals the profound bias of the European tradition and the mutually constitutive relationship of citizenship and exclusion. As Dipesh Chakrabarty
has argued with Ranajit Guha, “The European bourgeoisie . . . made its
own interests look and feel like the interests of all” (Chakrabarty 2000: 15).
The implications of such a politics are far-reaching and are only beginning
to be unveiled. They force us to take a closer look at history, as well as to
reexamine our own disciplines and the ways we approach reality (Rodriguez,
Boatcă, and Costa 2010; Boatcă 2010; Lander 2002; Mignolo 2008).
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Contemporary France: How to
Be More Equal Than Others

In contemporary France, assimilation still provides the only way to find
acceptance among white, mainstream Frenchmen and their polity. Assimilation, however, is not easily achieved, even if most immigrants seek it. On
one hand, nonwhite skin color resists easy assimilation; on the other, religious beliefs and the symbols they come with seem too costly to simply give
up in order to find acceptance. The result among all those who seek integration, acceptance, and even assimilation, but have not been able to achieve
any of them, is often one of frustration and resignation. Among the youth,
especially those born in France, this frustration has led to protests of different forms—some nonviolent, others less so. However, French official ways
are apparently stubborn. In February 2004, the French parliament outlawed
the use of religious symbols in public schools, forcing Muslim girls to unveil
themselves. After the breakout of minority youth riots in early November
2005, Prime Minister Villepin asserted: “France is not a country like others.
It will never accept that citizens live separately, with different opportunities
and with unequal futures.”1
The way the French state seeks to ensure equal opportunities is guided
by its commitment to the republican ideas of citoyenneté and intégration,
which point to assimilation as the only way to integrate immigrants and
nontraditional citizens into the nation. The core of this philosophy is to
not recognize differences among French citizens, and to apply color-blind
public policies to ensure equal opportunity.
However, the assertion of the French prime minister was in stark contrast to a French reality that has been depicted by many as increasingly
separate, where people of different ethnic backgrounds encounter very different opportunities and face highly disparate futures.2 France has become
a showcase and example for a more dominant European policy of not recognizing ethnic groups and minorities, and focusing on assimilation as
the main, and indeed only way to integrate immigrants. Officially, once a
citizen, the French state does not take into account any group-specific characteristics that de facto set the citizenry apart, such as ethnicity, religion,
or gender. The French state therefore insists on a form of radical individualism that is anchored in political liberalism and classical republicanism.
This model is dominant all over continental Europe, and the importance
of understanding the French way of officially denying the very existence of
minorities, therefore, extrapolates beyond the borders of the Fifth Republic, where it originated.
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In real life, the distinction of insider/outsider that regulates national
belonging and the distribution of rights is negotiated through the construction of a racialized conception of community. Nationalist political
groups rediscover and disseminate a myth of “purity,” detecting “foreign”
elements that “contaminate” the national body. Thus, whereas French
political elites insist on not officially recognizing any minorities within
the national body, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences are routinely
recognized in everyday interactions, and they are extremely consequential.
The French citizenry is in itself biologically, culturally, religiously, and
ethnically heterogeneous and has indeed always been so. This implies that
nonwhites are not necessarily foreigners and immigrants. To present and
frame them as such is at the very core of the problem—or more precisely, it
constitutes them as a problem. This framing is, however, very prevalent in
France as elsewhere in Europe. In a very telling interview broadcast in October 2005 on prime-time French TV, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, a French
historian and distinguished member of the Académie française, when asked
about how to understand the riots of black youth in French banlieues, stated:
“I am not surprised at all: how could young Blacks, coming directly from
their African village, adapt to the French way of life?” (Millot 2005).
There is, however, no reason to believe that the black youth who took
the streets in France in 2005 and thereafter were foreigners—let alone
immigrants. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that instead,
the situation of the two boys electrocuted while running from the police
after playing soccer on October 7, 2005, was typical: both Bouna and Zyed
were born in France. Generally, it takes a long history of broken promises, frustrated hope, failed help, and discouraging experience in one’s own
country—not the country of others—to produce the kind of protests the
world has been witnessing in France (Keaton 2009). However, the exact
backgrounds of French minorities are not known, because official population surveys do not account for them, following the French tradition so well
established in such places as Syria and Lebanon. The only data available
come from nongovernmental organizations and are thus limited in their
degree of representativeness. They are still informative.
In a survey conducted in 2007 by sofres, “the most renowned and largest market-research firm in France” (Tin 2008: 36), a total of 3.86 percent
of adults interviewed self-declared “black.” Of those, 56 percent declared
that they had experienced racism in their everyday lives.3 Research has further demonstrated that young blacks (classified in the available surveys as
second-generation Maghrebins and sub-Saharan Africans) are 2.5 times as
likely to be unemployed than their white counterparts, which means that
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their unemployment rates hover around 20 percent! Although nonwhites
also drop out of school more often than whites, their difficulties in finding
jobs remain, even when compared to whites with the same qualifications
(Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007).
Similarly, such authors as Philippe Bernard (2004) and Sylvie Zappi
(2004) have demonstrated that nonwhite French graduates from French elite
universities were 25 percent less likely to find jobs in the private sector compared to their white colleagues with the same qualifications, and that France
has never appointed a black ambassador to one of its 156 embassies—even
though there are plenty of well-prepared black diplomacy graduates.
Hence, in the words of Pap Ndiaye (2008), being black in France is an
“objective social handicap” (Ndiaye 2008: 430), and the de facto effect of
discriminatory practices is one of racialization. According to Ndiaye (2008),
“There therefore exists a black minority in France insofar as there is a group
of people considered black and united by this very experience, which constitutes a tenuous, yet indisputable link. This link is not necessarily the
foundation of a racialized identity, but it recognizes the shared destiny of
being considered black, no matter the subtle diversity of the chosen identities” (Ndiaye 2008: 65, my translation). Patrick Lozès, former president
of the French Representative Council of Black Associations, an umbrella
organization for black associations in France (Le Cran), and candidate for
the 2012 French presidency, confirmed this assessment. In his experience,
“Blacks in France are not full citizens . . . they are invisible ‘glass citizens,’
because not even their numbers are fully known.”4 The research conducted
by Le Cran showed that 81 percent of blacks in France were indeed French
citizens; the widespread perception, however, is that most blacks in France
are foreigners. “They cannot go back anywhere—their country is here” (Patrick Lozès, interview June 20, 2011).
The racist and exclusionary practices responsible for this situation are
not hard to decipher as anxious responses of traditional, white residents
towards a changing environment, fanned by nativist political elites that
have much to gain from blaming immigrants and nonwhites for complex
socioeconomic problems (Giry 2006). Indeed, as Vincent Geisser has demonstrated in the case of Muslims, “Islamophobia in France, unlike elsewhere
in Europe, is largely an intellectual phenomenon driven by elites, and it
stems less from insecurity than from racialist ideology” (quoted in Giry 2006:
92). The public debates about the accusation of Vincent Geisser, a French
researcher accused in 2009 by the “defense security officer” of the National
Center for Scientific Research (cnrs) for holding “too favorable opinions
of Muslims” further testified to the active involvement of political elites in
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the framing of nonwhites as non-belonging foreigners and intruders who
do not deserve the same treatment and rights as traditional white citizens.
However, the black presence in France started in the eighteenth century, the
great century of the slave trade. By royal decree, once in France, slaves had
to be liberated and instructed in a craft. Already in the seventeenth century,
there was thus a bifurcated treatment of blacks. Whereas those residing in
the colonies fell under the 1685 Code Noir, those brought to and residing
in mainland France had access to certain rights and privileges, and slavery
was thus actively fought in mainland France. Free blacks did fall under some
restrictions, such as the ban to marry, in order to avoid the proliferation of
mixed races. “In December of 1738, a royal decree limits the stay of slaves
to the learning of a craft and a maximum time of three years” (Ndiaye 2008:
134, my translation). As early as 1770, some 5,000 blacks resided in France,
out of a total population of 20 million (Ndiaye 2008: 134f ).
Hence, as Pap Ndiaye (2008) has argued, “Paris has been a black capital, where Africans, Caribbeans, Guyanese, and African Americans have
mingled since the 1920s and where an encounter between the universally
humane and the particular black has been practiced, with all its tensions and
contradictions, and at times its tears” (Ndiaye 2008: 427f, my translation).
The depiction of nonwhites as intruders and immigrants is thus not correct,
and instead of describing a reality, rather provides a framework that permits
the allocation of blame. “Foreigners” and “immigrants” are held responsible
for most of the contemporary problems France faces, even though the great
majority of them are indeed French citizens, so that this blame can easily
be translated into blaming nonwhites and non-Christians (Patrick Lozès,
interview June 20, 2011).
However, as noted above, white French citizens effectively benefit
from the exclusion of nonwhites—especially in the job market, where
high unemployment also affects them. In such crucial institutions as the
National Assembly, the diplomatic corps, the army, or even in local government bodies, black citizens are either severely underrepresented or entirely
absent (Lozès, interview 2011). Housing is another central area where
discrimination is widely practiced, negatively affecting nonwhite citizens
while positively furthering the chances of white citizens in such competitive housing markets as those in Paris. “Some blacks simply cannot find
apartments and are thus forced to live permanently in hostels, where they
are exposed to all kinds of dangers, or they are forced to live in apartments
that pose risks to their health, due to contaminated walls and pipes” (Lozès,
interview 2011).
According to Patrick Lozès, to achieve justice, the crafting of public

France

|

95

policies that ensure equity is crucial, because “it is all about power, and
nobody wants to share power” (Lozès, interview 2011).
Given the evidence of discrimination and unequal treatment affecting
the French citizenry, depending on their skin color and religion, how can
we explain that the French state insists on not providing statistics that
capture these inequalities? Established practices around the job market
provide a first clue: It is a common practice in France, as well as elsewhere
in Europe, that curricula vitae need to contain information about the age
of the applicant, as well as a photo. The black French citizens I interviewed in 2007 all had experienced similar situations when applying for a
job. Their candidacy advanced up to the moment when it became obvious
that they were black.
The statement of one black female interviewee, age twenty-eight, holding a university degree, born in France and a French citizen, was typical.
She explains (after my question regarding situations where racism is most
influential): “At work, especially when you apply for a job. At job interviews, I would always be asked where I was from. I am French, but to them,
it doesn’t appear that way.”5
On average, the black French citizens I interviewed in 2007, all of
whom held university degrees and were French citizens, took about three
years to finally find a job. In most cases, they found jobs that did not
meet their expectations—a finding confirmed by more systematic research
(Simon 2003).
The French state thus demands, or at least tolerates the fact that job
applicants need to give evidence of their skin color when applying for jobs,
fully aware that this will significantly impact their chances to find a job. In
other words, French political elites and the state they command are aware
that traditional white French citizens routinely discriminate against nonwhites and non-Christians, a conclusion that is further evidenced by the
long history of half-hearted and thus ineffective measures taken by the
French government to at least formally address this issue (Kiwan 2007). But
those same elites avoid taking any concrete and effective action to counteract this situation with reference to the ideals of universalism, laicism,
and republicanism, although all of these ideals were formulated precisely
to ensure equality, brotherhood, and liberty. So why have political elites in
France not acted more decisively to ensure the quality of their democracy
and the upholding of the high principles it represents? The most plausible
answer, it appears, is that they do not want to. The conclusion reached by
Louis-Georges Tin, black activist and founder of Le Cran, seems the most
plausible:
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I must note that the fierce adversaries of communities, as a matter of fact,
were not against communities as such; they were against some communities:
Arab-Muslims, Jews, and homosexuals. . . . No one criticizes the sixteenth
arrondissement in Paris, a bourgeois community which also has its particular
habits, mores, and customs. No one would dream of criticizing the traditional
communities, professional communities, and the Catholic communities. (Tin
2008: 38)

Prohibiting the excluded from using cultural, ethnic, and religious criteria to address inequalities, while at the same time allowing employers
to use ethnic criteria in their hiring practices, reveals the deep bias with
which political elites address this issue. French political elites know about
the discriminatory practices that victimize a part of the French citizenry, yet
they do not act decisively to resolve them. Instead, they hold onto a mere
rhetoric of universalism, even though the aim of universalism is to ensure
equal rights for all. French citizenship has, as a consequence of persistent
discrimination, become racialized and divided. Whereas traditional, white
citizens insist on their citizenship rights, thus treating them as assets and
entitlements, ethnicized nontraditional citizens have become second-class
citizens, who are not allowed to experience the full extent of the role of
being a citizen. To them, citizenship is not a set of entitlements, but has
remained an unfulfilled promise.
It is not surprising that people seek to defend privilege, especially
if unmerited, when it promises to secure concrete and very important
advantages—for example, in a very competitive job market. Under such
conditions, whiteness serves as an important capital, bestowing extra symbolic capital onto its bearer (Reiter 2010). It is, however, the responsibility
of political elites and state apparatuses to check these tendencies and enact
policies that aim at ensuring equal opportunities. That is the core of the
universalist idea. Instead, French political elites are assisting white citizens
to defend their privileges, thus revealing profound double standards. If the
French state were indeed so sternly opposed to any form of particularism,
then the ethnic marking of applicants on their curricula should be illegal,
especially considering its highly consequential effects on (universalist) equal
opportunities. Racist bias in hiring would also have to be addressed in other
ways in order to ensure equal chances—for example, by enacting quotas.
Furthermore, if state elites were really committed to achieving universal
equality, they would not rob those negatively affected by discriminatory
practices of the means to address them. They would allow a diagnosis of the
current situation of the French citizenry that takes into account inequalities,
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in the form of color-conscious censuses. French political elites, however,
have not acted decisively to effectively counteract the racist practices of
traditional, white citizens. This reluctance can only be explained by remembering the benefits that political elites and their electorate reap from the
current situation: it provides the white majority with a competitive advantage in the job market, and it allows state elites to escape scrutiny and shields
them from being held responsible for the wide array of social problems facing French society by blaming “others.”
As such, the French case highlights the structural impediments and
perverse incentives created and maintained under majority rule whenever
political cleavages reflect ethnic differences. Under such conditions, white
majorities have no incentives to extend substantive citizenship to nonwhite
minorities, as access to substantive citizenship is perceived by these majorities as a zero-sum game, where extending access implies losing privileges that
are perceived not as rights, but as entitlements. Political elites, in turn, have
no incentives to truly represent the interests of minorities, even less so when
the representation of their interests is perceived as hurting the interests of
the majority, whose votes they need, after all. More than in racial hatred,
many of the problems around successful integration of minorities in France
are thus rooted in the asset character of substantive citizenship, which provides structural incentives for the political mobilization of majorities against
structural minorities.6 This phenomenon is made worse by the impossibility of rendering ethnicity and religion politically unproblematic by simply
ignoring them, as they tend not to be ignored in everyday interactions.
Under such conditions, black scholar-activist Pap Ndiaye (2008)
expresses sadness in the face of so many dreams and hopes crushed. Seeking
to capture the aspirations of black French formal citizens, Ndiaye explains,
“We want to be at the same time black and French, without being considered suspicious, strange, or merely tolerated as a temporary problem waiting
to be assimilated away. We want to be invisible in our social lives so that the
distortions and mishaps that affect us as blacks are effectively reduced. But
we want to be visible when it comes to our black cultural identities, our precious and unique contributions to the French society and culture” (Ndiaye
2008: 426, my translation).
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Conclusion: The Discriminatory
Dimensions of Civic Bonds

The case of France allows us to discern several causally relevant mechanisms
producing exclusion and second-class citizenship. The analysis of France
demonstrates that racism can survive and indeed articulate itself with civicness. The French system is such that it first encourages non-French to
become French—only to classify some people and groups as unassimilable.
The frustration that such a system produces among those so classified can
hardly be overstated—and the vehemence of youth protests held by minorities since the beginning of the 2000s gives ample evidence of this frustration.
It is not just unfair, but wickedly racist to first declare that all can become
French—except you.
Practicing this sort of schizophrenic classifying of human beings and
groups, while at the same time ensuring that they have no means of classifying themselves (which is achieved by not providing any official numbers on
the situation of minorities), the French state reveals the deep contradictions
of its liberal, republican foundation. In fact, the republican ideal of selfgovernance, as expressed so radically by Rousseau, never meant to include
others besides white European males. Worse, it used nonwhites to construct
the very position from which it proclaimed its own superiority. By doing
so, it also evidenced the hollowness of the classical Western liberal tradition
on which this discourse ultimately rested. To govern oneself as a collective, individuals had to be rational and autonomous—but according to the
thinkers developing this idea, not all men were. Women certainly were not,
and neither were all those whose poverty or divergent societal and developmental models pushed them down the civilizational ladder, according to
the monodimensional evaluation model of the European classifiers. In fact,
white European males found only themselves worthy of self-governance and
democracy. The rest of the world—black, brown, or yellow as classified during colonial times—they found lacking, and at best able to learn Western
ways after long and arduous work and training. Some, especially Africans,
were deemed unassimilable. To say so was necessary, because how else to
enslave, dominate, and control them, treating them as tools, things, and
machines—radically dehumanizing them? What was called “universalism”
thus reveals in the treatment of nonwhites and non-Christians its profound
particularism and bias. The high talk of liberalism, republicanism, equality,
brotherhood, and justice was nothing more than that: talk.

Chapter 6

The Postcolonial Within
Portugal, White and European
It is part of the organic essence of the Portuguese Nation to carry out
the historical function of colonizing and owning overseas dominions
and civilizing indigenous populations.
—Article 2 of the Colonial Act,
Decree no. 18.570, 8 July 1930

In this chapter, I analyze Portugal’s negotiations around
the issues of citizenship, belonging, and rights. Portugal, again, is a very telling and crucial case. It represents several empirical/historical phenomena.
For one thing, as a European Union member, Portugal is a typical European
case. Given Portugal’s fairly recent admission to the EU and its position
at the margin, geographically as well as in terms of importance and influence, an analysis of Portugal allows us to untwine the rather complex issues
involved in joining the “Fortress Europe” (Gordon 1982). But Portugal as a
case has more to offer. Due to its long colonial history as the first European
power to set out to conquer the rest of the world, and the last European
country to let go of its former colonies (in 1974), Portugal is a showcase of
the colonial entanglements that characterize other European former colonial powers as well. Portugal is typical in its “French” approach (described
above) of focusing solely on assimilation as the sine qua non condition
for the integration of nonwhite and non-Christian others, and thus represents a broader European integration regime. What stands out in Portugal,
however, is the very clear way in which the state is involved in forming,
enforcing, regulating, and policing this regime. It is precisely this strong and
99
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clearly observable state involvement in the ways of Portuguese belonging
and not-belonging that provides one of the strongest rationales for including Portugal in this study. To be certain, all states are directly involved in
the ways that issues of citizenship, belonging, foreigners, immigrants, and
integration are framed and discussed in their respective societies. In Portugal, however, this involvement is more clearly observable than elsewhere.
Here, not only is one able to observe and analyze the direct involvement
of the state in the framing of a common sense of who is rightly Portuguese
and who is not—but also one can observe how other elite-dominated central state institutions, particularly universities, are recruited in this effort.
Portuguese universities, I shall demonstrate in this chapter, have become
accomplices in the process of framing nonwhite Portuguese citizens as foreigners and immigrants.

The Re-engineering of National Belonging

Portugal has a long history as a nation-state, reaching all the way back to
1249. National unity and the early creation of a nation-state, which allowed
for the systematic collection of taxes and extraction of profit, allowed the
Portuguese crown to invest in overseas adventures before any other European nation had the means to do so. Portugal ventured to, and conquered,
parts of Africa as early as the early fifteenth century, successfully taking
North African ports, such as Ceuta, in 1415. Sponsored by Henry the Navigator, Portugal, a small country with barely one million inhabitants, became
the biggest trans-maritime empire of the world, with possessions in Africa,
India, China, the Pacific, and, after 1500, the Americas.
Much has been said and written about the Portuguese propensity to
mingle and mix with native populations, contributing to a vast mixed population wherever they went. For the current purpose, this is not a relevant
discussion. However, it is relevant to note that the Portuguese male conquerors lacked the numbers to effectively populate those regions they had
conquered, thus resorting to the production of mixed offspring as a means
to guarantee control of the vast empire. This was achieved by making their
mixed offspring the overseers and indirect rulers over natives. Portugal thus
created its own form of indirect rule—one relying on the politics of demographics. It also used colonized people from one place to control colonized
people from another, typically in such a way as to use lighter-skinned people to control darker-skinned groups, hence creating a sophisticated, and
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wicked, scheme of colorism throughout its empire. Indians from Goa were
thus used to control Mozambicans; Cape Verdeans became indirect rulers
over Angolans, the people of Guinea-Bissau, and the people of São Tomé
and Principe (Leonard 2000).
The Portuguese empire lasted longer than any other modern European
empire—from the mid-fifteenth century all the way to 1974, when the
empire finally crumbled from within. During the last years of Portuguese
colonialism, the Portuguese regime under Salazar and Caetano resorted
to very consequential strategies in order to keep the empire intact. They
extended Portuguese nationalism to include the colonies, thus boldly
declaring that Portugal had no colonies. Instead, they argued, such places as
Angola and Cape Verde were one with Portugal.
Such strategic maneuvering, of course, came with a price. Until 1961,
the price consisted of offering Portuguese passports to all those who worked
for the Portuguese colonial state, as well as all those who could pass the
“civilizational” test as spelled out by the indigenato legal code, which regulated who was to be considered civilized and who remained barbaric. By
adopting the customs of the colonizers, some natives could thus gain access
to the right of Portuguese citizenship. Lastly, all those fighting and willing
to die for the Portuguese motherland during the long wars of independence
were also given, as reward, the privilege of Portuguese citizenship.
After independence for most (not all) Portuguese colonies finally arrived,
many of those attached to the Portuguese state in one way or another moved
to Portugal, either because they had no other choice, or because they hoped
to cash in on the benefits that lifelong sacrifice for Portugal had earned them.
With them came some 800,000 “returners”—that is, Africans who had held
onto their privileged status of being colonizers while living, often for generations, in the colonies. Their passports were written on their skins, as their
whiteness legitimized them as being “truly” Portuguese.
Faced with such a large legacy of some five hundred years of colonizing
the world and declaring that all of it was, in fact, part of Portugal, the country had to rethink what it meant to be Portuguese. This necessity became
even more urgent when the country applied for membership in the European Union, in the early 1980s. To join Europe with such an expansive
notion of who one was, and thus who could also benefit from European
membership was impossible and would have made Portuguese membership
impossible. After all, it would have meant opening the gates of Europe to
parts of Africa and Asia.
Whereas from the European perspective, Portuguese admission was a
question of cutting back the contours of who counted as “Portuguese,” for
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the Portuguese themselves, there was even more at stake. Experts as they
were on measuring and judging the level of civilizational progress that would
make one deserving of the rights and privileges of exclusive membership,
they now had to pass the civilizational tests for being considered truly European and thus worthy to join such an elite club as the one in which France,
England, and Germany were important members. All of a sudden, the long
history of mixedness, of exposure and openness to Africa that had produced
in the Portuguese the supposed hybridity that made them the champions
of cordial race relations—this legacy now cast a dark shadow over their own
situation. In the eyes of many European observers, but even more so in their
own eyes, they were indeed not really white, not really pure, European, and
civilized. To some of their former colonies—particularly Brazil, which had
gained independence much earlier—they were even “funny,” entertaining,
backward oddities; the poor cousins who lived in a backward peasant country, small and unimportant, speaking with an anachronistic accent.
For the Portuguese elites—political, intellectual, and economic—in a
country where there was much overlap among those categories, the nation
thus had to be purified and purged of its hybridity and mixedness; sanitized
and transformed into a modern, white, civilized, and thus truly European
country (Fikes 2009). Starting in the 1980s, Portugal thus became a showcase of national re-engineering and an example of how to redefine and
remold a whole country. Nowhere else, to my knowledge, can this process
be observed in more detail and clarity than in Portugal, thus making it an
ideal case for such a Foucauldian analysis.

Nonwhites into Foreigners

Portuguese society is increasingly heterogeneous—although there are no
data on how heterogeneous its population truly is, as the Portuguese state
follows the French model of not differentiating among its citizens. However, cities such as Lisbon count on a significant population of nonwhite
citizens who go to school with, and compete for jobs against, the dominant
white population. After examining the role of state elites in the creation
and maintenance of a racist common sense that leads to racialized conceptions of first- and second-class citizenship, the case of Portugal permits us
to shed light on the implication of academia in the maintenance of a racist
and exclusionary common sense, which frames nonwhites as foreigners and
immigrants while deciding upon who “fits in” based on ethnic background.
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I shall present two arguments to elucidate this phenomenon: first, the fact
that there are almost no studies on blacks in Portugal, despite their visibility
in cities like Lisbon and Porto; and second, the fact that some immigrants
are much more welcome and taken care of than others, namely, those labeled
“home-comers” (retornados), an attribute with strong racial undertones.
When searching for books and articles about blacks in Portugal, or on
the situation of minorities in that country, one is hard pressed, as there
are almost none.1 Instead, it is very common to read that “Portugal is a
fundamentally homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity and language,
and also as regards religious faith” (Freire 2007: 208). This contradicts all
empirical experience when in Lisbon, and we do know from research that
“legally settled foreigners represent around 5 percent of the resident population” (Marques, Valente Rosa, and Martins 2007: 1149). Furthermore,
research on education, such as that undertaken by Marques, Rosa, and Martins (2007), who in 2004 conducted a case study in the poor municipality
of Oeiras, Greater Lisbon, allows us to grasp the degree of heterogeneity
that characterizes contemporary Lisbon society. Marques et al. find that
among their sample of Oeiras students age fourteen to twenty-four, “44.3
per cent [were] . . . children of immigrants” (Marques, Valente Rosa, and
Martins 2007: 1156). At the same time, articles and books about immigrants abound, thus creating the false impression that Portugal has indeed
an immigration problem, but not a problem of ensuring equal opportunities for its diverse citizenry.
The question arises: what kind of scholarly blindness has allowed social
scientists to state that Portugal is a fundamentally homogeneous country? It
appears that the lack of statistics on the presence and situation of minorities
among the Portuguese citizenry has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. By
focusing academic research on foreigners and immigrants while at the same
time not producing any information on the mere number of minorities, let
alone their socioeconomic situation, Portuguese scholars help perpetuate
a common sense that says, “Portuguese citizens are white; nonwhites are
foreigners and immigrants.” Similar to the French case, the interest behind
such maneuvering is quite evident: real problems remain unexamined and
important questions unaddressed; political elites escape scrutiny by shifting
the blame onto others, which allows them to continue in their malpractices;
whites, perceived as “normal citizens,” benefit from the bedeviling of nonwhites and reap tangible benefits.
In the case of Portugal, where funding for scholarly work in the social
sciences is scarce, and almost 100 percent of funding for scientific research
generally comes directly from different state agencies or from the state-owned
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Foundation for Science and Technology (fct), it becomes clear that intellectual elites depend on state elites for the funding of their research projects.2
The fact that there are so few studies on ethnic minorities, especially blacks, in
Portugal thus cannot be interpreted as a coincidence. To the contrary, the only
two possible explanations for this lack are that (a) the state does not fund such
studies, or (b) that Portuguese researchers do not propose any research projects about Portuguese ethnic diversity in relation to equal opportunities and
the question of justice. Both possibilities seem plausible; however, the inherent conservatism and inertia of scientific research programs, favoring research
projects that are within already established paradigms, clearly play a role. This
scientific conservatism complicates the emergence of new research projects
that are unconnected to already established truths and the methods, units of
analysis, and research questions associated with them (Popper 2002; Kuhn
1996). Hence, even if state agencies are involved in consolidating a racialized
common sense, scholars share in the responsibility of perpetuating the invisibility of ethnic minorities in Portuguese society, which in turn contributes to
perpetuating their situation of exclusion and second-class citizenship status.
According to the extremely scarce information available, secondgeneration immigrants (a doubtful denomination in itself ) fare much worse
in school compared to their white counterparts. Marques et al. (2007) find
that “Africans have gained the status of the most ‘visible minority.’ Surveys show that they are more prone to be perceived as immigrants than any
other category. . . . They are still the least welcome in close family relations”
(Marques et al. 2007: 1149). These researchers find that “nearly three quarters of students with Cape Verdean ancestry experienced grade blockage
at least once” (Marques et al. 2007: 1160). In other words, 75 percent of
students with a Cape Verdean background, age fourteen to twenty-four,
attending school in Oeiras, greater Lisbon, have repeated at least once before
they graduate from high school!
These researchers state that “In Oeiras we found that around a third of
the Portuguese students have to repeat a school year at least once, compared
to 41 per cent for native-born children of immigrant parentage and 51
per cent for the foreign-born” (Marques et al. 2007: 1158). There are also
extreme differences among “native-born children of immigrant parentage”
and those born to traditional Portuguese residents with regard to dropping
out, despite the fact that the majority of Portuguese students (77 percent,
according to Marques et al.) aspire to attend university. Hortas (2008) confirms these findings, at least indirectly, when she states that “When we look
at immigrant dropout/failure, we see that the rates are triple the norm in
primary school, and double for the other cycles” (Hortas 2008: 423).
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The use of such extremely cumbersome designations as “native-born
children of immigrant parentage” hints at the difficulties that Portuguese
scholars face when discussing this issue. When reading through the available educational statistics and the research conducted in this field, it
appears that what schoolchildren who face above-average dropout and repetition rates indeed share is not their legal status, but the color of their skin.
They are all nonwhite, and even though Portuguese is their first language,
they perform significantly worse than their white Portuguese colleagues
and white EU immigrants.3 To put this clearly: white foreigners whose first
language is not Portuguese by far outperform black Portuguese students
whose first language is Portuguese.
The relative absence of studies about the socioeconomic situation of
Portuguese minorities, especially blacks, and the cumbersome treatment
and reluctance with which they are treated, if at all, together with the high
profile of studies that focus on immigrants—all help consolidate the already
widespread common sense that transforms black Portuguese citizens into
foreigners. The statement of an interviewee illustrates this state of affairs:
I am a Portuguese citizen but at the same time I am not a Portuguese citizen. I
have all the rights, but at the same time, I have none. I have even represented
Portugal at international events, while I was a student. But because of my color,
I am not treated as a citizen. I constantly experience discrimination at all levels:
social, cultural, economic. . . . I compete in the job market against Portuguese
classmates that had worse grades, but they get the job.4

Who counts as a national and who does not thus has severe consequences
on opportunities in France as well as in Portugal—no matter what the citizenship status. “Nationals are white,” says the common sense—a common
sense that obfuscates all the inequalities and injustices to which nonwhite
citizens are routinely exposed, while at the same time securing privileges to
white citizens, and relieving political elites of their responsibilities to ensure
justice and equality among their citizenry—the cornerstones of democracy.

Ties to the Motherland: Of
Remittances and Returners

A final piece of empirical evidence of the construction of extremely biased
racial regimes in Portugal is provided by the curious case of the so-called
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“home-comers” (retornados)—white African immigrants who settled in Portugal mostly between 1974 and 1975. When Portugal’s African colonies
achieved independence in 1974, many white colonizers ran the risk of losing their privileges and maybe even their properties and lives, and some
800,000 decided to move to Portugal. These white home-comers encountered such a willing and open Portugal that the whole experience has been
widely praised as a “great success story” of integration (e.g., by Rui Pena
Pires 2003). The willingness of the Portuguese society and state to accommodate these immigrants went so far as to alter a long-established legal
tradition, namely, the naturalization law, which in 1981 was changed from
jus solis to jus sanguini to accommodate the returning colonizers now left
without a home. Since the changes of 1981, a child born to a Portuguese
parent automatically becomes a Portuguese citizen, provided the parent was
born in Portugal or in a territory administered by the Portuguese state.5
Since 1981, Portugal thus has extended citizenship to those able to claim
Portuguese ancestry, while at the same time complicating the integration of
all those who lack it. Through this maneuver, returners were not considered
immigrants (Pinheiro 2008: 66). The success of this reintegration, according to Pinheiro, who quotes retornado researcher Pena Pires, one of the most
respected scholars in this field, was due to the fact that “this biographical
particularity of this community is not visible in Portuguese society” (Pinheiro 2008: 66). Read: they were white. Pinheiro continues: “With the
retornados also came approximately 28,000 Africans, both refugees from
the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and working immigrants from
all former colonies. Unlike the retornados, this African community had no
special connection to Portugal or Portuguese nationality since they came
from independent states” (Pinheiro 2008: 67)—no connection other than
having worked for the Portuguese colonial empire and, as a consequence of
betting on the wrong side, having lost a home in the newly independent
African states, one might add. Indeed, a significant number of this early
group of Africans in most likelihood held Portuguese passports because they
had worked on the side of the colonizers, helping to control and administer the “natives,” a fact that can easily be verified by interviewing this
population. They just did not blend into a predominantly white society
as easily, due to their own “biographical particularity.” In fact, as Marques
et al. (2007), explain, some of these “returners” have lived in Africa for
generations. The maintenance of cultural ties to the colonial motherland
has proven extremely consequential to them, so that in contemporary Portugal the divisions created under colonial rule—namely, between colonial
subjects and colonizers—still plague intra- and interethnic relations (Reiter
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2008). It also seems legitimate to deduce that the dual labor market that
affects the chances of African migrants and their descendants, diagnosed
by Eaton (2001), can in part be explained by the relation of different
African-descendant groups to the Portuguese colonial state. In an interview
conducted in 2003, the president of the Lisbon-based Cape Verdean association, Ms. Alestina Tolentino, explained:
After independence, many Cape Verdeans settled in Portugal. They were Cape
Verdean nationals, but they had worked for the Portuguese state in Cape Verde.
As such, they had acquired certain rights, pensions, social security, and such,
which they had because they were Portuguese citizens. So when all these returners arrived in Portugal after independence, among them were many Cape
Verdeans. They were highly qualified because they had worked for the Portuguese colonial apparatus. . . . The face of colonialism for many Angolans and
Mozambicans was not Portuguese, but Cape Verdean.6

Most returners moved to Portugal because of the links they had forged
during colonial times, when they had a direct connection to the colonizing
state apparatus. Once in Portugal, they could count on pensions and social
security schemes. They felt like, and most of them also officially were, Portuguese citizens, and all those who were not would become so after 1981. If
they were Cape Verdean nationals, they would still fit the racial regime that
was created during colonial times and then employed to construct social
hierarchies in Portugal, as most Cape Verdeans are easily distinguishable
from Angolans and Mozambicans by their lighter skin color.
As Reiter (2008) explains:
Under the indigenous law code that regulated life in most of the Portuguese
world until 1961, some natives could become Portuguese citizens if they passed
the “civilization-test,” consisting of demonstrating their degree of assimilation
to European values and manners. The Indigenous Code of 1954 regulated the
stages that led from being “indigenous” to becoming “civilized,” making the
achievement of European manners and customs the benchmark for gaining
access to Portuguese citizenship rights. Assimilated Portuguese citizens had to
demonstrate that they had left their “native savagery” behind. Successful assimilation had to be proven through Portuguese language skills, clothing style, food
habits, and other western civilized manners. (Reiter 2008: 403)

After 1974, Portuguese state elites thus took care of their own, and by
doing so made sure uncivilized “others” could not slip in. However, the
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maintenance of bonds to individuals and groups with connections to the
motherland is not an uncomplicated matter—especially not for Portugal,
a country that had long claimed to be intimately close to their colonial
subjects. Portuguese settlements in Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, GuineaBissau, Goa, Macao, South Africa, and Cape Verde reach back to the
sixteenth century. Portuguese presence never effectively ended with independence, so that most of the former colonies still have a sizable Portuguese
population. However, by the late 1990s, the economic boom that was
caused by joining the EU and receiving millions of EU structural funds to
improve infrastructure started to slow down, and unemployment started to
rise. During that time, the first studies about remittances emerged. From
the late 1990s onward, the amount of remittances to Portugal had declined
steadily, down from accounting for 3 percent in 1990, to 2.5 percent of
Portugal’s GNP by the end of the decade.7
While colonial ties seemed to demand taking care of all those who
had helped sustain the colonial apparatus by facilitating their integration
into the Portuguese state, by the late 1990s it became clear that Portugal
could not welcome all those communities that upheld their Portuguese
nationality. Under these new economic circumstances, and equipped with
hard evidence about the magnitude and importance of remittances for the
Portuguese economy, Portuguese political elites shifted gear. They realized
that it was no longer desirable to “bring home” all the former colonizers, or those who had passed the “civilization test” and could count on
national solidarity based on their white skin or their white customs. While
it still seemed important to keep the bonds that united these exile communities to the motherland, the sine qua non condition to ensure that
remittances continued to flow “home,” it seemed also important to ensure
that these exiles stayed where they were, thus not further burdening the
Portuguese labor market.
Political elites found the solution to these new challenges of the late
1990s in the Camões Institute. Since 2000, new Camões cultural centers were established in Paris and in Poitiers (France), Dakar (Senegal),
Windhoek (Namibia), Dili (East Timor), Hamburg (Germany), Stockholm (Sweden), Vienna (Austria), and in the headquarters of the African
Union in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and of the Economic Community of
West African States in Abuja (Nigeria). Portuguese language centers were
opened in Canchungo, Ongoré, Mansoa, Bafatá, Gabú, Buba, Catió, Bolama, Bubaque, and Quinhamel, all in Guinea-Bissau, to spread fluency in
Portuguese as the official language in the country. Taken together, since
1998, the Portuguese state has opened nineteen language centers and is
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now present in twenty cities of different countries. According to Jorge Malheiros (2002), “Portugal’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has registered and
attempts to maintain ties with nearly 4.3 million Portuguese and people
with Portuguese ancestry living abroad.”8 In 2007, the Camões Institute,
together with the Lisbon-based Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalhoe Empresa (iscte) determined that the Portuguese language contributed
to 17 percent of the Portuguese GDP.9
Portuguese political elites have thus found a way to categorize their
citizens into those who can live in Portugal and those who are more functional if and when they stay abroad but send their money home to their
families. Not all passport holders are also welcome in the motherland—as
the situation of all those who hold passports but are treated as foreigners demonstrates. Conversely, others have been received with open arms,
and laws have been changed to accommodate them. The racial project
that informs this sorting out of people and groups into desirable and lessdesirable ones is hard to overlook. Yet most Portuguese scholars do just
that—be it because they cannot find funding for projects that would raise
these issues, or because they are too caught up in a hegemonic common
sense that has long accepted that nonwhites are not Portuguese and thus
cannot count on the solidarity of the national community. By doing so,
Portuguese academia gets implicated with the reproduction of a racialized common sense that legitimizes the maintenance of a racialized social
order, dividing the Portuguese citizenry into first- and second-class citizens. Whereas the white (biologically or culturally defined) first-class
citizens can count on citizenship rights as entitlements, second-class citizens have not been allowed to live the roles of citizens. The asset character
of citizenship becomes evident, as all those benefiting from such a system
have no reason to change it—and instead have every reason to hold the
“others” out.

Conclusion

An ethnically defined nationalism has become the norm in Western Europe.
Although its emergence can be explained by the late state formation of some
EU member states, such as Germany (Hobsbawm 2003), other states, such
as France or Portugal, have only recently shifted away from (in the case of
Portugal) or restricted the reach of (in the case of France) the jus solis rules
that have long been a cornerstone of their democracies. The contemporary
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strength of ethnic nationalism must thus be seen as the result of deliberate
political action that is aimed at redrawing the rules and borders of belonging.
Ethnic nationalism, however, not only perpetuates the exclusion of nonwhites by defining them as not belonging to the national community; it
also stands in the way of achieving truly universal citizenship and democracy with strong civic, political, and social components. A complication
that adds to this problem is caused by the almost exclusive focus on citizenship rights—to the detriment of citizenship duties and responsibilities.
Ethnically defined nationalism, coupled with a widely held belief that citizenship is a matter of rights without responsibilities and duties, has created
a situation where ethnic white Europeans arrogantly insist on their “rights”
as citizens, thus representing them as entitlements, while conveniently overlooking their responsibilities towards their fellow citizens. Instead, minority
citizens get routinely blamed for all economic, social, and political problems
that many European countries have experienced over the last decades.
The lack of a focus on civic solidarity and a civically defined membership
is also at the core, I would contend, of the oftentimes awkward difficulties
many European states and societies have when dealing with antidemocratic
elements in their midst. Instead of focusing on antidemocratic agents as
the prime culprits of terror and insecurity, blame is commonly shifted away
from civic and political matters towards cultural and ethnic ones—thus religions, cultures, and ethnic groups are unduly blamed for violent acts and
“tendencies,” and stereotypes about “others” are further perpetuated.
To make matters worse, several European states do not provide census data
on the ethnic backgrounds of their citizens, justifying such a policy with reference to the principle of universal citizenship. Minority citizens thus have no
way of knowing their numbers, situations, and the degree to which they have a
shared destiny. By most accounts, having access to these numbers could prove
explosive and is thus avoided by status quo oriented political elites. Parallel to
not providing census information on European minorities, several European
states actively fund a plethora of studies that focus exclusively on immigrants,
thus anchoring public attention and discourse firmly on issues of foreigners
and their problems of attaining legality and achieving integration. Academia
has become implicated in the dissemination of a framework that almost automatically transforms all nonwhites into foreigners and immigrants. There is
a clear lack of studies on an increasingly diverse European citizenry and the
difficulties of nonwhite citizens in finding acceptance, equal opportunities,
and equal treatment by the state and other, white, citizens. They have become
second-class citizens who are not allowed to experience the full extent of the
social role that comes with the status of being a citizen.
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Broadly accepted racist practices support the discrimination of nonwhite European citizens and expose them to discriminatory practices. The
unchallenged reproduction of discriminatory practices and policies provides
evidence for the high degree to which such discrimination has been normalized. Extremely unjust racial regimes are thus being constructed, and their
victims are robbed of the tools to face them effectively.
The influence of European racial regimes becomes even more evident
when considering how some migrants, namely ethnic whites, have been
able to successfully escape the status of victims. Post-1974 white African
immigrants to Portugal have successfully claimed the status of “returners”
(retornados), which has allowed them to successfully settle in Portugal, even
though some of them were born in Africa to families that had lived in Africa
for several generations. In 1981 the Portuguese National Assembly effectively passed a law restricting Portuguese citizenship to those of Portuguese
descent—thereby shifting citizenship criteria from jus solis to jus sanguinis
in order to accommodate white “returners” and facilitate their integration.
But what, if not ethnicity, makes one a “returner”?
Ethnic nationalism, coupled with inherent problems of majority rule,
are thus at the core of many problems of contemporary European states and
societies. Instead of blaming immigrants, EU member states ought to make
democracy the EU’s foundational element, and membership dependent on
the willingness to actively support and defend democracy, which would
imply a stronger focus on citizenship responsibilities. But instead of focusing on democracy and its requirements, political elites have successfully
shifted the focus onto migrants and foreigners and made them the culprits
of most of the social problems European societies face today. Such a focus
allows those same elites to avoid being blamed for the problems that they
are ultimately responsible for. Scholars, who in their studies focus excessively on immigrants and foreigners, further contribute to a hegemonic
common sense that transforms nonwhites into foreigners and intruders.
In doing so, they support political elites in their maneuvering and provide
them with legitimacy.
If anything, social scientists should produce more studies on failing and
unresponsive states, inefficient bureaucracies, and inadequate democratic
institutions. They should also unveil more of the injustices and problems
that a significant part of the European citizenry routinely faces. If they
would do so, we might have a chance to improve current situations and
work towards more just and inclusive democracies, which might also prove
more economically efficient—at least if we believe the Nobel Prize–winning
economist Amartya Sen (2000).

Chapter 7

Brazil
Experts in Exclusion
After the uprising of 17 June the secretary of the Writers’ Union
distributed pamphlets on Stalinallee, which stated that the people
had forfeited the trust of the government and could only win it
back by doubling their work effort. Wouldn’t it be simpler if the
government dissolved the people and elected another?
—Berthold Brecht, June 1953

This chapter focuses on yet another illustrative case: Brazil. As I have done before, I present each case to highlight one particular
aspect of the dialectics of citizenship. In this chapter, the main focus is “how
exclusion works.” I have chosen Brazil as an example to explain how exclusion works not because Brazil is peculiar in this respect. To the contrary,
Brazil is typical. The ways in which exclusion is produced and reproduced
there are repeated elsewhere in the same, or very similar, ways. Thus, Brazil is a “case” introduced to unveil and highlight the causal mechanisms
that typically are put to work by those who seek to defend their own privileges by excluding, stigmatizing, and discriminating against others. My own
familiarity with Brazil and Brazilian Portuguese allows me to take a closer
look at and a deeper examination of how exclusion works. The Brazilian
case allows us to explore the microdynamics of how the reproduction and
defense of privilege produces exclusion. It also allows us to take a closer look
at the interpersonal and intergroup level of this dynamic—without, however, claiming that the interpersonal level is the only one of relevance when
analyzing the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion. The Brazilian case, to the
113
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contrary, is intended to add texture and complexity to the manifold ways in
which inclusion and exclusion constitute each other.
Why Brazil? one could ask. Brazil fulfills the conditions of a typical
case because of the richness and clarity of the causal mechanisms used in
this process. Brazilians are indeed “experts in exclusion” and as such, they
provide a very clear and textured image of how exclusion works at the
interpersonal and intergroup level. Given that individual and group interactions become institutionalized and shape social structures, the way in
which Brazilians exclude also allows us to see how Brazilian social structures have been constructed around this exclusion. To be sure, implicit in
this exploratory analysis of Brazil is that we can learn something about how
exclusion works in general.
Of central importance in the process of exclusion and discrimination—
that is, of withholding full access to the rights citizenship promises—some
factors stand out as particularly relevant—namely, racism, the importance of
linguistic codes, and the strategic use of formalistic protocols for exclusion.
The end result of these different ways to exclude, which are in reality not
separable, is a phenomenon I have called “the formal versus the informal.”
Formality in language, in general habitus, and in the structuring of institutions conditions access to the spheres of power and money, as this chapter will
show. By doing so, it excludes all those who are stuck in their own informality,
mostly due to their lack of formal education, from full citizenship.
This finding also provides the caveat of this analysis. This way of reproducing privilege works best where parts of the population are rather less
educated, or differently educated, than those that control the spheres of
power and money. While diverse educational backgrounds are the most
common ground upon which such a way to exclude works, the presence of
different language codes, where one stands out as the “high” variety and others are thus declared “low” or “vulgar,” provides another typical background
for this type of exclusion. Brazil, thus, represents a typical case for how
exclusion works in colonized societies.

Whiteness as Capital

A recent poll on Bolsa Família recipients, conducted by the Rio de Janeiro–
based Laboratory for Economic, Historical, Social and Statistical Analyses
of Race Relations (laeser), found that of the 10.2 million families (18 percent of all households) in this income transfer program aimed at Brazil’s
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most destitute families, 66.4 percent were Afro-Brazilians (the chief of the
household self-classified as either preto or pardo) and 26.8 percent selfdeclared “white.” Nationwide, almost one-fourth of Afro-Brazilian families
were enrolled in this program. Afro-Brazilians thus continue to occupy the
lowest ranks of Brazilian social hierarchies.
In general, when comparing such highly consequential indicators as
years of schooling, the latest data confirms a long-lasting trend: namely,
that where in 1988, Afro-Brazilians (pretos and pardos) had completed on
average 3.6 school years, whites had completed 5.2 years. Twenty years later
(in 2008), both groups had improved, but the gap separating whites from
blacks had grown; in 2008, Afro-Brazilians had completed on average 6.5
years of schooling, while whites had finished 8.3 years. The educational
gap separating white from black Brazilians thus has actually grown from
1.6 years in 1988 to 1.8 years in 2008. Similarly, the proportion of AfroBrazilians in the “poverty” category has remained double that for whites.
The meaning of “being white,” however, is anything but clear in a
country like Brazil, where whiteness is not a biological reality, but is used as
a symbolic indicator of civilizational potential. Jeffrey Lesser (1999) demonstrated that what it meant to be “white” shifted in Brazil between 1850
and 1950, but whiteness remained a relevant and consequential category
that continued to allow for the self-identification with a group. To this day,
it signifies superiority and well-deserved privilege. During the nineteenth
century, Brazilian elites openly discussed and compared the different
degrees of whiteness of such potential immigrants as Arabs, Japanese, and
Southern Europeans, associating whiteness with aptitude—especially for
their potential to whiten the highly mixed Brazilians. Inspired by the racial
science and ideology of the time, the declared goal of Brazilian elites was to
attract white ingredients that would further lighten the racial mixture that
made up the Brazilian population, thus allowing it to become “civilized.”
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whiteness thus
was constructed as a form of capital, strongly associated with merit and
progressive, developmental potential.
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) Theory of Distinction allows
for conceptualizing whiteness as a symbolic capital that structures social
hierarchies. According to Bourdieu, “The volume and composition of capital give specific form and value to the determinations which the other factors
(age, sex, place of residence etc.) impose on practices. Sexual properties are
as inseparable from class practices as the yellowness of a lemon is from its
acidity: a class is defined in an essential respect by the place and value it
gives to the sexes and to their socially constituted dispositions” (Bourdieu
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1984: 107). The same can be said of ethnic properties. Whiteness, conceived in this way, constitutes a capital in addition to the other capitals,
namely, financial, social, and cultural. The relative presence or absence of
these capitals determine the social place an individual occupies in a society,
where much of the outcome is determined by the successful performance of
that which is perceived as typical “white” behavior. This performance is particularly important in societies without a rigid color line, where belonging
to one status group or another has to be constantly negotiated and upheld.
It is in this sense that whiteness constitutes a “racial capital”—one that signals the presence of other capitals, even though they might not be present.
Blackness, at the same time, signifies the absence of other capitals. Both
whiteness and blackness thus overdetermine (Reiter 2009; Harris 1993).
As a result, the strategic use of whiteness as a symbolic capital in Brazil
is tied to a broader strategy to defend historically inherited privileges associated with status—including the status of being a citizen invested with
specific rights and privileges. Hence, one of the main mechanisms by which
the effectiveness of citizenship is denied is racism. For many minorities, racism translates into second-class citizenship, as it undermines trust in public
institutions and exposes some to the discriminatory practices of their fellow
citizens. Whiteness tends to become normalized, thus made both the norm
and normal in a process that produces a racialization of nonwhites, who
in this process are transformed into “others.” Successfully claiming to be
white, in all those societies structured by European colonialism, functions
as a symbolic capital that marks one’s belonging to the group of the historically privileged—those who have rights and can give favors. It also fulfills
important gate-keeping functions, because it eases the sorting out of those
who “deserve” privileges from those who do not (Quijano 2008; Telles and
Flores, forthcoming). The process through which this structuring of social
hierarchies works separates people into different status groups, with all those
who are able to successfully claim whiteness adding a very powerful and
highly consequential symbolic capital to their account.
The result of upholding whiteness as a criterion for privilege and using
it as a demarcation to separate first- from second-class citizens provides a
formidable barrier to achieving general, substantive citizenship. It has the
potential to place nonwhite formal citizens outside the realm of effective
citizenship—at least in those societal spheres that are firmly controlled
by those able to claim whiteness. Given Brazil’s colonial past, the societal
spheres where whiteness carries the highest value tend to be those where
money and power are brokered.
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Protocols

In July 2008, I interviewed a group of black women organized as a local ngo
in the Brazilian city of São Luis. Their organization is dedicated to assisting
the poor inhabitants of this city of about one million in their quest to receive
federal housing benefits and qualify for federally funded low-income housing loans. Concretely, they help those who qualify apply for state-backed
mortgages, given to them by a state-controlled bank, the Caixa Economica
Federal. The very existence of such an ngo points to the difficulties ordinary citizens often encounter when dealing with the public realm. During
the interview, as they were telling me about their very frequent dealings
with both bank managers and state officials, after about thirty minutes of
engaged talk, I ended up asking directly about my main interest: how are
you received and treated by these representatives of power and money—
given that you are female, black, and poor? At that point, their statements
became more vivid, and the main spokeswoman explained:
It takes us one entire year to fill out all the forms required by the Caixa Economica. If we go to the municipal secretary of city management and ask for a
meeting with the secretary, the person at the entrance gives us a very hard time
and schedules a meeting in two months. . . . We feel discrimination every day.
Our biggest challenge is to overcome that. The prejudice is very strong. The
bureaucratic hurdles are very great and we always have to quebrar protocolos.1

This statement is typical and hints at two often-cited problems: first,
the extremely complicated procedures and forms applicants have to fill out
when they want to apply for a state program. In fact, formal application
requirements can be so burdensome and require such sophisticated knowledge and formal writing skills that ordinary people are effectively barred
from having access. Those who still want to apply have to recruit specialists
in the form of lawyers—or, if they are lucky, local nonprofit organizations
that assist them in the application process, as is the case here. Offering a
low-income housing loan program, but then designing the required paperwork in such a way that most low-income people cannot fill out the forms,
casts severe doubt on the seriousness and commitment of the federal bank
that has developed these procedures and made them a requirement. Offering a federal housing program for the historically excluded, but then barring
their access through complicated procedures and forms that fulfill gatekeeping functions that keep the truly needy out certainly creates a feeling of
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alienation among all those who qualify for this program but are unable to
fill out the necessary forms.
The second important piece of empirical information coming out of the
above statement is the experience of discrimination and racism related by
the informant. Their skin color, gender, and other physical characteristics
mark them in the eyes of biased interlocutors as poor and uneducated. In
a bank, this biased assessment quickly translates into a perception of not
being a valuable client, but rather a needy and bothersome petitioner—and
thus, in the eyes of bank personnel, not worth their while. The same logic
applies in a government environment, where black females are routinely
perceived as poor and thus unimportant power brokers who possess nothing of value to offer. In other words, they are prejudged for being black and
poor, as in the eyes of the observer, these two characteristics “naturally” go
together. As this prejudgment potentially bars their access to the formally
established channels of interaction with banks and political office holders,
the interviewees resort to a strategy of “quebrar protocolos”—which translates into breaking protocols.
What are those protocols? In this concrete case, the interviewees would
have to stand in line, fill out forms, make appointments, come back for
more appointments, stand in line again, fill out more forms—in short, the
access to the decision-making spheres would be so burdensome and lengthy,
and the final success so uncertain, that many applicants would desist from
pursuing their goals. Elisa Reis (1990), who analyzed 27,367 petition letters sent to the Brazilian minister of De-bureaucratization between 1980
and 1982, offers some further insight into this reality. Reis, for example,
describes a widow who in her letter to the minister complains that she has
to go repeatedly to the physician to get a certificate that states that she is
still alive and thus eligible to receive her pension (Reis 1990: 165). Another
letter analyzed by Reis states,
In six months, I went seven times to the office of the IRS (“Delegacia da
Receita”) to get information about my income declaration. In order to get a
personal loan, I had to go to this same federal office 36 times in seven months.
(Quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)

Another example:
I have already gathered 425 documents in response to the demands of the federal government in order to prove that I have dealt correctly with all the fiscal
requirements of my small firm. (Quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)
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And finally:
I spent 12 hours waiting in line, under heavy rain, in order to get the money
that I so desperately need, but to no avail. Why have workers to be treated so
inhumanly? (Quoted in Reis 1990: 166, my translation)

Why indeed? All these examples express a very typical situation that
can easily and readily be observed by anyone expecting any type of service
in Brazil, public or private—even though the overall quality of services has
improved since the 1980s. The writer of these lines can amply testify to
waiting hours in line to resolve such simple issues as making a deposit into
one’s own bank account or withdrawing money from it, as well as to waiting for hours in the antechamber of some local civil “servant” before he or
she finally grants “an audience.”2 It appears that the Brazilian state, as well
as some service-related businesses have wrapped themselves in a shell of formalities and procedural protocols that have the effect of keeping ordinary
citizens out—or forcing them through an almost ritualistic procedure of
self-humiliation when seeking to reach those institutions and people that
supposedly work for them. This strategy of bureaucratic isolation works
through several mechanisms. It makes use of complicated procedures to
make access more difficult, especially for all those unable to maneuver their
way through these hurdles because of their lack of formal training, or simply because they are unwilling or unable to tolerate the humiliation that
often seems an integral part of the procedure (again: the author has himself
pondered several times about how much humiliation and mistreatment he
was willing to accept in order to receive something from a civil servant or
someone else thinking of him- or herself as important).
This form of excessive state autonomy and office abuse has deep historical roots in Brazil. According to Florestan Fernandes (2006), during the
early twentieth century, when the sons of plantation owners moved to the
cities, they brought with them their aristocratic demeanor, which led to a
“bureaucratization of patrimonial domination” (Fernandes 2006: 116, my
translation). Raymundo Faoro ([1957] 2001), who has produced the most
detailed explanation for this isolation of the state from people, argues that
“The stand (or status group), serving as the administrative rank for the
exercise of dominion, configures a minority government. Few rule, control
and spread their patterns of conduct to the many. The leading group does
not exercise power by delegation or inspired by the trust that the people,
as a global entity, irradiate. It is a sovereignty that encysts itself, impenetrable and superior, a restricted stratum, ignorant of the dogma of majority
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rule.” (Faoro 2001: 108, my translation) According to Faoro, the patrimony of the king was gradually shifted over to the state and administered
by an increasingly bureaucratic status group. Thus, explains Faoro, holding a state position, instead of representing a calling to serve the people,
“transforms the holder into an authoritative figure. It gives him the mark
of nobility” (Faoro 2001: 197, my translation). In sum, the way a public
official envisions his or her governmental position is not one of “representing” or even “serving the public.” Government officials not only perceive
themselves often as disconnected from “the people,” they feel superior to
them, distinguished by the position they hold and by the honorific treatment it bestows on them.
This way of relating to the public is, however, not restricted to the state.
As mentioned above, similar behavioral patterns can be found in banks or
other situations where ordinary people need to interact with those who are
higher up in the societal hierarchy. In a deeply divided and highly racialized society, such as Brazil’s, it becomes clear that the abuse of power by
state officials, the rich, or all those in situations of power is not random,
but rather part of a general pattern of social interaction between different
status groups. It is the way in which the members of formal or official
society, who see themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the country as it
was handed down from Portugal, relate to all those of the informal sector
of society, which in a country like Brazil constitute some 40 percent of the
population.

The Language of Exclusion

The use of protocols to defend status privilege is operationalized in daily
encounters between the members of formal and informal Brazil and serves
an important gate-keeping function, where the performance and display of
formality in language, conduct, and general habitus play important roles
(Bourdieu 1987, 2003). One of the central mechanisms for enacting protocols is through the strategic use of language, or more precisely: linguistic
codes. In the following, I will thus take a closer look at Brazilian Portuguese
language codes and how they are used to uphold privilege and first-class
citizenship by demarcating the speaker from all those thus transformed into
second-class citizens. Brazil, again, is an ideal case for this inquiry because
of its highly divided society, especially along educational lines. In a country where access to formal education is highly restricted, the use of formal
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education to defend privilege becomes a very central tool. To be sure, in
2009, the average years of schooling had reached 7.5 years—up from under
5 years only recently. However, according to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (ibge), in 2009, some 25 percent of adults (older than
fifteen) self-declaring either preto or pardo were functionally illiterate,3 as
were 15 percent of whites. At the same time, in 2009 only 10 percent of
Brazilians between twenty-five and thirty-four years had a university degree
(8 percent in the age bracket fifty-five to sixty-four; ibge), thus allowing
those with diplomas to reap very tangible advantages from their elevated
educational levels. This situation is made worse by the low quality of Brazilian public basic education, which, while it seeks to educate the great
majority of Brazilians (85 percent), also stigmatizes them and often bars
their access to institutions of higher education (Reiter 2010, 2009).
Formality in language in such a context becomes a way to constitute
privilege and demarcate the outer boundaries of this privilege through the
use of formal language code. Brazilian Portuguese language and habitus
thus are full of gate-keeping utterances and conducts. This starts with the
naming of average people as gentinha, povão, Zé Ninguem, Pé de Chinelo,
and others. All these terms refer to what would be called “people” in English. On the other hand, those classified in such a way smartly refer to
those dominating them as barão—that is, barons—at least in the regional
context that is informing this study, namely the Northeast of Brazil. The
use of the term “baron” clearly indicates the strategies used by the historically included to defend their privilege—namely, by giving themselves an
aristocratic air in both demeanor and language. Before going into some
more concrete examples that show how this works in everyday encounters,
I want to lay out some of the theoretical underpinnings upon which the
empirical analysis can be conducted.
Language not only represents difference, privilege, and distinction—it
also creates and sustains them. John B. Thompson, who wrote the editor’s
introduction to Pierre Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power (2003),
explains, “The more linguistic capital that speakers possess, the more they
are able to exploit the system of differences to their advantage and thereby
secure a profit of distinction. For the forms of expression which are the most
unequally distributed, both in the sense that conditions for the acquisition
of the capacity to produce them are restricted and in the sense that the
expressions themselves are relatively rare on the markets where they appear”
(Thompson 2003: 19).
Pierre Bourdieu indeed offers an analytical framework that allows us to
analyze language in its relation to power. Bourdieu argues that, in general,
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“the social uses of language owe their specifically social value to the fact that
they tend to be organized in systems of differences . . . which reproduce,
in the symbolic order of differential deviations, the system of social difference” (Bourdieu 2003: 54). To Bourdieu, language is but one manifestation,
as well as a tool to negotiate difference in daily interactions. He explains,
“Linguistic exchange . . . is also an economic exchange which is established
within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed
with a certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is
capable of producing a certain material or symbolic profit. In other words,
utterances are not only (save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated
and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be believed and obeyed”
(Bourdieu 2003: 66). Next to financial capital, Bourdieu demonstrates that
other capitals are equally functional in structuring social space. Next to
social and cultural capital, Bourdieu argues for considering “linguistic capital, producing a profit of distinction” (Bourdieu 2003: 55).
For Bourdieu, then, language reflects and enacts social hierarchy, and
for him, “the whole social structure is present in each interaction” (Bourdieu 2003: 67). Once this basic insight is understood, it can be applied to
the analysis of more specific constellations—for example, to what is often
called the “high,” or official, variety of a language. Bourdieu explains, for
example, that “All linguistic practices are measured against the legitimate
practices, i.e. the practices of those who are dominant” (Bourdieu 2003:
53). He also explains the effects that the use of different language codes has
on the speaker: “Speakers lacking the legitimate competence are de facto
excluded from the social domains in which this competence is required,
or are condemned to silence” (Bourdieu 2003: 55). When examining the
genealogy of this high language, Bourdieu finds that “the official language
is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in
the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language”
(Bourdieu 2003: 45).
From there, Bourdieu is also able to shed light on the opposite end of
the language continuum. When writing about “popular language,” Bourdieu finds that “reduced to the status of quaint or vulgar jargons, in either
case unsuitable for formal occasions, popular uses of the official language
undergo a systematic devaluation” (Bourdieu 2003: 54). Seen through this
prism, such power-constituting speech acts as condescendence reveal their
social function: “The strategy of condescension consists in deriving profit
from the objective relation of power between the languages that confront
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one another in practice . . . in the very act of symbolically negating that relation, namely, the hierarchy of the languages and of those who speak them”
(Bourdieu 2003: 68). Just like any other market, the laws of scarcity also
apply to the linguistic market: “The more formal the market is, the more
practically congruent with the norms of the legitimate language, the more it
is dominated by the dominant, i.e. by the holders of the legitimate competence, authorized to speak with authority” (Bourdieu 2003: 69).
The effects of linguistic capital are manifold, especially in the field of
domination: “The reality of linguistic legitimacy consists precisely in the
fact that dominated individuals are always under the potential jurisdiction of
formal law, even when they spend all their lives, like the thief described by
Weber, beyond its reach, so that when placed in a formal situation they are
doomed to silence or to the broken discourse which linguistic investigation
often reports” (Bourdieu 2003: 71f ). Dominant language does more than
control those unable to speak or write it. It silences. “The constraints exercised by the market via the anticipation of possible profit naturally take the
form of an anticipated censorship, of a self-censorship which determines not
only the manner of saying, that is, the choice of language-’code switching’
in situations of bilingualism—or ‘level’ of language, but also what it will
be possible or not to say” (Bourdieu 2003: 77). This happens, according to
Bourdieu, because “the sense of the value of one’s own linguistic products
is a fundamental dimension of the sense of knowing the place which one
occupies in the social space. One’s original relation with different markets
and the experience of the sanctions applied to one’s own body, are doubtless
some of the mediations which help to constitute that sense of one’s own
social worth which governs the practical relation to different markets (shyness, confidence, etc.) and, more generally, one’s whole physical posture in
the social world” (Bourdieu 2003: 82).
According to the Italian anthropological linguist Maurizzio Gnerre
(1991), who wrote about this phenomenon in Brazil, “The official language
is a communicative system that is accessible only to a reduced part of the
members of a community; it is a system associated with a cultural patrimony presented as a body of values, fixed by written language” (Gnerre
1991: 6, my translation). This is certainly the case in Brazil, where over
20 percent of the population is classified as functionally illiterate, which
means they have no access, let alone dominion, of such elaborate, formal
language codes. Gnerre finds that “Citizens, even if declared equal before
the law, are in reality discriminated against even on the basis of the very code
in which the law was written. The majority of the citizens does not have
access to this code, or, in some cases, has limited access” (Gnerre 1991: 10).
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The same author also explains that “The separation between the ‘cultured’
or ‘official’ variety and the others is profound due to different reasons: the
cultured variety is associated with the written variety . . . and it is associated
to the grammatical tradition; it is inventoried in the dictionaries and it is the
bearer of legitimate cultural tradition and national identity” (Gnerre 1991:
11). Gnerre leaves no doubt about the function of elaborate language code
usage—a function that can be traced back to the sixteenth century and that
still today serves the purpose of constituting power.
As Benedict Anderson (2006) has described, and Martin Luther demonstrated much earlier in practice, any communication—written or oral—done
in an exclusive language code such as Latin or grammatically correct European Portuguese serves the purpose of restricting the circle of participants to
a minimum; and it is this restricted circle of the educated, or initiated, few
who tend to use their privileged access not only to dominate and control the
majority, but also to renew their own source of legitimacy with reference to
access to privileged knowledge. The circular logic becomes evident: the powerful define an exclusive language and codify it; then they use it to wield their
power; and finally, they bolster their power through linguistic exclusivity. As
Gnerre highlights, “Language constitutes the most powerful barbed wire to
block access to power” (Gnerre 1991: 22).
In a Brazilian context, the language of the initiated, the high, sophisticated written Portuguese is the Portuguese that was codified in Coimbra
and has its Portuguese purity upheld by the Academia Brasileira de Letras,
the Brazilian Academy of Literature. It is a Portuguese that excludes all those
who are functionally illiterate or otherwise stuck in their own informality.
This become particularly relevant in context where the formally educated
control and regulate access to spheres of power, such as state agencies and
banks. In these environments, formal language and sophisticated procedural
protocols serve as very effective means to keep all informal elements out.
Informality, in this Brazilian context, refers to all those not able to dominate
and manipulate elaborate codes, thus marking them as potentially uneducated and poor.
In 2009, some 21.7 percent of Brazilians fifteen years and older were
classified as functionally illiterate (defined by unesco as the percentage of
the population aged fifteen or over with less than four years of study).4
A 2007 World Bank study found that Brazil’s first-grade repetition rate is
28 percent, among the highest in the world. It also stated that “According
to the international pisa tests, approximately half of Brazilian 15-year-olds
have difficulty reading or cannot read at all; and about three-fourths cannot
manage basic mathematical operations.”5 According to Ulyssea and Szerman
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(2006) some 35 percent of Brazilians are active in the informal sector, which
provides a low estimate of all those effectively excluded from the spheres of
society reserved for the formal or official society, thus suggesting a strong
overlap of economic informality, illiteracy, poverty, and blackness. Indeed,
the divisions of Brazilian society run deep and can be traced back to colonial
times. From the beginning of the colony, privileged Brazilians were part
of what Franklin Knight (1990) has called the “official society”—a term
he employs to describe that part of plantation societies that had access to
the formal and literate world. The majority of a plantation society, according to Knight, was informal. They emerged unplanned, as an unintended
side effect of slavery and indentured labor. The Portuguese crown, as well
as the independent Brazilian government, for a long time had no real plan
for these groups. They were simply seen as a problem and finally became
“the social problem” under Getúlio Vargas, under whose presidency the first
social programs were enacted targeting these groups who were poor, increasingly urban, functionally or altogether illiterate, and nonwhite. Those social
groups that were perceived as problematic under Vargas have indeed never
been able to successfully challenge, let alone reverse, the social hierarchies
that projected them to the bottom. Even after democratization and broad
political inclusion, in 1988, the system of values and norms upon which
social hierarchies is constructed survived, having led some to refer to Brazil as
the “unrevolutionary society” (Mander 1969). Indeed, with few exceptions,
many poor, black, and indigenous Brazilians are still excluded from being
considered equal members, and their access to full citizenship is barred. The
mechanisms for keeping them out, however, have changed over time.
Brazil has a long history of applying criteria to separate the formal from
the informal society, and then using this separation to justify privilege and
citizenship for one group, and exclusion and second-class citizenship for the
other. As James Holston (2008) has shown recently, the Brazilian electoral
law of 1881 introduced direct, voluntary elections, but as it did so, it also
established both literacy and proof-of-income requirements, with the result
that Brazil witnessed a decline of voters to 2 percent of adults, or 1 percent of
the total population (Holston 2008: 102). Holston also shows that in Brazil,
illiteracy restrictions were maintained until 1985, and even the new 1988
constitution, with 50 percent illiterate in 1950 and 25 percent in 1980, has
led him to conclude that “Regardless of political regime—under monarchy,
democracy, and dictatorship—the few ruled” (Holston 2008: 103).
Even though this scenario changed completely in 1988, when the franchise was extended to include illiterates and the voting age was lowered
to sixteen, in contemporary Brazil one of the clearest legacies of colonial
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domination is the existence of different Portuguese language codes—apart
from the different local dialects. One is the official language, which follows a Portuguese grammar and demands a sophisticated use of pronouns
and articles. The other one is the Brazilian-spoken Portuguese broadly
used by the “popular classes.” In this variety, there are no pronouns and
attached articles, no dei-lhe or even dar-lhe-ei. Instead, there is dei para
ele/ela and vou dar para ele/ela. Formal Brazilian Portuguese grows out of
Portuguese from Portugal and thus carries with it grammatical forms that
are not used in Brazilian colloquial language. Brazilian elites have thus
long used elaborate languages codes to set themselves apart, especially in
written Portuguese. This was noted as early as in the 1940s, for example,
by Claude Levi-Strauss, when he was in São Paulo helping to establish the
University of São Paulo. Here is a quote about his students: “Learning was
something for which they had neither the taste nor the method; yet they
felt bound to include in their essays, no matter what their nominal subject
might be, a survey of human evolution from the anthropoid apes to the
present day. Quotations from Plato, Aristotle and Auguste Comte would
be followed by a peroration paraphrased from some egregious hack—the
obscurer the better, for their purpose” (quoted in Mander 1969: 289).
Their purpose was, of course, to achieve distinction and to set themselves
apart from ordinary Brazilians.

The Codified Language of the Law

A very consequential domain where this distinction between the formal and
the informal has a structuring force is the law. As Gnerre (1991) explains,
“To compose a document of any judicial value it is not only necessary to
know a language and be able to write intelligible phrases, but one must
also be familiar with a whole complex and archaic phraseology” (Gnerre
1991: 22). This is indeed the language used in judicial documents, and the
testimony from the above interviewees hints at this difficulty. If it takes one
year to fill out an application for a social housing program, it is safe to say
that this is not an unintended side effect, but rather a functional ingredient
of the application process. The same logic applies to Brazil’s legal codes in
general: written by erudite lawyers and humanistic scholars, they are not
written for the informal sector of Brazil’s society. Instead, they serve the
function of establishing prestige by placing them at the cultural height of
the colonizing nation and other nations commonly perceived as civilized
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and cultured. After all, as Gnerre explains, “The central function of all
special languages is social: they have a real communicative value, but they
exclude the people who belong to linguistic out-groups and, at the same
time, they fulfill the function of reaffirming the identity of the members of
the in-group” (Gnerre 1991: 23).
To illustrate this phenomenon, I am reproducing a passage from an article I wrote together with a Brazilian federal judge, in 2007, about precisely
the exclusion that the use of sophisticated language codes creates:
To penetrate the spheres of power, Brazilian citizens have to imitate the
habitus of the powerful. Recently, Brazil initiated a movement, led by the
association of Brazilian Magistrates (amb), aimed at convincing its members
to change its language. Our preliminary observations, as participants in this
effort, lead us to a pessimistic diagnosis of this initiative, given that the discussions in this respect already started without focus, which demonstrates
the degree of alienation of these attempts, endogenous to the baccalaurean
problematic, as it confounds language with stylized profile and forgets the
buffonian warning that “le style est l’homme même,” while at the same time
going against the terminological specialization—from which we get the socalled “technolets”—that every scientific-technical knowledge must have.
In reality, this topic has a profoundness that is not perceivable with such
superficiality: throughout its historical development, the baccalaurean juridical language has remained encapsulated the same way as the knowledge that
it transmits, neglecting that “la liberdad del lenguaje es libertad histórica,
libertad del hombre como ser histórico.” Without facing the social reality
to which theoretically it should dedicate itself, this instrumental phraseology, even if in fact less invaded by literary affections of doubtable gusto, has
remained in a somewhat social schizophrenic state in a time when belletristic
has lost its influence in the formation of contemporary baccalaureates. (Castro Jr. and Reiter 2007: 96, my translation)6

It is hard to overstate the comic effect that this appeal for the use of a
simple language made by a Brazilian federal judge produces. However, it
illustrates just how difficult it is for those who are members of such an elite
group as Brazilian federal judges to make a genuine connection to ordinary
citizens. Apparently against their overt intention, their language continues
to exclude by virtue of its elevated code. Another example of the exclusionary effect of language is this excerpt from the Brazilian Diario Oficial, that
is, the official newspaper of the federal government to inform its citizens of
what it has decided.
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Ministry of Justice
National Council for the Rights of Children and Adolescents
Act of the seventy-seventh ordinary assembly, held on February 14 of 2001
At nine hours and forty minutes of the fourteenth of February of two thousand
and one, the seventy-seventh ordinary assembly of the national council for the
rights of children and adolescents (conada), presided over by its president,
Cláudio Augusto Vieira da Silva, (Foundation Fe e Alegria do Brasil). Present
are . . . We take notice of the justified absence of . . . We have called on the presence of nonprofit councilors . . . , as well as civil society deputy councilors . . .
The president opened the session, offering his welcome to all and thanking
them for their participation in this first assembly of the new millennium. He then
submitted the minutes to the plenary. They were approved, with exception of item
eight of the second day, shifting it to the fourth item of the first day. For the item
“General topics,” the scheduling of executive assemblies were solicited; discussion
of the Direct Action of Unconstitutionality of articles two hundred and fifty-four
and two hundred and fifty-five of the Law for the Child and the Adolescent (Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente), proposed by the Brazilian Workers Party –ptb
–with the participation of conanda in the Committee of Supervision of the
Social Policies for Public Safety. The other items remained unaltered. Continuing, the President proposed changes in the composition of the existing Thematic
Commissions and Working Groups, justifying that such a change would not hurt
the Internal Regimentation of the Council. He informed that the commissions
would bring the thematic angles (éixos temáticos) together, as they would function
as follows: 1) Commission of Articulation—would have as a thematic angle the
State, Municipal, and Capital Councils and the Title Councils; 2) Commission
for Budgeting and Finance—would have as a thematic angle the socio-educational
measures; 3) Commission for Public Policies—would have the fourth National
Conference as a thematic angle; 4) Commission of Communication—the actions
of this Commission would be developed in partnership with andi and be restricted
to the necessary proceedings in order to develop a communication policy together
with andi: The proposal was debated and approved by all. Next, the assembly
moved to the composition of members, which was constituted as follows: . . . The
Technical Commissions met during the period of the morning and beginning
of the afternoon in order to deal with specific issues of their area of action, to
update the pending items of the previous assemblies and to elaborate an action
plan and the goals for the exercise of two and one.
(excerpt from Diario Oficial da União, no. 67-E, 5ª feira,
April 5, 2001, page 2, sect. 1, my translation)7
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What is it that they actually did and decided? It is indeed difficult to tell.
Where in the first example, it was the use of elaborate language code that
excludes, the second example constitutes a typical example of the exaggerated
formalism and “protocolism” that characterizes Brazilian public politics—and
thus provides a typical example of how formalism and protocolism exclude all
those not prepared and trained in the skills of deciphering, let alone actively
engaging in, elaborate and overly formalistic language games. Even if this type
of exclusion is far from unique to Brazil, in the case of Brazil, the end results
of both types of exclusion are that ordinary, informal citizens are routinely
excluded from accessing the public sphere. The Brazilian public sphere—that
is, the space where citizens and the government can connect and interact,
where citizen voices and concerns can crystallize and solidify and ideally influence the government, holding it accountable and responsive—this public
sphere is as divided as the rest of Brazil, as the inequalities that characterize and indeed structure broader Brazilian society spill over into the public
sphere, dividing it into a plethora of different public spheres. Whereas those
public spheres operating at the bottom of social hierarchies tend to be open
and inclusive, even if homogeneous, those connected to the spheres of power
and money tend to be dominated by individuals who are able to use their
symbolic capitals strategically and in their own favor. The language and conduct of these public spheres is anything but public; it is official and erudite,
formalistic and full of protocols. As such, it fulfills a gate-keeping function,
excluding all those unable to participate in this erudite language game while
at the same constituting privilege for all those who can.
The elite domination of some public spheres and the political realm per
se finds reflection in the astonishing support that average Brazilians have
given to those public representatives who stand up, or even just for, the
informal sector of Brazilian society—that sector that cannot read the Diario
Oficial or the complicated acts and decrees produced by Brazilian lawyers
and judges. The election of Lula da Silva must certainly be understood in
this light—as the election of someone “like us”—with only four years of formal education, who started to work at age twelve as a shoe shiner. The more
recent election of Tiririca to serve as federal deputy provides yet another
example of the same phenomenon. In the 2010 national elections, Tiririca
received 1.3 million votes—more than any other candidate. Tiririca briefly
faced a challenge for being considered illiterate, but ultimately passed this
hurdle. In his campaign, he stated, for example:
Vote for Tiririca, it can’t get any worse than it already is! (Vote no Tiririca, pior
do que tá não fica!)
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Hi Folks, I am here to ask for your vote, because I want to be a federal representative, so I can help the most “needy,” including my family. So my number is
2222. If you won’t vote for me, I will dieeeeee! (Oi gente, estou aqui para pedir
seu voto porque eu quero ser deputado federal, para ajudar os mais necessitado,
inclusive a minha família. Portanto meu número é 2222. Se vocês não votarem,
eu vou morreeer!)
Hi, I am Tiririca, from TV. I am a candidate for federal representative.
What does a federal representative do? Actually, I don’t know, but if you vote for
me, I will tell you. (Oi, eu sou o Tiririca da televisão. Sou candidato a deputado
federal. O que é que faz um deputado federal? Na realidade eu não sei, mas vote
em mim, que te conto.)

Clearly, the greatest appeal of Tiririca was his informality, expressed in
his very rudimentary Portuguese, full of semantic and grammatical “errors.”
This is yet another “man of the people” who does not represent traditional
economic and educational elites and is himself not part of the traditional
political elites—and is thus able to cater to all those who seek a more genuine representation. If self-rule and direct rule are impossible, then having a
closer, more direct representation seems the second-best option for many
who feel misrepresented, cheated, or not represented at all by political elites.8
Seen under this light, the election of Tiririca in 2010, and also the election
of Lula to the presidency in 2002 and 2009, are calls for a more direct and
immediate participation in politics, uttered by people who feel and know
that they are excluded from it. If they cannot participate themselves directly,
the next best thing is to elect a representative who is “one of us.”

Conclusion: The Formal against the Informal

“Domination is the requisite for exploitation,” writes Anibal Quijano (2008:
220). Indeed, as the Brazilian case demonstrates, domination is an intricate,
multidimensional, strategic game that makes use of different capitals—
material, symbolic, and linguistic—in order to uphold and actively defend
privilege and regulate access to the spheres where power, money, and
influence are brokered. People who do not look or talk “right”—that is,
people unable to reproduce elaborate language codes, as well as women and
nonwhites—are kept outside. Exclusion and a transformation of citizenship into a set of entitlements—accessible only to those with money, power,
or access to other sorts of symbolic capitals—have alienated the common
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people from democracy in Brazil and elsewhere. The Brazilian case allows
for an unveiling of some of the specific mechanisms at work that produce
this alienation. Exclusion, the use of complicated and neocolonial protocols, the use of elevated language codes, a legal tradition that is based on
colonial traditions that do not reflect the lifeworlds of ordinary people, and
finally a transformation of democracy and citizenship from a regime where
rulers and ruled strongly overlapped into a system where citizenship is a
mere legal right—all these factors reinforce each other and alienate ordinary
citizens from politics, the public sphere, the state, and government. The
fault lines of these divisions have developed out of colonial scripts, where
former colonizers have first become official citizens and later constituted
the formal society, whereas the formerly colonized have remained informal
and as such remain excluded from the official world (Mignolo 2008). And
just as Alexis de Tocqueville (2003) argued in the early nineteenth century,
democracy relies on the kind of social glue that associational life provides.
If significant segments of a democratic citizenry feel alienated from politics,
this glue is drying up and society falls apart into at least two disconnected
groups: the included and the excluded, where the included have a tendency
to perceive their own privileges as commodified entitlements, whereas the
excluded have lost their stake in the polity.

Chapter 8

Colombia
When Law and Reality Clash
These are difficulties the man from the country has not expected; the Law,
he thinks, should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone, but as he
now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp
nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait
until he gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets
him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years.
—Franz Kafka, Before the L aw, 1915

In 1991, the Colombian state declared itself a multiethnic
and pluricultural nation. The new constitution also included Article 55,
an affirmative action law for ethnic minorities. Law 70 of 1993, known as
the Law of the Black Communities, soon followed, giving Afro-Colombian
communities in the Pacific coastal areas the right to collectively own and
control their ancestral lands.1
The new national legislation made it easier to enhance the relationship
between Afro-Colombian organizations and the state. For most AfroColombian leaders, their historical claims for recognition as a marginalized
minority group were officially validated when the state gave them the right
to collectively negotiate their demands. The official recognition of their ethnic identity as a distinct minority group gave the Afro-Colombian advocates
an unparalleled opportunity to approach state and international organizations. In 2000, after four years of debate, Law 649 was passed, providing
that Afro-Colombians have the right to elect two congressmen as an ethnic
group. Moreover, Colombia signed the International Labor Organization
133
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(ilo) Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Communities,2 as well as the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of the United Nations.3
The legal recognition of Afro-Colombians and their rights as an ethnic group is the outcome of grass-roots organizing at the local, national,
and international levels. Indeed, Afro-Colombians and their supporters
have created such organizations as the Afro-Colombian National Conference, the National Association of Afro-Colombians Displaced by Violence
(afrodes), the National Association of Afro-Colombian Mayors (amunafro), the Washington, D.C.–based Afro-Latino Development Alliance,
the Black Community Process (pcn), and the afroamerica xxi-colombia
to advance their collective interests.
However, despite all these efforts and the legal successes that AfroColombian organizing has achieved through the years, most analysts find
that the political and economic situation of Afro-Colombians, as well as their
overall well-being and safety, has not improved significantly, even though
overall violence in the country has ebbed (Urrea and Viafara 2006). According to the 2005 census, the infant mortality rate among Afro-descendants
remains nearly twice as high as that of the rest of the population (48.1
compared to 26.9 per 1,000 live births). In Chocó, home to 44.1 percent
of the total Afro-Colombian population, infant mortality rates have reached
77.5 per 1,000.4 Hence, the infant mortality rate in Chocó is comparable to
that of the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, and Mauritania (Observatory on
Racial Discrimination 2008). How can this be explained? In other words:
why has the livelihood of Afro-Colombians not improved despite the ratification and enactment of a whole series of progressive and protective laws?
Concretely, the research question driving this project is this: In 1991, AfroColombians were recognized as a minority group and given collective rights.
However, according to most analysts, these new rights have not translated
into improved living conditions. Why?
To address this question, this chapter focuses on three causal factors
that together provide a plausible answer to the question. I argue that, first,
changed legal frameworks do not automatically change social realities; they
only provide possibilities for change. Factual social change depends on the
social power to bring it about, where different social groups assert different
influences to bring about change, where change is mediated by the state and
the state’s own power. To put this into a schematic framework: pro-change
forces face anti-change forces, where both seek to influence the state and
are in turn influenced by it, taking advantage of the political opportunity
structures that the state provides them (Tarrow 1994). Effective change thus
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depends on the relative power positions of pro-change forces, anti-change
forces, and the relative autonomy (or lack thereof ) of the state. Weak states
that lack autonomy will be unable to change social realities, as they lack the
resources to actually produce the kind of reality that the law depicts. Furthermore, weak states are weak because they lack legitimacy and thus cannot
count on the compliance of their citizens, thus making it costly to enforce
the rule of law and order (Bendix 1969; Mockus 2009).
Secondly, this general tendency is sharpened when the law does not grow
out of social reality, but represents an unachieved ideal, expressing what
ought to be, rather than what actually is. Such conditions of “legal idealism”
(Moreno 1969) are worsened in extremely divided societies where lawmakers are not familiar with, and ultimately not interested in, the realities of
the majority, let alone the reality of excluded and marginalized groups. This
problem is made more acute due to the fact that citizenship in contemporary democracies inherited not just codification from Rome; according to
John Pocock (1995), it was also during the Roman Empire that citizenship
was forever transformed into a legal principle, thus losing its original Greek
political content. Under such circumstances, existing legal frameworks can
easily serve as tokens for substantial change, given that one of the central,
and most consequential, places of exclusion in highly divided societies is the
exclusion from the judiciary. As James Holston and Teresa Caldeira (1998)
have demonstrated for Brazil, the poor and excluded simply do not have
access to the court system, while inclusion is constituted and defined by just
this access. These authors write that “The civil component of citizenship
remains impaired as citizens suffer systematic violations of their rights. In
such uncivil democracies, violence, injustice, and impunity are the norms”
(in Agüero and Stark 1998: 263).
In Colombia, as elsewhere in the region, access to the courts has
remained a privilege of the few. Once new laws are created, political elites
can then retreat without being accused of not acting on behalf of the poor
and excluded. The law, under such circumstances, has become a toothless
scapegoat, replacing political action for change.5
Finally, overcoming persistent social forces aimed at reproducing the
privilege of some by perpetuating the exclusion of others takes more than
altering a law, or even a constitution. Racism, especially in societies that
are officially colorblind and raceless, is a practice that easily escapes rigid
legal frameworks, as it operates in gray zones of legality, structuring people’s
lives and the outlook one group has towards another (Wade 2005). None
of these practices and the values associated with them can be eliminated by
legal decree alone.
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In this chapter, then, I discuss these three themes one after the other
by applying them to the case of Colombia and the specific situation of
the Colombian Pacific Coast, home of a predominantly Afro-Colombian
population. Colombia, and its Pacific rim in particular, thus present a
demonstrative case that allows one to discern and describe the causal mechanisms at work with exceptional clarity. As such, Colombia represents a
typical scenario, and understanding Colombia promises to shed light on
other cases that present similar conditions for the independent variables
at work here—namely, weak states, postcolonial legal frameworks, and
ingrained racist practices in everyday interactions. To properly situate these
approaches, I will begin with a short theory discussion of the works of Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser.

Stuck between Facts and Norms

Jürgen Habermas’s most significant contribution to contemporary democratic theory is his elaboration of a utopian model of democratic legitimacy,
based on deliberate public consent and his grounding of morals and
legal frameworks in democratic, rational communication. Distinguishing
between lifeworld and system, Habermas finds that capitalism and the state
exert control over citizens. Civil society, on the other hand, offers the possibility for free and uncoerced communication—thus making it the place par
excellence for the renewal of democratic legitimacy. Writing in the Enlightenment tradition, Habermas takes on Max Weber’s pessimistic critique of
modernity and points to the positive and universalistic dimension of reasonable argumentation as a way out of Weber’s inevitable “iron cage.” In his
vision, any mutually binding rule must be based on the agreement of all the
potentially affected. Habermas does not argue that civil society or the public
sphere have ever come close to this ideal. Instead, his Theory of Communicative Action explains what a democratic civil society and a democratic public
sphere should look like, and what they can accomplish.
With regard to legal frameworks, Habermas (1998) argues that “the
de facto validity of legal norms is determined by the degree to which such
norms are acted on or implemented, and thus by the extent to which one
can actually expect the addressees to accept them” (Habermas 1998: 30).
In his 1998 book Between Facts and Norms, Habermas thus extends his
work on democratic communication to the genesis of laws. Without engaging in some of the controversial discussions about the difference between
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legal language and common language (Abad I Ninet and Monserrat Molas
2009), Habermas’s work still provides a useful framework for not only analyzing the difference, or gap, between legal norms and everyday facts; it also
points out how to potentially bridge this gap. Concretely, Habermas offers a
vision of how laws ought to emerge in democratic societies, namely, as institutionalized norms that have been created by democratic discourse. This
discourse must be inclusive and follow democratic principles—and as such,
as argued above, it can best happen in diverse public spheres or in different
associations that then together provide foci of democratic rationality, able to
spread and disseminate democratic norms and values. Democratic laws, to
put it bluntly, must emerge from below and should not be imposed on the
people from above by elites.
Another helpful theorist able to advance this discussion is Nancy Fraser.
Fraser (1998) has shown that contemporary injustices are rooted in a lack
of recognition and a lack of economic distribution, where both mechanisms
reinforce each other, but have distinguishable causes and results. Although
economic inequality results in the stigmatization of the poor, Fraser argues
that this stigmatization is not the cause of their poverty. Lack of recognition,
on the contrary, expressed as cultural domination and racialized and gendered oppression, is a cause of injustice that persists even when economic
equality is achieved. The recognition of the different causes of inequality
brings Fraser to distinguish between different strategies to overcome them,
as one strategy cannot address the different causes of oppression.
Fraser points at capitalism as the cause of economic inequality and
socialization into fixed models of gendered and racialized identities as the
root of cultural oppression. She finds that changing the causes behind these
inequalities requires the radical deconstruction of “traditional” identities.
The utopia of a radical deconstruction of traditional identities with fixed
roles that ultimately deny change and learning brings Fraser close to the
Habermasean project of the reasonable and democratic discussion about
norms and rules involving all those potentially affected by a law. Such a
nonauthoritarian defining of rules has been wrongly accused of being universalistic (e.g., by Fraser herself and Iris Marion Young [1990]). To the
contrary, as a careful reading of the Theory of Communicative Action and
Between Facts and Norms shows, Habermas argues that any group of people have to decide discursively what norms they accept for them. Similar to
Fraser’s notion of deconstructing traditional identities, Habermas’s communicative action (similar to Popper’s writing on the open society) provides for
a theory of tentative and relativistic definition of democratically legitimated
laws cum social norms.
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Fraser (1998) has also pointed to the shortcomings of Habermas’s work.
According to her, instead of one dominant public sphere, we must rather
think of several concurrent public spheres. Furthermore, instead of Habermas’s focus on consent, Fraser points to the inherent conflict within each
public sphere and between one another. Civil society, under such a light, is
a sphere where structural inequalities are played out. However, even bearing
this critique in mind, civil societies and public spheres remain the central
places bearing the potential to initiate struggles for justice and consolidate
new norms and laws. Civil societies and public spheres, after all, bear the
potential for freedom from control and coercion, as well as the possibility
of a collective and discursive deconstruction of inequalities that have sedimented in our lifeworlds. Reified structural inequalities have a tendency to
become “normalized,” which refers to their perception as being “normal,”
“unproblematic,” and “natural.” As such, they easily escape scrutiny and
become institutionalized mechanisms of understanding and making sense
out of the world.
This debate points to the need for active public participation, and
encompassing and inclusive public discourses leading eventually into a
gradual solidification and institutionalization, thus becoming law. In this
view, which is indebted to Emile Durkheim, laws are institutionalized
traditions. They are democratic if and when all those sectors of society living under the law have had an opportunity in the formative phase of the
law, by participating in the discourse that produced a widely accepted and
hence legitimized common sense and a practice that is reflective of this
common sense.
Hence, Habermas and Fraser leave us with an analytical framework that
allows us to assess and judge the legitimacy of laws, as well as the problems arising when laws do not reflect social realities. Applied to the case
of Colombia, it quickly becomes clear that one of the main problems with
the new legal frameworks created in 1991 and thereafter is rooted in a lack
of popular involvement in the process of their emergence—this, I argue,
despite the constituent assembly held in 1991 that drafted the new constitution. To use a somewhat exaggerated language, this chapter argues that the
new Colombian constitution did not really emerge from below, despite the
constituent assembly, because important sectors of the population, such as
Afro-Colombians, did not participate.
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Law and Reality in Latin America and Colombia

Colombia, just like the rest of Latin America, firmly stands in a Roman legal
tradition and adopted the Napoleonic Civil Code as the base for organizing civil, commercial, and penal law. For Francisco Moreno, this means
that “The acceptance of Roman law and its implicit philosophical bases
determined the direction of Spanish political thought and institutional
development. The idealism and universalism which had found judicial and
political expression in the Ius Honorarium, Ius Naturale, and Ius Gentium
became an integral part of the Spanish way of thinking” (Moreno 1969: 4).
Moreno further explains that
Law was for the Romans, above everything else, a moral interpretation of life—
an effort to define those ethical goals that the political community should strive
to attain. The works of Cicero, Seneca, and the later Roman lawyers suggest
examples of this interpretation of the legal function. Law became an attempt,
based upon abstract ethical reasoning, to determine how people ought to
behave. (Moreno 1969: 7)

It is this tradition that to this day determines the outlook on laws in the
Latin world. Under this tradition, laws do not reflect reality as it is—they
rather represent how the social world should be ordered. In colonial contexts,
this tradition takes on yet another, complicating aspect, as it raises the question of who it is that “imagines” the social order of a country in such a way.
As we have argued elsewhere,
Latin America . . . inherited a tradition of code law rooted in the legal practices
of the Roman Empire and spread across the globe by Spanish and Portuguese
colonizers, which is deeply marked by legal idealism. Legal idealism characterizes a system where laws are created and codified by elites, who take little
interest and are indeed unfamiliar with the reality of the majority. Under such
circumstances, legal codes do not necessarily articulate the consolidated practices and norms of “the people.” Rather, they represent the definition how a
society ought to organize according to societal elites; and they thus contain an
inherent paternalistic and antidemocratic trait of elite-tutelage. (Nef and Reiter
2009: 43f )

In the case of Colombia, the answer to this question was clear before
1991, as the previous constitution was enacted in 1886 and thus firmly
represented the imaginary and legal cunning of the country’s Europhile
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elite. Explains Lynch: “Once the codification movement did take hold in
the 1850’s, it was still isolated from the realities of Colombian life. . . . It
was enacted with little or no debate even though it was based on a Spanish Code of 1829 drafted for a very different social and economic context”
(Lynch 1981: 31). Lynch further finds that “This isolation of the codification movement is another example of the tendency to import European
political and legal forms in an effort to pattern the formal character of the
Colombian state after the European metropolis” (Lynch 1981: 32).
According to Robert Means, “A certain degree of isolation is a natural
part of codification in the civilian tradition because of the relative autonomy
of that tradition’s intellectual structure. But the disparity in development
between Colombia and even relatively under-developed European countries like Spain magnified the isolation in two ways. The first concerned the
number of persons for whom the code had any relevance. . . . The second
concerned the proportion of the new code that was relevant to anyone”
(Means 1973: 22f ).
This legal tradition continued to influence the ways legal frameworks
developed all the way into the twenty-first century. During the early twentieth century, according to Lynch, “the dominant trend in the legal order
remain[ed] the continuation of the codification process. New codes were
enacted to facilitate the expansion of private corporations and, more recently,
to increase government control over the use of corporate capital” (Lynch
1981: 33). During the 1960s, finally, the Colombian state reformed several
of its legal codes, giving more power to the executive (Lynch 1981: 34).
In general, Colombia, just like the rest of Latin America, confronts a
situation where the law stands in isolation, or even in opposition, to reality.
According to one analyst, “The typical problem of the ‘peripheral modernity’ in regard to the allopoiesis of law amounts to the weakness, irrelevance
as well as the absence of the constitution as a structural coupling of politics
and law, a mechanism that makes a legal solution of the self-reference problem of the legal system possible. The political takes precedence over the legal
so that one can hardly speak of operative autonomy or functional differentiation of both systems” (Neves 2001: 260). The same author, who is a legal
scholar specializing in Latin American legal traditions and philosophy, concludes his diagnosis of contemporary constitutionality in the region thus:
“There is a scandalous divergence between the constitutional model based
on democratic principles and rule of law, on the one hand, and political and
legal practice, on the other hand” (Neves 2001: 260).
In the case of Colombia, with the expansion of executive power came
the growth of clientelism. According to Lynch, “The most important trend
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in the political sphere has been the increase in government planning and the
use of regulatory law to control the economy. At the close of the nineteenth
century, the government had become a caretaker state primarily concerned
with maintaining order and enforcing a set of rules designed to facilitate
private economic agreements. The two major parties competed for control
over the public bureaucracy as a source for jobs, money, and status. The
party in power used the public treasury to reward its faithful with jobs and
manipulated the capital investment of government funds to their advantage” (Lynch 1981: 35f ).
Clientelism is alive and well in Colombia, as Agudelo (2002) has
recently demonstrated. According to Agudelo, after 1988, when mayors started to be elected directly, the system of “a vote for a favor” grew.
Explains Agudelo: “Now that the population had a much more direct
mechanism to approach a politician in the midst of their great needs for
services and employment, the interchange of votes for tangible material
benefits accelerated” (Agudelo 2002: 178). The question then is: how
much of a break does the new constitution of 1991 represent? The very
procedure that produced this new constitution is suggestive. The constituent assembly came together in February 1991 and after five months
of deliberation produced the new constitution, which became effective
in July of that same year. The population elected seventy delegates to the
assembly. In addition, and in order to seal the peace agreement with different armed forces, four delegates of previous guerilla movements also
participated in this process, although without the right to vote on the final
draft. However, the different factions of the until-then very loosely organized Colombian Black Power movement were unable to overcome their
internal divisions and settle on one candidate to represent their interests
in the assembly (Agudelo 2002: 182). An indigenous leader (Francisco
Rojas) represented the interests of the black community, raising this issue
on the last day of the meeting.
However, even if the Black Power movement had been able to be more
present in this process, the outcome, I suspect, would not have been much
different. This can be seen when comparing the Colombian case to other,
similar processes in the region. In Brazil, for example, even though popular
segments participated in the drafting of the 1988 constitution, popular participation did not bring the law closer to reality. If anything, some elements
of the 1988 constitution are even more utopian, leading Roberto Campos
to the conclusion that “The Constitution of 1988 promised us a Swedish
social security with Mozambican resources” (Revista Veja, October 8, 2008,
my translation).
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Despite the polemic tone of this statement, made by a right-wing
economist and politician, the problem he points out is very real. Social
inequality, after all, cannot be legislated away, especially when mechanisms
and resources able to actually bring such a desired new reality about do
not accompany the new legal frameworks. It is thus not surprising that the
anything-but-right-wing Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez reaches
a verdict about the relation between law and reality in Colombia similar to
the one voiced by Campos in and on Brazil. Says Márquez: “I believe that
we are acting, thinking, conceiving and trying to go on making not a real
country, but one of paper. The Constitution, the laws . . . everything in
Colombia is magnificent, everything on paper. It has no connection with
reality” (quoted in Pearce 1990: 11).
The Colombian constituent assembly, as well as the ones in Brazil and
other Latin American countries that have recently enacted new constitutions
(such as Bolivia and Ecuador) thus all followed the French revolutionary
model by focusing on changing legal frameworks in order to overcome
deep-seated political and social problems. Doing so, they attempted, in the
words of Moreno, to “legislate problems out of existence” (Moreno 1969: 9)
without being able to establish, let alone guarantee, the necessary enforcement mechanisms that could actually bring about these realities and bridge
the gap between legal normativity and social reality—or facticity, in the
words of Habermas.
Such laws do provide political opportunities (Tarrow 1994) for historically marginalized populations to organize and mobilize—a phenomenon
we have been able to witness amply, as the new legal frameworks did indeed
lead to increased levels of black and indigenous contentious organizing, and
even to the emergence of new leadership among this segment of Colombian
society. However, the same is true for the historically dominant segments
of Colombian society. To them, the new constitution and Law 70 also provided ample political opportunities.
By passing beautiful laws and signing international conventions that are
then either not enforced, or actively violated, the Colombian government is
able to garner international legitimacy and thus substitute it for democratic
internal legitimacy. The structural problems of this country—elite domination and concentration of landownership—have not been addressed and
remain in place. The legalization of the political aspects of citizenship in a
world where access to the law is a privilege of the few means that traditional,
conservative political and economic elites have not much to fear from an
independent judiciary, because they know that the poor have no access to
the law so that they can actually make it work for them. There are very few
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lawsuits brought forward by historically excluded groups—and even fewer
lawsuits won. Where people and groups pressure the government to enforce
the law, they are intimidated and their lives are threatened by the executive
arm of the elites—the paramilitary groups—as in the case of the current
president of the Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians, afrodes, whose
life has been threatened several times since she started advocating for the
fulfillment of the human rights anchored in the Colombian constitution.
Instead of political power, Afro-Colombians now have laws like Law 70,
but they do not find much support to actually enforce it, as both the executive and legislative branches of government remain under firm elite control
and are opposed to changing the status quo. Colombian citizenship has thus
become even more legalized and less political.6 Effective citizenship in such
a system critically depends on access to the legal system—“the right to sue
and be sued,” according to Pocock. This right, however, is distributed very
unequally in Colombia, as elsewhere in the region, where access to the legal
system has remained an elite privilege. Castoriadis’s words come to mind:
“The ‘executive’ power does not execute anything; it decides and governs. It
is bailiffs and secretaries who ‘execute.’ The ‘executive’ power is in reality the
governmental power; it makes decisions that are predetermined by no law.
It does not ‘apply’ the law; it acts within the framework of the laws, which
is something else entirely. Its decisions are, in the major cases, discretionary
and without remedy” (Castoriadis 1990: 214f ).
The missing element in Afro-Colombian empowerment is the political.
Because of their political weakness, Afro-Colombians pose no real threat
to the interests of traditional elites, who firmly control the executive and
legislative branches of government—and have been able to use the independence of the judiciary in their own favor. Wherever Afro-Colombians have
challenged their exclusion from the political, then traditional elites, who
control not only the government but also the state and the very definition
of what “political” means and who has legitimate access to this realm, have
struck back violently in order to uphold the system. The effects of the political weakness of Afro-Colombians are made worse by the relative weakness
of the Colombian state—an argument that requires some further scrutiny.

What Is a Weak State?

Once such a new legal framework is created, the inevitable question
becomes: what is done for this law to become reality? Colombia’s state has
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historically been too weak to even fulfill the minimum requirements that
give states their very definition, namely, the control of violence in a territory. Several nonstate actors, mostly guerilla movements, have long and
successfully disputed control over several parts of the Colombian territory.
With the proposal of the Plan Colombia by President Pastrana in 1998, and
the significant financial support received from the United States with its
advent, the Colombian state was able to significantly strengthen the executive branch of the state, together with the military. However, the very strong
military bias of this support has led not to an equal strengthening of the
Colombian state, but to a one-sided growth of the military and the executive branch of government. Strengthening the law-enforcement and military
capacity without strengthening the legislative and judicial components of
the Colombian state has done nothing and maybe even contributed to a
further erosion of the legitimacy of the Colombian state. A strong state,
as Hillel and vom Hau (2008) have recently argued, cannot be reduced to
the power of the executive or the military. We know at least since the work
of Max Weber’s Economy and Society, first published in the 1920s, that for
government to work successfully it needs to rely on the willing compliance of the citizenry. Reinhard Bendix, who followed Weber’s analysis while
examining changing social orders and how they relate to nation-building
and citizenship (Bendix 1969), has thus argued that “While governments
vary greatly with regard to the subordination they demand and the rights
they acknowledge, the term ‘political community’ may be applied wherever
the relations between rulers and ruled involve shared understandings concerning this exchange and hence are based in some measure on agreement”
(Bendix 1969: 23). Bendix has summed up this insight by stating that “Ultimately, it is a question of ‘good will’ whether the laws and regulations of
political authority are implemented effectively by the officials and sustained
by public compliance and initiative” (Bendix 1969: 23).
In short, and following both Weber and Bendix, it becomes clear that
“effective authority thus depends upon cumulative, individual acts of compliance or confidence” (Bendix 1969: 24). This argument receives much
empirical support from the experience of the successful city government of
the Colombian capital, Bogotá, under the mayor Antanus Mockus (January 2001 to December 2003). As Mockus (2009) explains, it was through
instilling in the population a sense of admiration for the law coupled with
a fear of legal sanction, together with the establishment and dissemination
of moral codes of conduct and the creation of a social environment of social
trust and control, that the city of Bogotá was able to successfully combat the
then-rampant crime, disregard for the law, and general disregard of anything
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relating to the government and public life. By focusing on legal norms,
moral norms, and social norms, the Mockus administration was able to
significantly reduce homicide rates from a peak in 1992 of 80 homicides
per 100,000 inhabitants in the city of Bogotá to 23 per 100,000 in 2004
(Mockus 2009: 143). Due to increased voluntary compliance with traffic
regulations, Bogotá also experienced a reduction of deaths in traffic accidents, which went down from some 24 per 100,000 during the 1990s to 8.6
in 2003 (Mockus 2009: 145).
In general, however, the Colombian state has not made the kinds of
investments in citizen trust and voluntary compliance that Mockus initiated in Bogotá in 2001. To the contrary, the widespread sentiment among
Colombians towards government is one of well-founded distrust, which
then produces a pattern of seeking to replace the logic of the public with
the private logic of personal dependence. As Brazilian anthropologist
Roberto da Matta (1987 has explained, where the state is not trusted, people end up betting on personal-trust relationships, which then leads into
systems of patrons and clients—the proverbial clientelism. Even though
da Matta writes about Brazil, his analysis equally applies to other Latin
American countries that have inherited Iberian legal traditions and associated behavioral codes. Da Matta explains how for most Brazilians, the very
notion of the state and the law it represents implies something negative. He
quotes a popular Brazilian proverb that says, “For my friends, everything;
for my enemies, the law!” (da Matta 1987: 319). Furthermore, da Matta
finds in an empirical study among Rio de Janeiro residents that to most,
following the law is considered a stupid thing to do. Indeed, most people
interviewed by da Matta considered those obeying the law idiots (da Matta
1987: 318). The general point that da Matta makes is that being a citizen
is a social role that not only needs to be learned, but also oftentimes holds
negative connotations—at least among the Rio de Janeiro inhabitants he
interviewed during the late 1980s. Da Matta comes to the conclusion that
“Citizenship as a social role is not experienced in this manner in daily life.
In effect, the word ‘citizen’ is always used in negative situations in Brazil
to demarcate the position of someone who is at a disadvantage or inferior”
(da Matta 1987: 317).
It is this negative association with rules, laws, and being a citizen in
general that Antanus Mockus sought to change while serving as mayor in
Bogotá. The Colombian state is thus weak not only because it lacks resources
and capabilities; it is weak because its citizens do not have enough trust in its
functioning to voluntarily comply with the existing laws and regulations. A
weak bond exists between the state and its citizens—something that should
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not surprise anybody aware of a history of elitism and corruption that has
long defined the Colombian government. In Colombia, this situation is
worsened by its history of elite pacts, known as the “National Front,” which
secured power to the two predominant parties for decades, blocking the
access of popular interests to the state apparatus. Where states are controlled
by elites, and citizens feel that the state is not truly theirs, alienation and lack
of compliance are inevitable.
Furthermore, the weak Colombian state also lacks autonomy from
societal elites—so that social hierarchies spill over into the political realm
and transform the state into an instrument of societal elites. In Colombia,
traditional elites have had such a firm grip on the state that oppositional
groups were pushed into illegality, thus forming guerilla movements. As
a result, Colombians are confronted with strong elites, able to control
the state apparatus and use it in their own interest; a weak bond between
the state and its citizens, thus leading to reluctant voluntary compliance;
and—in the case of Afro-Colombians—a social group that is unable to
garner enough political power to oppose the hegemonic societal forces that
control the Colombian state.
Under such conditions, crafting new, beautiful laws becomes just
another superficial state maneuver with little or no real consequence. To
make matters worse, a history of at times camouflaged racist practices has
further weakened the bond between citizens and the Colombian state. It has
also produced a social reality, or fact of extremely unequal lives in Colombia, keeping Afro-Colombians and indigenous people at the very bottom
of social, economic, and political hierarchies. The Colombian way of racial
exclusion thus deserves some further scrutiny.

Racism in a Deracialized Society

As I have argued above, the final factor impeding substantial positive
changes for the black community living in the Colombian Pacific coast
is the prevalence of discriminatory practices, or simply “racism.” Racism
in a formally and officially raceless society takes on a particular form that
warrants more detailed explanation. Colombia has only recently, and only
formally, admitted to its multicultural population, but such an admission
is a small step towards actually acting on behalf of historically excluded
groups. For most of its history, Colombian elites have fought to suppress
their own native and African populations in an effort to wipe them out of
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collective imageries by making them invisible (Friedemann 1984). This
effort goes back to the very beginning of independent Colombia as the
declaration of independence also proclaimed de jure equality of all citizens.
De jure equality, however, did not translate into de facto equality, and slavery remained legal until 1851. After independence, the predominant way
to “deal” with the black and indigenous populations of Latin America was
by constructing and disseminating the myth of racial democracy, which
allowed elites to block the formation of racially based associations that
could potentially formulate group-specific grievances. Marixa Lasso (2007)
shows how the first two decades of independence were crucial for the construction of this myth, and how at the end of the successful construction
and dissemination of the myth, and by linking it to patriotism, “the explicit
expression of racial grievances became a mark of unpatriotic divisiveness”
(Lasso 2007: 13). Because of its relevance, I will take a closer look at this
symbolic construction of racial democracy in Colombia.
Proposing—or “imagining,” in the words of Benedict Anderson
(2006)—the myth of racial democracy provided Latin American elites with
a powerful way to escape the racial determinism that dominated Western
intellectual circles during the early nineteenth century (Skidmore 1993).
According to Anderson, “It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson
2006: 7). Similar to the passing of laws that do not entail real change in
the 1990s, proposing a way to think of and represent the nation as a community of equals was a way to block the de facto formation of political
cleavages able to press for real change in the early eighteen hundreds. This
strategy offered the additional advantage that it allowed Latin American
elites to escape a racial determinism that implicated them vis-à-vis their
North American and European models. As Nancy Stepan explains, “To a
large extent the educated classes of Latin America shared the misgivings of
the Europeans. They wished to be white and feared they were not” (Stepan
1991: 45). White immigration and whitening became the two tools of Latin
American elites everywhere to achieve the kind of modernity that they knew
of—one that was European and white. In Colombia, as Lasso shows, “in
the early decades of the nineteenth century, the newly independent Spanish
American countries decreed racial equality among free men and constructed
powerful nationalist notions that linked racial harmony and equality to
national identity” (Lasso 2007: 34).
During the years of struggle for independence, Colombian elites
needed Afro-Colombians in order to gain numerical strength during the
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independence negotiations in Cadiz, and then to fight back the Spanish
colonizers—yet they also feared the Afro-Colombians’ upward mobility, and
the threat to white privilege that such mobility implied. Instead of offering
real political and economic change, which would have meant sharing some
of the very tangible benefits that their status secured them, Colombian elites
offered de jure equality—as early as in the first constitution of Colombia,
ratified in the newly independent Cartagena, then an independent republic
(Muñera 2008). “The 1812 Constitution eliminated legal color distinctions; guaranteed suffrage to all free men but vagrants and servants; and,
although it did not abolish slavery, outlawed the slave trade. In addition,
pardos of modest origin became members of the constitutional assembly,
the war council, and the parliament” (Lasso 2007: 78).
However, after using the black masses for political support, and to justify
splitting from “despotic Spain” in the name of liberty, Creole elites feared
losing control over those masses and gradually grew afraid of nonwhite
political participation. Creole elites struggling to maintain control after
1812 invoked fears of a new Haiti and a race war, which ultimately led to
the expulsion of black republicans from the Cartagena congress. Once AfroCartageneros had fulfilled their political function, white Creoles initiated
a process of gradually marginalizing them from the collective memory by
stressing white Creole heroism and denying black participation. For Lasso,
“Creole patriotic history thus made raucous bandits of Afro-Colombian
patriots” (Lasso, 2007: 86).
This new framing associated lower-class participation with disorder.
When Spain again became a threat, and while Creole elites again had to call
on black military participation, Cartagena race relations entered a second
phase. As Lasso explains, “By the time the independence struggles were over
[1824], several pardos had become officers—even generals—in the patriot
army. The question now was what role these men would play in the new
republic” (Lasso 2007: 90).
The answer to this question became clear when white elites voiced their
concerns about a “pardocracy” and associated the voicing of racial grievances
with the fear of an impending race war and the potential dawn of another
Haitian Revolution. As Lasso explains, rumors of race war emerged whenever
blacks seemed to threaten white privilege by ascending to powerful positions (Lasso 2007: 138). The invocation of the race-war rhetoric thus served
to block black social mobility, and openly addressing the topics of racial
inequality and racism had dire consequences for the accusers. Lasso finally
explains that “Once they had been declared unnecessary, racial grievances
became dangerous attempts to disrupt public order” (Lasso 2007: 143).
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It appears that whereas in 1812 Cartagena the call of the day was for
“one people, one nation,” in 1991 it was the official recognition of multiculturalism that allowed traditional political elites to defend their entrenched
positions of privilege by invoking and codifying paradise, while perpetuating hell (Wade 2001 and 2005).
In 2005, fourteen years after Colombia became officially multicultural,
the infant mortality rate among Afro-descendants remained almost twice
as high as that of the rest of population: 48.1 percent and 26.9 percent per
1,000 live births respectively. Life expectancy for Afro-Colombians in that
year was 66.4 years, while for the rest of the population it was 72.8 years.
Despite the laws and legal codes passed in 1991 and the following years,
reality for the poor and excluded continues to look anything but bright.
Structural racism has cast such a strong shadow on Afro-Colombians that
even in the Chocó department, progressive forces have not been able to win
political power—even though there are significant community structures,
such as the community umbrella organization Cocomácia, representing
124 consejos comunitarios in the Medio Atrato region, and a supra-umbrella
organization called Foro Solidaridad Chocó, which represents 64 community
umbrella organizations and covers the entire Chocó department. Racism in
Colombia thus has undermined the political power and autonomy of AfroColombians, who have not been able to forge enough group solidarity to
win political control even where they are the absolute majority.
It becomes clear that racism cannot be overcome by legal frameworks
alone. Concrete measures must be taken that actually address the economic
and political positions of nonwhites in racial hierarchies. This is a far cry
from what Colombian political elites have done over the past years.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to demonstrate that by adopting a new constitution
and signing several international agreements on the situation of black and
indigenous people, Colombian elites have been able to address the problems
of racism, violence, exclusion, and displacement vis-à-vis the international
community, thus gaining in legitimacy and securing international support
and continued aid. Upon taking a closer look, however, it appears that those
elites have done what they have always done in the past: they have proclaimed change without providing the means for this change to actually
become a reality. For all those at the bottom of social and racial hierarchies,
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not much has changed in their situations of marginality—only that now
the elite-dominated state has shielded itself from any criticism from below.
Afro-Colombians continue to live in Mozambique, but now under a Swedish constitution—to use the metaphor of Roberto Campos (quotes above).
To explain this, I have highlighted three causal mechanisms—namely, the
weakness of the Colombian state, the legal tradition of Colombia, and the
persistence of racist practices and a racist common sense. The term “weakness” actually stands for more than one phenomenon in that it indicates a
lack of state autonomy, a weak connection between state and citizens, and
finally a lack of state capabilities. All three are relevant here. The tradition of
legal idealism, in turn, is not something that characterizes Colombia alone;
Colombia is but one of many countries that follow this tradition, which
influences how citizens and political elites envision social change. While
it is certainly true that because of Law 70, Afro-Colombians have become
recognized political actors, the whole definition of what counts as political,
and how citizenship is operated changed precisely when these new legal
frameworks became available. In a very similar fashion to the cases already
analyzed, Colombia also provides evidence for the tradeoffs between the
strength of rights and their exclusivity: once some groups claimed access to
the political, thus challenging the traditional divisions of power that pushed
them into the realm of civil society, they were confronted with new strategies
designed to block their access and the effectiveness of their claim-making.
Finally, the engrained practice of racism also characterizes other countries beyond Colombia and has actually been described in more detail for
such countries as Mexico and Brazil. Together, these three composite, and
hence rather complex, causal variables produce the outcome we can readily
observe, namely, that social reality for Afro-Colombians has not changed
significantly despite changed legal frameworks.

Chapter 9

Conclusion
Learning from Exploratory Research

The empirical cases explored above, analyzed under the framework of what they can each tell us about the different aspects and
dimensions and the internal contradictions, or dialectics, of citizenship,
have fleshed out several insights that allow me to summarize some “lessons
learned” in this chapter.

Dialectics

The first insight is about dialectics. So far, thinking about inherent contradictions and unresolved tensions of citizenship has proven fruitful. Not
just because such a way of thinking is inherently dynamic and allows us
to focus on processes rather than stasis. Given that the social world is in
constant flux, such a way of thinking about it promises to produce fruitful
research questions, designs, and hypotheses to be explored and tested. Contrast and comparison is indeed the main way in which we are able to create
hierarchies and value, so that dialectics is not just a way of thinking, but
also appears to have an ontological status, as our efforts to categorize, sort,
order, and finally hierarchize end up reflecting back on the world, structuring it. Any good social science, I am tempted to say, needs to be dialectical
to some extent and focus not only on the relationship between structure
and agency, but also the relationship between form and content. When it
comes to social hierarchies, forms become contents. Contradictions are an
integral part of social reality, and we should not, as social scientists, try to
explain them away in our quest for patterns, regularities, and parsimony.
151
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Instead, social-science analysis should focus directly on the nodes and breaking points where contradictions are manifested. Those places tend to be the
most revealing and telling, and an analysis of those crucial cases promises to
shed light on much more than the case analyzed. Only dynamic historical
models about reality can capture this phenomenon.

Citizenship Dialectics

Citizenship, wherever and whenever one looks, has borne inherent contradictions. By providing rights, it has denied them to others—either
excluding them altogether, or making them second-class citizens. As the
analysis of ancient Athens shows, this is not a phenomenon caused by capitalism. Instead, it seems rooted in the very human strife for distinction and
privilege, which uses whatever capital it has to its advantage: financial and
symbolic. Money and power are thus put in play not against, but with—
and to strengthen—the effectiveness of other capitals: social, cultural, and
racial. In all of this, whiteness is a formidable symbolic capital—even in
those places where it does not exist as a phenotype. African and Indian
elites still seek to produce and justify their privileges with reference to
proximity to whiteness, Europeanness, or the other derivates that contain
and transport the same values, such as liberalism, progress, or civilizational
advance. As we have also seen in the chapter on Athenian democracy, it was
once believed that it is the proper task of politics to find ways to neutralize and counterbalance the inherent and apparently very “natural” human
tendency to strive for privilege.
When thinking about citizenship, one is thus well advised to think
about its inherent contradictions—even more so if one seeks to not just
think about, but analyze citizenship. When doing so, one should always
remember that “citizenship” is but a word and a category—and that the
realities it represents are complicated, multifaceted, entangled, and disorderly in the extreme. Our theorizing and analyzing can only shed light on
very limited aspects of this always-changing reality—but in doing so in a
structured way, we can make better sense of reality and discern better what
causal mechanisms are potentially at work, so that we can avoid some of the
obvious pitfalls and instead strengthen the promising potential of a reality
we constantly reproduce and reshape in our social interactions.
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Exploratory, Inductive
Research in the Social Sciences

This book has also demonstrated, I hope, what exploratory social-science
research can accomplish and under what conditions. As I have explained at
the beginning of this book, pure “discovery” is impossible to us, because as
human beings, we share the cultural frameworks, or lifeworlds, of those we
seek to analyze. We should not pretend otherwise, and instead should be as
honest and transparent as possible about our own situatedness, social place,
and limitation. This, I realize, is much to ask from most “professors”—but
it is the only way to actually produce objective knowledge.
Exploratory research still needs to start from a hypothesis, and from
there expand the researcher’s understanding of all the factors that influence and produce the hypothesized outcome. Research must thus aim at
closing the hermeneutic circle. To do so, a clearly formulated starting position is needed. In this respect, much can be learned from “taking Popper
seriously”—but it also becomes clear that Popper’s high standards are not
suitable for the social sciences. There are not paradigms and there never will
be, as the social world is one of constant change, constituted by meaningful
social interaction that requires constant interpretation to reach even partial understanding. Thus we operate one level below Popper’s high ground,
and on that level induction is not only possible, but plausible and desirable. What we should aim for, then, is structured, self-aware, self-critical,
and self-conscious anticipation, which is followed by testing for plausibility,
illustration, and exemplification.
It is in this sense that the cases presented above do not constitute a comparative case study, or an attempt to confirm a hypothesis through a most-similar
case study. I do not want to argue here that such a thing is impossible. To the
contrary, as the excellent work of such scholars as John Gerring (2007) and
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) has recently demonstrated,
such an endeavor is possible and indeed very promising.
Exploratory research, in contrast, uses cases to demonstrate the usefulness of a previously formulated model. It then proceeds by applying this
model in such a way as to produce as much insight into a given case as
possible. Hence, it does not compare cases, but rather explores each one
of them to the maximum. The rationale for case selection accordingly is
one of choosing the most telling or richest cases—that is, cases where the
causal mechanisms previously stipulated are manifested in the clearest way.
This can mean that the causal mechanisms under scrutiny have produced
the strongest impact; but it can also mean that they are easiest to describe
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and hence very illustrative. Exploratory research thus looks for telling, rich,
and illustrative cases in such a way that each case reveals as much as possible about a causal mechanism that has been previously formulated in an
explicit model or theory, and has led to the formulation of clear and precise
hypotheses. I hope that this book has demonstrated the potential of such
an approach.
Beyond the epistemological and methodological insights that this book
has sought to present, the empirical cases discussed in each chapter all have
produced important insight into the dynamics and dialectics of citizenship
in its articulation with democracy, exclusion, inclusion, and such related
social phenomena as the racialization of some groups in this process. In the
remainder of this chapter, I will bring the different insights together, thus
providing for an overview of the factual “contribution” of this book about
the dialectics of citizenship.

Colonial Entanglements

The cases of France and Portugal clearly demonstrate that the same mechanisms described and analyzed for Brazil and Colombia also structure
citizenship elsewhere. France and Portugal stand at the other side of the
colonial entanglement they created. There, too, some citizens are deemed
less worthy than others, and the mechanisms by which this exclusion is produced are very similar to those applied in their former colonies.
From Portugal, we can learn how the colonial legacies produced during
five hundred years of colonial enterprise have started to cast a shadow on
postcolonial Portugal. Portuguese colonizers sought to secure their privileges through the power of the colonial empire they represented, and by
making strategic use of their skin color to justify their privileges as colonizers. After independence, the former colonizers brought this knowledge
of how to secure their privileges back to Portugal, where they were able
to get the state behind their cause. White African immigrants were recognized as “returners” and treated differently from black “immigrants.”
The complacence, and indeed collaboration that the Portuguese state has
shown these returners gives important lessons about state roles, and how
some groups are able to use the state against others. The resulting framing
of nonwhite citizens as foreigners and immigrants also shows the role that
other elites—particularly academic—can play in this process. By changing
its naturalization laws, Portugal indeed joined the European mainstream of
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replacing ius solis principles to regulate citizenship with the now dominant
ius sanguini principle, which regulates rightful belonging by descent.
Portugal thus provides important insights into the intersections of citizenship with nationality, and it sheds light on how both of these ordering
principles were created, reformulated, and changed by state elites in order to
accommodate postcolonial realities.
Similar lessons can be learned from the French case, where states are
equally dominated by traditional elites who seek to defend the interests of
their traditional, majoritarian electorate by not providing any means for
second-class citizens to mobilize, organize, and formulate grievances. In this,
the French case is paradigmatic, providing the blueprint for other European
states and governments. However, France is such a rich case that it is able to
also shed much light on the whole liberal tradition it represents.

Liberalism Dismantled

The French case indeed shows that the liberal tradition, together with the
universalist ideals such a focus on individual rights necessarily entails—all
of which this country so proudly claims for itself—was indeed hollow and
exclusionary from the very beginning. Colonials, women, the poor, and the
educated were never included in this vision of “all men being equal.” The
attitudes against Africans and their descendants provide one of those pivotal
nodes of analysis that tell us much about the general workings, depths, and
breadth of such lofty ideals. In practice, all nonwhites were relegated to the
realm of non-men, thus nonhumans.
There is no clearer place to observe this than in the French colonies.
There, French liberalism revealed its own inherent contradictions. And while
I am aware that it is “unfair” and not “scientifically” sound to apply contemporary criteria of justice to the analysis of times way past, the absolute
negation of nonwhites by European thinkers and statesmen clearly demonstrates how exactly Europe achieved its worldwide supremacy—namely,
by embracing and disseminating the myth of their own, racial, superiority.
That this enterprise was so successful attests to the power and vehemence of
the European war and colonizing machine, as well as to the attractiveness
and fatality of the capitalist market system it brought with it and symbolized. It is fair to say that no corner of this world was left untouched by
it, so that racialized social hierarchies transported, sold, and disseminated
under the mantle of liberalism, universalism, and progress are now present
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everywhere—even if, in their local declinations, finding expression in different local schemes of hierarchizing positionalities.

Law and Reality

Several authors have highlighted the extreme distance separating law from
reality in such countries as Brazil. Such seminal authors as Raymundo Faoro
(2001) and Florestan Fernandes (2006) have long explained to us that in
Brazil, joining the ranks of the legal profession served first and foremost
the purpose of distinguishing oneself by becoming an urban aristocrat—
especially during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Francisco
José Moreno (1969) has argued that Latin America inherited from its motherlands a tradition of legal idealism that found expression in the codification
of idealized norms. The essence of this legal tradition resides in the fact
that law does not reflect social reality, but an ideal type to which society
should aspire. For Moreno (1969), “The lack of correlation between what
ought to be and what is, as reflected in the social and psychological patterns
of the Roman-Spanish tradition, was transferred to the colonies” (Moreno
1969: 12). Furthermore, according to the same author, “The concern with
the abstract concept of justice rather than with the preservation of traditions as sources of law was in Castile, as it was in Rome, a demonstration
of ineffective community integration. A society in which customs can be
legally superseded by abstract intellectual ideas is one in which past collective experiences are not usually looked upon as a source of identification and
security. Such a pattern of legal organization is indicative of a low degree of
social cohesiveness. Adherence to ideal formulas is used as an artificial way
of providing the social unity and identification that the institutions of the
community do not supply” (Moreno 1969: 11).
In the Brazilian case, we can discern a similar pattern to the one discussed by Moreno. The authors of the Brazilian legal codes are those
same “men of letters” that Kirkendall (2002) described when discussing
nineteenth-century elites as “classmates.” Such letrados as Clovis Bevilaqua
(who composed the old Brazilian civil code), Francisco Cavalcanti Pontes
de Miranda, J. X. Carvalho de Mendonça, Orlando Gomes, and Miguel
Reale were Brazilian men of letters par excellence. A jurist, writer, historian,
and philosopher, Bevilaqua was the cofounder of a literary journal and was
a member of the French Academy in his home state of Ceará. Even though
Bevilaqua’s civil code, regulating private and commercial life since 1916, was
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finally replaced by a new civil code in 2003, this new code still represents an
ideal, imagined and then codified by men of letters. It is not the outgrowth
of the historical experience of the Brazilian people—a people who in 2010
still have on average seven years of formal education. It does not reflect the
traditions and habitus of “Brazilians.” The same is true for other legal codes,
such as the penal code and the constitution—even though the constitution
of 1988 for the first time integrated the voice of Brazil’s civil society.
In a widely described process of the constituinte, Brazilian citizens
were able to present amendments to the constitution, as long as they had
gathered 30,000 signatures that were then endorsed by three civil-society
organizations. This participative process produced a total of 122 popular
amendments and led to a constitution that codified many of the popular demands of the time (such as regular salary increases). However, even
though popular segments participated in the drafting of the 1988 constitution, popular participation did not bring the law closer to reality. If
anything, some elements of the 1988 constitution are even more utopian,
leading Roberto Campos to the conclusion that “The Constitution of 1988
promised us a Swedish social security with Mozambican resources” (Revista
Veja, October 8, 2008, my translation).
At the heart of this problem is a Roman-Iberian legal tradition where the
few educated legal specialists commit to writing their version of what Brazilian reality should look like. Given the extreme inequalities characterizing
Brazil and the very deep alienation of its elites from the average Brazilian
people, whose realities they often ignore and sometimes despise, Brazilian law has remained the law of the educated Europhile elites—educated
typically in law schools where not the law, but elitist behavior and attitude
provided the core of their learning (Kirkendall 2002).
Indeed, a Brazilian federal judge has a starting salary of some 20,000
Brazilian Reais per month—compared to the 2010 minimum salary of 510
Reais and an average per capita income of 668 Reais (Instituto Brasileiro
2010). Antonio Carlos Wolkmer (2003), not without revealing his own
entanglements with erudite, Euro-descendant language codes, thus argues
that “Clearly, it is in the mercantilist, absolutist, and counter-reformist Portuguese social formation that we can find, even if remotely, the primary
factors that produced a political-judicial tradition that is individualistic,
erudite, and legalistic. We can thus verify that the imposition and the favoring of the prepositions of a foreign law not only discriminated against a
great part of the native population, it also ignored the customary practices
of an autochthon law, widely practiced in innumerous indigenous and black
slave communities” (Wolkmer 2003: 137, my translation). The same author
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comes to the conclusion that “The structural constitution of this judicial
culture helped produce, on one hand, the practice of the ‘favor,’ the clientelism, nepotism, and cooptation; on the other, it introduced a legality that
is undeniably formalistic, rhetorical, eclectic, and ornamental” (Wolkmer
2003: 138, my translation).
As the case of Colombia has demonstrated, the gap separating law from
reality is caused by several factors, legal traditions being just one of them.
Governments that are dominated by traditional elites, and states not autonomous enough from elite interests and interference probably constitute the
core of this problem. However, Colombia also shows that traditional elite
interests can be sidestepped, even if not ignored. Constituent movements
and assemblies were able to produce new legal frameworks that in part aim
directly at elite interests and cause them much discomfort. And even if the
legalization of the political dimensions of citizenship has created much
alienation, Colombia also shows that the judicial branch can be a strong
ally of social movements and popular demands for justice. The legalization
of citizenship, however, provides a formidable obstacle to closing the gap
between law and reality, because at the end, this gap is just a manifestation
of the much wider gap that tends to separate “the people” from the government and the state.

The Commodification of Citizenship

As we have seen throughout this book, the meaning of citizenship has
greatly changed over time. According to John Pocock (1995), in Rome,
“citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights to certain
things—perhaps possessions, perhaps immunities, perhaps expectations—
available in many kinds and degrees, available or unavailable to many kinds
of persons for many kinds of reasons” (Pocock, in Beiner 1995: 36). It no
longer meant what it had in Athens, where “citizenship is not just a means
to being free; it is the way of being free itself ” (Pocock 1995: 32). Thus it
appears that citizenship lost its muscle when it was extended to a greater
number of people. For Pocock, the legalization of citizenship conducted
under the guidance of the Roman lawyer Gaius (C.E. 130–180) was the
beginning of possessive individualism and the rise of “homo legalis”—a
person whose rights and political power were defined by the amount of
assets he commanded. It was also the beginning of stripping citizenship of
its aspects of obligation and responsibility. The more citizenship came to
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solely mean access to rights and entitlements, the more it became subject to
the logic of competitive markets, where most assets are worth more if others do not possess them. More than the legalization of citizenship, Pocock
suggests that under Gaius we saw the gradual commodification of citizenship, and its transformation into a possession and a good that only the rich
and powerful could afford.
Pocock’s idea forces us to look all the way back to democratic Athens and
the Roman Republic if we want to capture this legalization of politics. It also
suggests two important factors that demand attention in this phenomenon.
First, we need to analyze the question of how politics and social life relate to
the legal system—that is, what the potential consequences of a legalization
of the public and political spheres are. Second, if indeed Gaius was the one
to codify Roman law and in its vein commodify citizenship, then we also
need to consider this process of commodification—when it started, how far
it stretched, and what impact it had and has on the quality of democracy.

Citizenship Commodified

As the analysis of those countries with a colonial past has demonstrated, the
law and the very constitution of most societies are strongly influenced by
its deep social divisions. The formal and official members of its society have
defined how Brazilian and Colombian reality should look, and according to
which principles it should be guided. The informal segments, the historically excluded, the poor, and the functional or entirely illiterate had no role
to play in this idealization. They were instead forced to play by the rules put
in place by the elites—a daunting prospect indeed.
The resulting alienation from democracy should not come as a surprise.
However, to capture the full picture, one element of this explanation is still
missing, namely, the commodification of citizenship per se. Many citizens
are not just excluded economically and culturally and made to obey and live
under laws that do not reflect their own customs and traditions, they also
live in a system where political power to participate and contribute to collective decision making has long been reduced to a set of legal rights. For them,
just as for most people living in contemporary democracies, citizenship is no
longer characterized by active participation, but by the right to participate
through voting and a set of legal protections offered by the constitution.
Citizenship has thus been transformed from its original meaning.
As explained above, the core of Athenian democracy thus was that there
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was no clear division between rulers and ruled. Athenian citizens all participated in the ruling of their polity. To ensure that this setup remained in
place, Athenians devised several means, such as appointment to office by
lot. In addition, several institutions were created for the purpose of avoiding
a concentration of power among state officials. The strong commitment to
avoid a system where something like a ruling class would emerge becomes
evident in many of the formulations Aristotle uses to describe Athenian
democracy—for example, when he explains that since some people are
not superior to others, “it is clear that, for a variety of reasons, all must
share alike in the business of ruling and being ruled by turns” (Aristotle,
1332b12, 1992: 432).
As the chapter on classical citizenship has shown, citizenship in Athens,
rather than being a right, instead focused on responsibilities and duties. This
was also the case in the Tuscan republics. According to Aristotle, “What
effectively distinguishes the citizen proper from all others is his participation in giving judgment and in holding office” (Aristotle 1992: 169). In his
famous speech, Pericles also emphasizes the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship. According to Manville (1997), “One of the most telling parts
of Pericles’ speech concerns the relationship between private and public life.
The two spheres are several times distinguished (37.1–2; 40.2; 42.3), but a
central theme of the orations is the Athenians’ perception of the interdependence between the two and the citizen’s willingness to transcend the purely
personal sphere and involve himself in the matter of the polis.”
Hence, in classical times, as well as in the medieval Italian city republics analyzed in chapter 4, citizenship meant a lot to all those who were
citizens. It made them power holders and rulers of their own destinies, and
it implied and demanded much more than a codified set of rights. Under
such circumstances, alienation is virtually impossible, as there is no clear
separation between those who rule and those who are ruled. Not so, of
course, in Brazil, or any other contemporary democracy where the rulers
have been able to set themselves apart from those they rule in sophisticated
ways. Whenever the possibility to access and enter the spheres of power
become too remote, too unlikely, and when the rulers seem too distant and
too different—alienation is likely to result.
Alienation of the citizenry, or a significant part of it, from the state, the
bureaucracy, the sphere of politics, and the public sphere are at the heart of
widespread discontent with democracy and are ultimately also responsible
for its performance being lacking. If people do not feel invested or part of
the citizenry, if they feel their opinion and voice is not heard or does not
count, if they think that the system is not really “theirs” but controlled by
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elites—then democratic discontent and dysfunction will necessarily result
(Tocqueville 2003; Nef and Reiter 2009).
Two factors seem particularly relevant in explaining political alienation. First, exclusion is at the core of this alienation. The Brazilian case
has allowed us to deconstruct some of the ways in which exclusion works,
providing some insights into the linguistic and formalistic mechanisms used
to secure inclusion by reproducing exclusion. These mechanisms certainly
do not characterize Brazil alone.
Second, the commodification of citizenship has also contributed to a
sense of alienation from politics and the state, where commodification refers
to a slow and gradual transformation of citizenship from a regime of rights
connected to specific responsibilities to a system of rights as entitlements
that are claimable without any obligations, thus taking on an asset character.
As assets, rights as entitlements are partly determined by market mechanisms, hence commodified.1
This sense of alienation was furthered by instituting representation as
the dominant, and indeed hegemonic way that democracies work—both
today, but also back when representation was first instituted, in Rome.
From the beginning, it appears that representation was not a need, but a
tool devised to ensure elite rule, only this time under a democratic disguise.
There is indeed nothing democratic about the idea of representation and
elections per se, as Castoriadis has convincingly argued:
These “elections” themselves constitute an impressive resurrection of the mystery of the Eucharist and the real Presence. Every four or five years, one Sunday
(Thursday in Great Britain {Tuesday in the United States}, where Sundays are
devoted to other mysteries), the collective will is liquefied or fluidified and then
gathered, drop by drop, into sacred/profane vases called ballot boxes [urnes],
and the same evening, by means of a few additional operations, this fluid,
condensed one hundred thousand times, is decanted [transvasé] into the thenceforth transubstantiated spirit of a few hundred elected officials. There is no
philosophy of “representation,” though there is an implicit metaphysics; neither
is there any sociological analysis. Who represents whom, and how does he represent her? Forgotten without any discussion are the critiques of representative
democracy begun with Rousseau, considerably broadened since then, and unreservedly validated by the most superficial observation of contemporary political
facts. Wiped out is the alienation of the sovereignty of those who delegate to
the delegates. Such delegation is supposed to be limited in time. But as soon as
it is instaurated, everything is over. Rousseau was wrong in this regard: the English are not even “free once every five years.” For, throughout those five years,
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the alleged choices about what the electors will be called upon to pronounce
themselves on will have been completely predetermined by what the deputies
will have done between the two elections. These five-year terms obviously have
cumulative effects, and the “choice” of the elector finds itself reduced to such
grandiose dilemmas as François Mitterrand or Jacques Chirac, George Herbert
Walker Bush or Michael Dukakis, Margaret Thatcher or Neil Kinnock, and so
on. And as soon as a small separate political body exists, it cannot help but look
after its own powers and interests and enter into collusion with the other de
facto powers that are set up within society, notably economic ones. (Castoriadis
1990: 211ff )

Indeed, the study of Rome has shown that the shift towards representation by societal elites was not a necessary move, but a political maneuver.
True, ensuring the direct participation of great numbers poses a challenge,
but this challenge is one of logistics and institutional design and could be
solved for better or worse—if the political will to ensure self-rule and autonomy would have carried the day. It did not. Self-rule and autonomy were
instead stolen away from the people, and it appears that the trickery used to
achieve this final goal was not obvious to ordinary people.
Representation is what we all ended up with as a political legacy and
tradition, even if it was contested again and again (e.g., by the medieval burghers and French-Caribbean revolutionaries analyzed in this book, but also
by all those seeking to establish “Räte Republics” after the first World War).
Citizenship was pushed out of the political realm into the legal realm,
thus transforming it from a right to rule, to a right to sue and be sued.
This transformation happened early and went hand in hand with the transformation of direct rule into rule by representation. At the end of this
development stands the situation we know now: ordinary people talk of
the state, government, and even politics from the outside. They are alienated and no longer feel that they are the state and that the government is
truly theirs.
This change is not one of quantity, but of quality, as the very character of
what it means to be a citizen has changed in this transformation. Ever since
this transformation, ordinary people belong to civil society. Liberalism, with
its claim to privacy, only becomes possible once the people have left the
political realm. This diagnosis is opposite to the one offered by Agamben
(1998), who claims that biopolitics have absorbed humans to the point of
total control, whereas in ancient Greece, humans were thought of as political
animals, and zoe was differentiated from bios. From the point of view of state
power and control, this might be true. However, from the point of view of
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citizens and their relationship to states, the opposite seems the case: citizens
gradually lost their belonging to the state and the political realm. Politics has
become an elite business, conducted by specialists. Democracy no longer
is a system where the people rule themselves. In the midst of this change,
people’s lives have become fragmented, and more and more emphasis has
been given to the private realm—the realm of civic organizing, but also the
realm of consumption, entertainment, and distraction. Civic organizing is
only required once genuine political participation is no longer a possibility
and ruling has been handed over to elites. Civic organizing and the kind of
associationalism that Tocqueville heralds is indeed a weak and insufficient
substitute for true political participation and self-rule. The alienation from
the political also seems to find its reflection in the courageous civic activism
of many, but also in the tremendous consumerism so prevalent today. Both
seem motivated by a seeking of meaning, as well as a channeling of creative
energy—all of which were once integrated into political life.
Even the critique that direct democracy seems too time-absorbing and
burdensome appears in a different light when analyzed under the lens of lost
self-rule: where participation is meaningless and overshadowed by powerful
players from government or private business, participation becomes indeed
tiresome and meaningless. This is the lesson from the participative budgeting processes initiated during the mid-eighties in Brazil: only true and
effective participation can keep people involved.
At the very end, I permit myself to venture into the unknown and
to formulate some recommendations. The central one certainly is that to
reinvigorate democracy, citizenship needs to be reinvigorated. To fight
alienation, ordinary people have to participate again—not just as secondary participants, but as central players. Politics has to be reconquered.
Their actions should be guided by such slogans as “We are the state” and
“We are the government.” This goes far beyond the familiar communitarian claims (Sandel 1998), or the substitution of some politicians with “less
professional” others (as the Tea Party movement seems to demand). Citizens must not only share in the political responsibilities of self-rule; they
must be the ones ruling themselves for democracy’s true promise to be realized. Contemporary means of communication offer plenty of possibilities
for making this happen—but against it stand all those who have much to
lose, and hence do not trust: the people. For “the people” themselves, living in such a system would also imply many changes that would certainly
require some time of adaptation and transition, as we now live on top of a
huge pile of ideological garbage that we have accumulated ourselves, and
we have become victims of the life-transforming powers of elite rule. Our
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energies go wasted into mostly meaningless projects of distraction, consumerism, and “civic activism” that ends up frustrating most of us because
it achieves so little vis-à-vis the powers that control politics. A revolutionary step towards self-rule is thus not realistic or even desirable. What needs
to occur is a gradual increase of active citizenship, of taking on responsibilities at the local level over community lives.

Notes
Introduction
1. This diagnosis runs parallel to the currently fashionable analysis of Giorgio
Agamben (1998), who seeks to show how states exercise total power over
its citizens—even their very lives. However, my primary focus is not states,
but citizens, and instead of thinking about the power of states, my questions
start at an earlier level: how and why did states become so autonomous from
citizens?
2.	In this effort, I find myself supported by the call of Uday Singh Mehta (1999)
to focus on the “space in-between.” For Mehta, this space is the one that binds
liberalism and empire tightly together. My own analysis focuses on the pair
citizenship/exclusion, of which liberalism and empire form but one subgroup.
3.	Chapters 5 and 6 grow out of a previously published article called “Framing
Non-Whites and Producing Second-Class Citizens in France and Portugal.”

Chapter 1. The Epistemology and Methodology
of Exploratory Social Science Research:
Crossing Popper with Marcuse
1. This is not to say that all reality is socially constructed, as Searle himself
admits. A realist theory of science does not rule out the existence of institutional facts, as Roy Bhaskar (2008), Andrew Sayer (2010), and Daniel Little
(1998) have amply demonstrated—it only makes claims about the fact that
reality exists independently from our perception.
2. Given this impossibility of pure discovery and induction, the attempts formulated by those authors associated with “grounded theory” (Glaser, Strauss,
Charmaz, among others) seem naive—even after they have responded to
some of the critiques raised in this regard (Bryant and Charmaz 2010). The
same is true for those proposing “iterative research frameworks” (e.g., Srivastava and Hopwood 2009), or even those who have focused on “deviant
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cases,” but failed to explain and specify how exactly a deviant case leads to the
formulation of a new theory (George and Bennett 2005).
3.	Social scientists face a dilemma that sets us apart from natural science.
According to Thomas Kuhn (1996), we are in a state of “pre-paradigmatic”
inquiry, which means that we do not have broadly accepted theories or paradigms that can be explored to exhaustion. Although I disagree with Kuhn’s
assessment, I reach the same conclusion, namely, that 100 percent reliable
knowledge is impossible to achieve in the social sciences. In contrast to Kuhn,
my own assessment rather points to a post-paradigmatic phase—as we already
know, and have known for a long time, what the important questions in
the social sciences are and how to ask them. Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim,
Max Weber, Ferdinand Toennies, Alexis de Tocqueville, among others, have
already asked most of them—and given quite good answers. To argue that
we are in a pre-paradigmatic phase in the social sciences implies that a paradigm is yet to come—which is not only illusionary, but impossible (Jarvie,
in Cohen and Wartofsky 1983). Social life is in constant flux, and fixed laws
will never capture it. Most post-paradigmatic efforts, instead of producing
frameworks that help to further understand and explain the social world,
have instead contributed to creating less clarity and more confusion, some of
which seems self-serving, as many analysts seem to engage in efforts to mystify their analyses and themselves. Many social scientists, instead of putting
the old questions about power, exploitation, domination, and exclusion to
work—which would mainly consist of “working”—seem instead engaged in
efforts of self-promotion by proposing ever more “sophisticated” theoretical
concepts and models that, if possible, bear their own name and become their
brand. In this vanity fair, social scientists only serve their own egos and salaries; they also block an honest and collective effort to analyze the world—a
task that can be done jointly with non-academics if the language of the academics is not designed to exclude, but instead to involve (Feyerabend 2010).
4.	Hence, even in exploratory and inductive inquiry, Karl Popper’s insights
apply; namely, that “From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or
what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These
conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant
statements, so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them” (Popper 2002:
9). Where exploratory research departs from Popper’s approach is in his stark
formulation of the impossibility of induction, which results from his expecting, or demanding, too much from the statements derived from induction.
If, however, we depart from a place where certainty is not what we aim for,
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and if we also admit that paradigms are not what we can reach in the social
sciences, then induction becomes a disciplined and self-reflexive practice of
using common sense, where we anticipate in transparent ways and then seek
to assess the plausibility of the causal connections thus proposed by looking
for empirical information that supports it.
5.	In fairness, it should be noted that exploratory research cannot avoid the
risk of personal bias. However, instead of pretending to conduct “objective”
research able to unveil “universal” patterns, critical and self-reflective exploratory research seeks to lay bare the personal bias of the researcher up front,
thus allowing the reader to consider it. Instead of unveiling universal laws,
such research is also more limited in scope in that it can only reveal what is
accessible to a given researcher at a given time, under the given circumstances
and limitations. As such, it is more objective than the research produced by
all those “playing the God trick” (Haraway 1988).
6. Understanding and explaining the ontological ramifications of dialectics
exceeds not only the space available, but also my training as a political scientist.

Chapter 2. Conceptualizing Citizenship:
Disjunctive, Dual, Divided, Entangled, or What?
1.	As argued, e.g., by Mireille Rosello 2001.
2.	It seems important to explain that my own interest in citizenship does
not take issue with a whole set of arguments about what rights are, and
if social reality can be influenced by such lofty concepts as citizenship
rights or social rights. I am skeptical about the potential of laws to produce
reality, and aware of the pitfalls of legal idealism. Citizenship, here, shall
thus not refer to a set of entitlements of citizens. This book is instead concerned with the quality and the conditionalities that restrict the political,
civil, and social rights of certain individuals and groups within a citizenry.
Stated more precisely, I want to analyze how societal dynamics affect and
condition the quality of citizenship. T. H. Marshall’s essay had a narrower
interest, namely, to analyze the relationship between citizenship and capitalism. He was thus able to see that “The components of a civilized and
cultured life, formerly the monopoly of the few, were brought progressively
within reach of the many, who were encouraged thereby to stretch out
their hands towards those that still eluded their grasp. The diminution of
inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to
the essentials of social welfare” (T. H. Marshall 1992: 37).
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3. The tension between formal rights and actual practice merits a more detailed
treatment, especially in Latin America, where legal idealism is the norm,
which refers to the fact that legal codes do not necessarily reflect reality, but
represent an ideal situation. The writing and codification of these legal codes
has been an elite affair, which raises the question of how much Latin American elites really know, or want to know, about the realities of the majority in
the countries they live in. Considering Latin America’s colonial past, it is not
a far shot to argue that Latin American elites have codified an idealized European reality that is entirely out of sync with the actual reality of the country
in question. See Reiter 2009, chapter 8.
4. This logic hinges on the almost exclusive treatment of citizenship as a set of
rights, thus stripped of its original content, which included obligations and
responsibilities. The history of how citizenship developed from a political
right to participate in the making of the rules by which one abides, to the
notion of certain rights and goods that the state has to provide will be part
of my forthcoming book. John Pocock (in Beiner 2007) has already focused
on this shift from political to legal citizenship that occurred under the late
Roman Republic.
5.	It is worth noting here that this logic also seems to apply to those societies that
have created myths of “Aryanism,” e.g., India or Iran. In both countries, whiteness is highly valued and constantly negotiated, which means that individuals
seek to achieve it by engaging in different strategies. These include biological
elements, such as the very common skin-bleaching, as well as symbolic ones,
manifested in behavioral codes, language, dress, and general habitus.
6.	It also highlights the importance of black republicans, such as FrançoisDominique Toussaint L’Ouverture and Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who fought
for liberté, égalité, and fraternité against the French army sent to the Caribbean to restore slavery.

Chapter 3. Classical Citizenship:
The Political and the Social
1. My focus on the classical democracies of Athens and Rome is not motivated
by any claims that these democracies were the only ones that existed, or any
related claims about the supremacy of the Western tradition over others.
2. There is considerable discussion about what these extra powers were. Rihil
(1995) considers that “the Areopagus was rejecting significant numbers
of magistrates at their dokimasiai and Ephialtes’ reforms sought first and
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foremost to transfer this power to the candidate’s peers” (Rihil 1995: 87).
Sealey (1964) looks instead to the end of the term, arguing that Ephialtes’s
reforms were essentially concerned with the procedures for calling magistrates
to account when they left office, making them vulnerable to accusations of
corruption.
3.	It is important to note the role played by nonstate entities in helping to
determine citizenship qualifications. Lambert’s (1993) work examines this
aspect and he notes, “In practice the phratry played the major role in controlling the major qualification for citizenship, Athenian descent” (Lambert
1993: 49). This was even more the case prior to 508 b.c.e., when the phratries had included all the citizens; in other words, “Those whose names were
lacking in the phratry rolls lacked ipso facto citizenship” (Ferguson 1910:
259). The ten new tribes created by Cleisthenes were intended to challenge
these nonstate groups.
4.	According to Plutarch (1960), Solon “permitted only those [xenoi] to be
made citizens who were permanently exiled [from their home cities] or who
removed to Athens with their entire family to ply a trade. This he did, as we
are told, not so much to drive away other foreigners, as to invite these particular ones to Athens with the assurance of becoming citizens” (Life of Solon
24.2). This is consistent with Manville’s ideas concerning the “usefulness” of
the citizen body to the polis (Manville 1997: 32).
5.	Ostwald (1996) further clarifies that “All citizens are equally ‘privileged’:
the privilege is a privilege only to the extent that slaves and foreigners are
excluded” (Ostwald 1996: 54f ).
6.	Aristocratic cultic associations did not die out, however, but instead took on
new roles and remained integral to Athenian religious and social life for a
considerable period of time (Lambert 1993).

Chapter 4. Medieval European Citizenship:
Christian Rights and Jewish Duties
1.	In 1993, the University of Copenhagen–based Copenhagen Polis Centre,
under Mogens Herman Hansen, initiated a broad research program called
Poleis and City-States, 600–323 b.c.e., which is steadily producing more evidence on the history of city-states around the world. The findings already
produced by this center testify against the assumption that city-states, democratic and nondemocratic ones, only emerged in the Western world.
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Chapter 5. France: Liberalism Unveiled
1.	Quoted from John Thornhill, the Financial Times, November 8, 2005.
2.	E.g., by Etienne Balibar (2004).
3. tns sofres 2007 survey results available online at http://lecran.org/?p=243.
4.	Interview conducted on June 20, 2011.
5.	Interview conducted on June 20, 2011, Rouen.
6.	As Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville had diagnosed already in the 1830s,
when writing about the structural contradictions inherent in democracies, in
Democracy in America.

Chapter 6. The Postcolonial Within:
Portugal, White and European
1.	A search in what is probably the most prestigious academic social-science
journal published in Portugal, Análise Social, revealed that between 2000
and 2009 this journal published twenty articles focusing on migration, but
only one that focuses on ethnic minorities—published in 2005 by Fernando
Luís Machado, Ana Raquel Matias, and Sofia Leal, who analyze the effects of
cultural differences on school performance (Análise Social 40, no. 3 (2005):
695–714. Notable exceptions to this tendency to render minorities invisible
practiced by Portuguese academia include the work of Teresa Fradique, Antonio Contador, Margarida Marques, and Maria Joao Valente Rosa.
2. http://alfa.fct.mctes.pt/estatisticas/global.
3.	A fact highlighted by Marques et al. 2007.
4.	Interview conducted on June 10, 2003, in Lisbon, my translation. The complete quote was printed in Reiter 2009: 409.
5.	ARTIGO 1º (Nacionalidade originária). 1—São Portugueses de origem:
Os filhos de pai português ou mãe portuguesa nascidos em território português ou sob administração portuguesa, ou no estrangeiro se o progenitor
português aí se encontrar ao serviço do Estado Português; b) Os filhos de
pai português ou mãe portuguesa nascidos no estrangeiro se declararem que
querem ser portugueses ou inscreverem o nascimento no registo civil português; c) Os indivíduos nascidos em território português filhos de estrangeiros
que aqui residam habitualmente há, pelo menos, seis anos não estejam ao
serviço do respectivo Estado, se declararem que querem ser portugueses; d)
Os indivíduos nascidos em território português quando não possuam outra
nacionalidade. 2—Presumem-se nascidos em território português ou sob
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administração portuguesa, salvo prova em contrário, os recém-nascidos expostos naqueles territórios.
A new law, passed in July 2007, amends the constitution to the extent
that legal residence of foreigners is regulated through the introduction of a
legal residence card. This new law does not change the definition of citizenship by descent.
6.	Interview conducted on December 6, 2003.
7. Banco de Portugal, “Remittances in the Portuguese Balance of Payments,”
Luxembourg Group on Remittances, June 26–27, 2006, available online:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/bop/2006/luxgrp/pdf/italy.pdf.
8. MPI: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=77.
9. Jornal Publico, January 21, 2009, 11–12.

Chapter 7. Brazil: Experts in Exclusion
1.	Interview conducted in São Luis, June 30, 2008.
2. By presenting these examples, Reis also sheds light on the often-discussed
phenomenon of clientelism. She explains: “Those who, for example, ask desperately for a job have already searched the job market in vain and they do
not see another alternative but to implore for an intervention of the authorities so that they can exercise their right to make a living through work” (Reis
1990: 166).
3. Defined as fifteen years and older with less than four years of schooling.
4.	IBGE, 2008.
5. World Bank Confidential Report No. 40011-BR: Brazil: Knowledge and Innovation for Competitiveness, available online at: http://www.planejamento.gov
.br/secretarias/upload/Arquivos/seain/Conhecimento_Inovacao_Competiti
vidade.pdf.
6. With apologies to my friend, Federal Judge João Batista de Castro Junior,
in the original: “Para penetrar as esferas de poder, cidadãos brasileiros têm
que imitar o ‘habitus’ dos poderosos. Recentemente, iniciou-se no Brasil um
movimento liderado pela associação dos magistrados brasileiros (amb) para
convencer seus associados da necessidade de mudança na linguagem. Nossas
observações preliminares, como participantes deste esforço, levam-nos a um
diagnóstico pessimista dessa iniciativa por constatar que as discussões a este
respeito já começaram desfocadas, o que mostra o grau de alheamento desses
ensaios endógenos de problematização bacharelesca, pois confunde linguagem
com perfil estilístico, esquecendo-se da advertência buffoniana de que ‘le style
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est l’homme même,’ além de ir contra a especialização terminológica—do que
decorrem os chamados tecnoletos—que todo saber técnico-científico deve ter.
Na verdade, a questão tem uma profundidade não apreensível com essa superficialidade: ao longo de sua evolução histórica, a linguagem do bacharelismo
jurídico permaneceu ensimesmada tanto quanto o conhecimento que ela
veicula, negligenciando que ‘la liberdad del lenguaje es libertad histórica, libertad del hombre como ser histórico.’ Sem voltar-se para a própria realidade
social a que teoricamente deveria dirigir-se, esse instrumental linguageiro,
embora atualmente menos pervadido de afetações literárias de gosto duvidoso, permaneceu com ar de esquizoidia social ainda que o beletrismo tenha
perdido substância na formação atual dos bacharéis.”
7.	In the original: “Ministério da Justiça, conselho nacional dos direitos da
criança e do adolescente, ata da septuagésima sétima assembléia ordinária
realizada em 14 de fevereiro de 2001: Às nove horas e quarenta minutos
do dia quatorze de fevereiro de dois mil e um, deu-se início a Septuagésima
Sétima Assembléia Ordinária do Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Criança
e Do Adolescente (conanda), presidida pelo seu Presidente Cláudio Augusto
Vieira da Silva (fundação fe e alegria do brasil). Presentes os Conselheiros
titulares Maria Izabel da Silva (cut); Kênia Augusta Figueiredo (cfess); José
Fernando da Silva (centro de-cultura luiz freire); Rachel Niskier Sanchez (sbp);
Valéria Getúlio de Brito (mndh); Ozantra Ferreira Costa (cecria); Guilbert
Ernesto de Freitas Nobre (ms); Olga Câmara (mj) (parcialmente); Caio Luiz
Davoli Brandão (mp); Euridice Nóbrega Vidigal (mf ) (parcialmente). Presentes também, os conselheiros–governamentais suplentes que assumiram a
titularidade nesta assembléia; Júlio Boaventura Santos Matos (mre); Marilda
Marfan (mec); Eliana Cristina Crisóstomo (mj) (parcialmente); Ivone
Bezerra-de Mello (mte); Clóvis Ubirajara Lacorte (Casa Civil), Registramos
a ausência justificada dos conselheiros do mpas e da Casa Civil. Por motivo
de ausência justificada dos conselheiros titulares—da cnbb e da puc/sp,
foram convocados e estiveram presentes os conselheiros não-governamentais
que assumiram a titularidade nesta assembléia: Olympio de Sá Sotto Maior
(abmp) e Marcos Antonio Paiva-Colares (oab). Presentes também os conselheiros suplentes da sociedade civil Silvio Alberto Valente Soares (abrapia) e
Laura Rosseti (fenasp). Por motive de ausência do conselheiro da Normando
Batista Santos da abong, o conselheiro Silvio Valente da abrapia assumiu a
titulariedade no segundo dia da asembléia. O Presidente abriu os trabalhos
dando as boas vindas a todos, pela participação da primeira assembléia do
novo milênio e em seguida submeteu á pauta à plenária, tendo a mesma sido
aprovada com alteração do item oitavo do segundo dia, transferindo—o para
o iten quarto do primeiro dia. No item Assuntos gerais, foram solicitados o
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agendamento das assembléias do exercício; discussão sobre a Acão Direta de
Inconstitucionalidade dos artigos duzentos e cinqüenta e quatro e duzentos
e cinqüenta e cinco do Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente, proposta pelo
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro—ptb—e participação do conanda no Comitê
de Acompanhamento das Políticas Sociais de Ségurança Pública. Os demais
itens permaneceram inalterados. Prosseguindo, o Presidente propôs alterações
na composição das Comissões Temáticos e Grupos de Trabalhos existentes,
justificando que a referida alteração nao fere o Regimento Interno do Conselho. Informou que as Comissoes aglutinarao os eixos tematicos, passando a
funcionar como segue: 1) Comissão de Articulação—terá como eixo temático
os Conselhos Estaduais, Municipais das Capitais e Conselhos Tutelares; 2)
Comissão de Orçamento e Finanças—tera como eixo temático as medidas,
sócio educativas; 3) Comissão de Políticas Públicas—terá como éixo temático
a Quarta Conferência Nacional; 4) Comissão de Comunicação—as ações
desta Comissão serão desenvolvidas em parceria—com a andi ficando restrita
aos encaminhamentos necessários para em conjunto coma a andi desenvolver
a política de Comunicação: A proposta foi debatida e aprovada por todos.
Em seguida, passou-se a composição dos seus integrantes ficando assim constituída: . . . As Comissões Temáticas se reuniram no período da manhã e
início da tarde para tratarem de assuntos especificos de suas áreas de atuação,
atualização das pendências das assembléias anteriores e elaboração do plano
de ação e de metas para o exercício de dois e um.”
8. The appeal of Sarah Palin in the United States, and also the election of
Barack Obama to the presidency can be explained to a great extent by this
framework—that is, their appeal to groups of citizens who feel underrepresented or not represented, be it youth, in the case of Obama, or patriotic
right-wingers, in the case of Palin.

Chapter 8. Colombia: When Law and Reality Clash
1. The state, however, did not provide the same right to other Afro-Colombian
“ancestral” communities living outside of the Pacific coastal areas.
2.	It was integrated into national legislation by Law 21 of 1991 (Ley 70 de
1993–Decreto 2248 de 1995).
3.	New York, March 7, 1966, ratified in 2004.
4.	Long Term Plan for the Black Population, Afro-Colombians, Palenque y
Raizal: Proposal y Process 2005–2007, National Department of Planning,
2007.
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5.	I am aware that this is a very general statement, and that Law 70 has been
used to challenge the constitutionality of development projects, land invasions, and even state actions—for example, in the notorious Curvaradó and
Jiguamiandó cases of October 2009 (Giupponi 2010). However, the number
of lawsuits brought forward by the Colombian populations against abuse and
violation by the government or private entities is still extremely low if compared to most rich countries. The general inefficiency of the law in upholding
and defending the interests of the general population was confirmed by the
Colombian ombudsman for the Chocó department (Defensor del Pueblo)
in an interview conducted on March 18, 2011, in Quibdó. The fact that
those who actually seek to use the law for human-rights purposes are routinely threatened and killed gives further evidence of the general weakness of
Colombian law as a mechanism to uphold justice.
6.	Even though Law 70 has politicized a whole new group of people, who before
were at the margin both economically and politically, see Oslender 2004.

Chapter 9. Conclusion: Learning
from Exploratory Research
1. This is a case where concrete historical changes impact the way reality has to
be analyzed—in other words, where ontology impacts epistemology. As such,
it points at the interdependence of ontology and epistemology to the extent
that empirical changes, such as the changing character of citizenship, trigger
the application of an analytical framework such as market theory.
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